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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses one of the most important issues in free speech
today: whether a judge may grant a plaintiff an injunction against a 
defendant’s defamation.1 It argues that existing and proposed principles 
of confinement on granting, drafting, and administering an injunction may
overcome an injunction’s risks to the defendant’s freedom of expression.
It concludes that, under limited circumstances, a judge may grant a plaintiff 
an injunction that forbids a defendant from repeating defamation. 
While this Article was in its final stages, I learned about Professor Eugene 
Volokh’s Article, Anti-libel Injunctions and the Criminal Libel Connection.2 
His Article is an important endorsement of this Article’s principal point:
An anti-libel injunction is constitutional.  A judge should be able to grant 
a plaintiff an injunction to forbid the defendant’s proved libel.  The  
Articles come to the same conclusion from different starting places.  This
Article discusses Volokh’s in its footnotes. 
This Article follows the imaginary lawsuit of Baldder v. Lokki to
illustrate its points. Lois Lokki hired electrical contractor, Paul Baldder, 
to install some wiring in her condo.  Mutual rancor corroded their relationship.
Irritated about both the quality of his work and the size of his bill, she
declined to pay the latter. After missing some jewelry from her dresser, she 
began a campaign against him on GripeLex, a community consumer website. 
In addition to attacking his workmanship and charges, she accused him of
being a thief who stole her necklaces. Later Lokki found the jewelry in her 
drawer, but still livid, she has not cleaned up her GripeLex posts. 
1. David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2013). 
2.  Eugene Volokh, Anti-Libel Injunctions and the Criminal Libel Connection, 167
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with the author).
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Baldder sued Lokki for libel in the Lex state court. His demand for 
judgment includes money recovery, compensatory damages, and punitive 
damages, plus an injunction that requires Lokki to remove the libelous 
statements from GripeLex and forbids her from repeating them in any  
form or format. 
Baldder v. Lokki is loosely based on the events in the Virginia Supreme
Court’s short decision in Perez v. Dietz Development, LLC.3  The circuit
judge had granted plaintiff, a remodeling contractor, a preliminary injunction 
that required defendant, a condo dweller, to delete defamatory criticism from 
Yelp.4 The Virginia Supreme Court, after accepting defendant’s petition 
for review, disapproved the trial judge’s take-down preliminary injunction, 
observing that damages were “an adequate remedy at law” for plaintiff.5 
In other words, plaintiff might be able to recover money damages for 
defamation from defendant, but he could not force her to remove her 
defamatory comments from Yelp.6 
Baldder v. Lokki assures Lokki’s substantive tort liability for defamation: a
home-owner defendant’s false accusation that a home-repair contractor is
a thief is a defamatory factual statement, either orally or in writing.7 
Lokki communicated the falsehood to others; this speech was not an isolated
her-face-to-his-face affront. It was factual, not opinion. She intended to 
communicate those facts to Baldder’s potential customers. If believed,
her remarks will lead many readers to direct their home repair projects
elsewhere. If so, Baldder will lose business. The public interest in consumer 
protection is not well served by a disgruntled homeowner’s inaccurate
evaluations. Her charges are not core political speech.
This Article argues and concludes that the barriers to granting a plaintiff
like Baldder an injunction against a defendant’s defamation should be 
lowered or eliminated. This Article unfolds as follows: It introduces two 
anti-injunction doctrines—the prior restraint rule or doctrine and the Maxim,
“Equity will not enjoin defamation.” It summarizes Near v. Minnesota ex
3.  No. 122157, 2012 WL 6761997 (Va. Dec. 28, 2012). 
 4.  Id. at *1; Justin Jouvenal, In Suit over Online Reviews, Neither Side Wins Damages, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2014, at C5. 
 5.  Perez , 2012 WL 6761997, at *1. 
 6.  See id. In early 2014, Perez went to a jury trial of plaintiff’s claim and 
defendant’s counterclaim both for libel.  Jouvenal, supra note 4.  After a five-day trial followed 
by eight hours of deliberations, the jury found defamation on both sides but returned a zero 
verdict for both.  Id. 
 7. 3  DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 534, at 225 (2d ed. 2011). 
617
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rel. Olson,8 wherein the United States Supreme Court added an injunction
to executive licensing as a prior restraint and subordinated the injunction 
to a criminal prosecution or a money judgment.9 
The New York Times Co. v. Sullivan privileges,10 which circumscribe 
many plaintiffs’ defamation actions, are considered, as they must be.  This
Article examines the development of “new defamation” in two state supreme
courts’ decisions. In Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, the California 
court countenanced granting the plaintiff an injunction against the defendant’s
defamation.11 In Kinney v. Barnes, on the other hand, the Texas court rejected
such an injunction.12 
To inquire whether an injunction menaces free speech more than a 
damages judgment, this Article analyzes defamation damages and several
differences between an injunction and a damages judgment. It turns to 
scholars’ arguments against an injunction as a prior restraint and proposed 
reforms; it finds them unconvincing.  A carefully adjudicated and drafted
injunction that specifically forbids defendant’s defamation, it concludes, 
will not imperil free speech values. It commends abolition of the Maxim 
and suspension or qualification of the prior restraint doctrine. 
II. BARRIERS TO AN INJUNCTION: PRIOR RESTRAINT AND 
EQUITY WILL NOT ENJOIN LIBEL 
A plaintiff seeking an injunction that forbids a defendant’s defamation 
must surmount two sturdy barriers.13 The prior restraint doctrine is Baldder’s 
the first barrier. The doctrine applies everywhere in the United States because
the Supreme Court based it on the Constitution.14 This Article will examine 
prior restraint decisions that involve defamation, as seen in Near v. Minnesota
ex rel. Olson,15 the United States Supreme Court’s 1931 granddaddy prior- 
restraint opinion;16 Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen,17 the California
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision that sanctioned an anti-defamation injunction;18 
and the Texas court’s 2014 decision in Kinney v. Barnes that rejected an anti- 
defamation injunction.19 Near, Balboa, and Kinney all involve plaintiffs
8.  283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 9.  See id . at 722–23. 
10.  376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
11.  156 P.3d 339, 341 (Cal. 2007). 
12. 443 S.W.3d 87, 89 (Tex. 2014). 
13. See generally 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 576, at 345. 
14. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738 (2005). 
15.  283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
16. Id. at 699. 
17.  156 P.3d 339 (2007). 
18. Id. at 341. 
19.  443 S.W.3d 87, 89 (Tex. 2014). 
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seeking injunctions against their respective defendant’s defamation, albeit
in different legal settings.
In Near, the public authorities sued Jay Near for defamation under a 
Minnesota public nuisance statute, seeking an injunction.20  In Balboa and 
Kinney, private litigants sued their defendants for the common law tort of
defamation, both seeking an injunction.21 Tory v. Cochran is the United 
States Supreme Court’s most recent venture into defamation.22  That cryptic
decision will receive less attention, however, because plaintiff Johnnie Cochran
died while the appeal was pending and the Supreme Court did not adjudicate 
an injunction against defamation.23 
Baldder’s second obstacle is the Maxim that “Equity will not enjoin
defamation.”24 The Lex state courts wield the Maxim which they found in
their common law and state constitution.25 The pre-merger rule that Equity 
lacked jurisdiction to enjoin libel, which was mostly an adequate remedy
at law and jury trial rule, became more of a free speech rule after Near and
the merger of law and equity. Before merger, a separate Chancery court 
would lack equity jurisdiction to enjoin libel; after merger, the merged
court had equity jurisdiction and the post-merger Maxim “Equity will not
enjoin a libel” was still based on the preference for jury trial.26  The Maxim
is broader than the prior restraint rule. “Defamation alone is not a sufficient
justification for restraining an individual’s right to speak freely,” observed
the Texas court in Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc.27 And, as in Lex, state 
courts often implement the Maxim under their states’ constitutions.28 
20. See Near, 283 U.S. at 701–02. 
21. Balboa Island Vill. Inn, 156 P.3d at 341; Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 89. 
22.  544 U.S. 734, 735–37 (2005). 
23. Id. at 734. 
24. 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 576, at 345; see also Kinney, 
443 S.W.3d at 95 (citing Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 677 (3d Cir. 1991)).  Trade 
libel is an exception to the Maxim that this article does not consider further.  See, e.g., 
CapStack Nashville 3 L.L.C. v. MACC Venture Partners, No. 2018-0552-SG, 2018 WL 
3949274, at *4–5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2018); Organovo Holdings, Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 
A.3d 102, 124–27 (Del. Ch. 2017). 
25. 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 576, at 345; Ardia, supra note 1,
at 50. 
26. See Organovo Holdings, 162 A.3d at 115–17. 
27. 647 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. 1983) (citing Ex parte Tucker, 220 S.W. 75, 76 (Tex.
1920)).
28. See, e.g., Fernandez v. N. Ga. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 400 S.E.2d 6, 7–8 (Ga. 
1991); Brannon v. Am. Micro Distrib., Inc., 342 S.E.2d 301, 302–03 (Ga. 1986); Sid 
Dillon Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc. v. Sullivan, 559 N.W.2d 740, 746 (Neb. 1997); 
Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 95; Ardia, supra note 1, at 50. 
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Baldder’s demand for an injunction forbidding Lokki’s defamation is doomed
unless the Lex court takes this Article’s advice and scuttles the Maxim. 
Even though GripeLex republished Lokki’s defamatory remarks, Lokki
is Baldder’s only viable defendant. Section 230 of the federal Communications 
Decency Act eliminates GripeLex as a defendant.29  The statute grants immunity
to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) like GripeLex and Yelp. Under the 
tort-reform provision, a republishing website is immune from a plaintiff’s
libel suit for damages.30 Authority has been divided on whether the provision 
may also protect an ISP from a plaintiff’s demand for an injunction, but 
the trend favors barring an injunction.31 If, moreover, Lokki had posted
her defamation anonymously and if Baldder had sued the ISP, her identity
would probably also be protected.32 
29. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
30. See id.; Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 
1010 (E.D. Ky. 2012); Blockowicz v. Williams, 675 F. Supp. 2d 912, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2009),
aff’d, 630 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2010); Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of N.Y., Inc., 952
N.E.2d 1011, 1016–17 (N.Y. 2011); Reit v. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413 (Sup. Ct.
2010). But see Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that Yahoo, 
which is immune under the CDA, may be estopped for failing to remove content that it
promised to take down). An exception occurs when the website participates in creating 
the statement. Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 741–43 (7th Cir. 2016) (piercing Communications 
Decency Act § 230(c) immunity for websites when website provides content). 
31. See, e.g., Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776, 788 (Cal. 2018) (involving a removal 
order used by the plaintiffs who sought to overrule Yelp’s decision to publish the three 
challenged reviews).  Where, as here, an internet intermediary’s relevant conduct in a 
defamation case goes no further than the mere act of publication—including a refusal to 
depublish upon demand, after a subsequent finding that the published content is libelous—
section 230 prohibits this kind of directive.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c); Noah v. AOL Time 
Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539–40 (E.D. Va. 2003) (barring a plaintiff’s Title II 
of the Civil Rights Act claim against AOL because of section 230), aff’d, No. 03-1770, 
2004 WL 602711, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004); Ardia, supra note 1, at 16 (citing 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230).
The result in Canada would have differed.  See generally Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols. 
Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824, 826 (Can.) (requiring nonparty Google to delist defendant
Datalink’s websites).  A sequel in the United States followed. See Google LLC v. Equustek 
Sols. Inc., No. 5:17-cv-04207-EJD, 2017 WL 5000834, at *1–2, *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 
2017) (barring enforcement of the Canadian judgment by default order based on section 230).
32. See generally Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 751 F. Supp. 2d 782, 789 (M.D. Pa.
2008); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954 (D.C. 2009); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,
966 A.2d 432, 456 (Md. 2009); Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Doe 1, 833 N.W.2d 331, 
344 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013); In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603, 607–08 (Tex. 2014) (finding that 
a plaintiff must show that the state has personal jurisdiction over the defendant before 
compelling his or her identity). But see Warren Hosp. v. Does 1–10, 63 A.3d 246, 251
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013); Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 429–30 (Sup. 
Ct. 2009); Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 752 S.E.2d 554, 567 (Va. Ct. App. 
2014) (finding that anonymous online reviews are not entitled to First Amendment protection
if the person reviewing was not actually a consumer, making the statements false). 
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A. Near v. Minnesota and New York Times v. Sullivan
Jay Near was a pest.33 His Saturday Press excoriated the Twin Cities
authorities.34  He accused them of lax, even corrupt, administration of the
prohibition laws.35 His heavy-handed anti-Semitic stories tied the local 
authorities to Jewish gangsters and criminals.36 Those authorities sued
Jay Near under a Minnesota public nuisance statute.37 Although it was a
libel case, the plaintiffs’ substantive base was a statute that the legislature 
had amended to add defamation to obscenity as a public nuisance.38  The
statute allowed a judge to grant a plaintiff an injunction against a defendant’s 
“malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other 
periodical.”39 
The trial judge granted plaintiffs an ex parte injunction.40 It forbade Jay 
Near from publishing a newspaper “containing malicious, scandalous and
defamatory matter of the kind alleged in plaintiff’s complaint herein or 
otherwise.”41 Jay Near ceased publishing his paper.42  The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed.43 
Because of the way the lawsuit had been formulated and argued in the 
lower courts, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the statute, 
not the injunction.44 In a decision in the early days of federal court review
of state free speech decisions, the Court held that the Minnesota statute 
was a prior restraint that violated the Constitution.45 
33. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 703 (1931). 
34. See id.
35. See FRED W. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE LANDMARK
SUPREME COURT CASE THAT GAVE NEW MEANING TO FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 43 (1981) 
(providing the readable account of Near).
36. See id.
37. Near, 283 U.S. at 703. 
38. Id. at 702 (quoting 1925 Minn. Laws 358). 
39. Id. (quoting 1925 Minn. Laws 358); FRIENDLY, supra note 35, at 40–54.
40. See Near, 283 U.S. at 704–05. 
41. Id.
42. See FRIENDLY, supra note 35, at 54. 
43. Near, 283 U.S. at 706–07. 
44. Id. at 708. 
45. See id. at 722–23.  I say “Constitution” instead of “First Amendment” here because 
the majority opinion referred to the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the First.  Professor 
Kauper discussed the tension between the First and the Fourteenth Amendments.  PAUL G. 
KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 53–85 (1962). 
621




    
       
      
    
  




    
   







   
     
     
    







       
  




The prior restraint doctrine had been around for some time to reprobate
executive censorship through advance licensing.46 The Near Court’s innovation
was to add the public nuisance statute and its judicial injunction to executive 
licensing as a prior restraint.47 Justice Butler dissented on this point.48 The
Court’s majority insisted that the prior restraint doctrine affected only a
plaintiff’s injunction against a defendant’s libel and that it left available 
both a plaintiff’s civil libel action for money damages and the authorities’ 
criminal prosecutions for libel.49 The Court’s majority contrasted the banned
injunction as a prior restraint with civil damages and a criminal prosecution, 
the preferred “subsequent punishments.”50 
We usually think of the criminal law as the government’s heavy artillery 
in contrast to the civil law for damages and an injunction, which are lesser
remedies for defendants’ misconduct.51 However, the Near Court subordinated
the ostensibly “milder” injunction remedy to both the authorities’ criminal
prosecution and the private civil plaintiff’s libel tort for money damages.52 
The Court maintained that an injunction threatens the defendant’s free 
speech values more than either of the subsequent punishments: a criminal
prosecution-conviction or a civil judgment for money damages.53  This
remedial reversal is an anomaly. After exploring the decision to favor the 
civil damages action over the injunction, this Article argues that to correct 
the anomaly courts should, under proper circumstances, cease disfavoring
the injunction.
In Near, several procedural and substantive defects clamored for the
Court’s attention.54 The trial judge’s procedure was ex parte; Jay Near lacked 
notice in advance and an opportunity to be heard in opposition.55 The
substantive libel doctrine was broad, imprecise, and vague. In pleading 
or at a factual hearing, the public nuisance statute put the burden of proof 
of his good faith on the defendant instead of requiring the plaintiff to prove 
the defendant’s bad faith.56 In a plenary hearing on an injunction, Jay Near
46. See Near, 283 U.S. at 723 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
47. See id. at 722–23. 
48. Id. at 735–36. 
49. See id. at 713 (majority opinion). 
50. Id. at 713–14 (quoting Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)). 
51. Francis A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal Sanctions, 
42 U. PITT. L. REV. 737, 738–39 (1981); Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Overcriminalizing 
Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1667, 1730–31 (2015). 
52. See Near, 283 U.S. at 715. 
53. See id. at 716. 
54. See id. at 709–13. 
55. See Ardia, supra note 1, at 53–54. 
56. Near, 283 U.S. at 709–10. 
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would not have been able to summon a jury, although in a criminal prosecution 
or a tort trial for damages, he would have been entitled to one.57 
After the Supreme Court’s Near decision, the overreaching law of libel 
changed. First, the existence of the criminal libel statutes that the Near
Court endorsed spoke to the possibility that a critic of government officials,
like Jay Near, might face jail after a criminal prosecution for his efforts.58 
This risk was eradicated by the Supreme Court’s development of First
Amendment protection.59  Defamation today is a civil tort, not a crime, even
though some states’ codes retain obsolete criminal statutes that forbid libel.60 
The internet defamation this Article examines below is so unlikely to lead
to a criminal prosecution—what is more a criminal conviction—that we can
consider the statutory criminal law effectively off the table. 
Second, as Professor Blasi wrote, “[T]he restraint [injunction] in Near
itself . . . would surely be invalidated under the modern vagueness doctrine.”61 
Third, in New York Times v. Sullivan and its queue of decisions, the
Supreme Court undermined a public official’s libel tort for money damages
against a critic of his official duties.62 To recover damages, the Court required
57. State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770, 773 (Minn. 1928) (refusing to
extend the right to a jury trial to an equitable action), rev’d sub nom. Near v. Minnesota ex 
rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
58. See Near, 283 U.S. at 711. 
59. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 69–70 (1964) (stating that libel
may be “inappropriate for penal control”); State v. Turner, 864 N.W.2d 204, 210–11 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2015); Parmelee v. O’Neel, 186 P.3d 1094, 1098–106 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); 
Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO. 
L. REV. 693, 720 (2012). 
60. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-417 (West 2019). Volokh’s Article, in contrast, 
emphasizes an anti-defamation injunction’s criminal law connections.  The Article argues 
that the “First Amendment does not preclude properly crafted anti-libel injunctions, in part 
because they are similar to constitutionally valid properly crafted criminal libel laws.” 
Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 49). 
61. Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 
MINN. L. REV. 11, 12 n.8 (1981); see also William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment 
Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint 
Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 279–80 (1982) (arguing that the Near injunction was both 
too broad and too vague).  The Minnesota judge’s injunction would also be improper today 
because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure forbid incorporation by reference in an 
injunction. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(C). 
62. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); LEE LEVINE &
STEPHEN WERMIEL, THE PROGENY: JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN’S FIGHT TO PRESERVE 
THE LEGACY OF NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN 109–10 (2014) (providing a later and more 
technical treatment of Sullivan); ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE 
AND THE FIRST AMENDEMNT 130–39 (1991) (providing the readable account for Sullivan). 
623





        
    
 




         
    
 
 
    
      
    
    
     
      
 
    
   
 
         
  
     
 
  
      
    
       
   
    





a public-figure libel plaintiff to prove the defendant’s “actual malice,” that
the defendant knew or should have known that its allegedly defamatory 
statement was false.63 The Sullivan principle protects a defamation defendant
from a public-figure libel plaintiff’s tort if that defendant did not know
and should not have known that its statement was false.64 
The reader should prepare for some technicality in the tort law of
defamation. Even before the Supreme Court decided Sullivan, Professor
Leon Green had written of defamation that “[n]o other formula of the law 
promises so much and delivers so little.”65 After Sullivan, Professor Bill 
Van Alstyne warned that the substantive law of defamation is “bewilderingly
complicated,” nuanced, and unclear.66 Although it has taken a while, the
official plaintiff’s libel action against a media defendant is desiccated, perhaps
essentially over.67 
Defamation’s complex principles remain controversial. If elected, then-
candidate President Trump said: 
I’m going to open up our libel laws so when they write purposely negative and
horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money. We’re going
to open up those libel laws. So, when The New York Times writes a hit piece which 
is a total disgrace or when The Washington Post, which is there for other reasons,
writes a hit piece, we can sue them and win money instead of having no chance 
of winning because they’re totally protected.68 
In 2019, Justice Thomas voiced his opposition to the Sullivan principles.69 
Concurring in the Court’s decision to deny the plaintiff’s cert petition in 
McKee v. Cosby, Justice Thomas focused on two ideas: when Sullivan applied, 
the “actual malice” rule made it almost impossible for a libel plaintiff to 
prevail, and the “actual malice” rule ignored both the state law of libel and 
the “original meaning of the Constitution.”70 Justice Thomas wrote the Sullivan
decision and its progeny were “policy-driven decisions masquerading 
as constitutional law” that should be “reconsidered.”71 “The States are perfectly
63. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
64. See David A. Anderson, Tortious Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 71, 80–81 
(1990) [hereinafter Anderson, Tortious] (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 45, 56 (1988)). 
65. Leon Green, The Right to Communicate, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 903, 907 (1960).  
66. William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations of Recovery from the
Press—An Extended Comment on “The Anderson Solution,” 25  WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 
816 (1984).
67. Ardia, supra note 1, 11 & nn.31–32. 
68. Adam Liptak & Eileen Sullivan, Trump, Angry Over Woodward Book, Renews 
Criticism of Libel Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/ 
30/us/politics/can-trump-change-libel-laws.html [https://perma.cc/59LL-WJRU].
69. See generally McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019). 
70.  Id. at 676, 678. 
71. 
624
 Id. at 676, 682. 
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capable of striking an acceptable balance between encouraging robust public
discourse and providing a meaningful remedy for reputational harm.”72 
First, the principals for public-figure libel are well-established and probably
safe. “Changing New York Times v. Sullivan would require either the Supreme
Court to overrule it or a constitutional amendment. Neither is remotely
likely, though Mr. Trump could try to appoint Supreme Court justices who
would vote to overturn the precedent.”73 Justice Thomas concurred alone;
not one of the other eight justices joined him.74 Second, Trump himself is 
now a libel defendant.75 Third, the intentional tort that Trump stated would
not be protected under the Sullivan principles, anyway.76 
The Supreme Court’s leading decision that bears on the internet defamation 
we are examining is Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.77  Where the defamation
plaintiff is a private person, not a public figure, the Court approved the plaintiff’s 
damages cause of action for the defendant’s negligent defamation because
of the State interest in compensating a plaintiff’s injury.78  “[S]o long as
they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves 
the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory
falsehood injurious to a private individual.”79 The Court qualified a plaintiff’s
damage remedies available under the preceding standard: “States may not
permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is
not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for 
the truth.”80  Private-plaintiff decisions hold that the plaintiffs need not prove
the defendant’s actual malice when recovery is confined to actual injury,
though actual malice must be shown if punitive or presumed damages are
sought.81  A private plaintiff must prove falsity.82 Furthermore, events may
72. Id. at 682. 
73. Liptak & Sullivan, supra note 68. 
74. McKee, 139 S. Ct. at 675. 
75. Zervos v. Trump, 74 N.Y.S.3d 442, 444 (Sup. Ct. 2018); Adam Liptak, ‘A Bit
of Divine Justice’: Trump Vowed to Change Libel Law. But Not Like This., N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/us/politics/trump-libel-lawsuit.html
[http://perma.cc/6JGC-SBHN]. 
76. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
77.  Gertz, 418 U.S. 323. 
78. Id. at 323. 
79. Id. at 347. 
80.  Id. at 347, 349. 
81. David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 
501 (1991) [hereinafter Anderson, Reforming].
82. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775–76 (1986). 
625
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transmogrify a private person into a limited-purpose public figure,83 who 
must show Sullivan malice.84 
Sub-rules developed. Plaintiff’s proof must be “clear and convincing.”85 
The trial judge and all appellate courts wield “independent,” perhaps de
novo, review of the jury’s factual findings.86 Defendants’ ready access to 
motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment will avoid plaintiff’s
intrusive and expensive discovery.87 Section 230 of the federal Communications
Decency Act shields a website from liability for another’s tort.88  A defamation
defendant may use general defensive tactics to protect itself.89 Defendant 
may employ a state anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation
(SLAPP) statute to flush out a plaintiff’s weak lawsuit.90 And in federal 
court, “plausibility” pleading makes a plaintiff’s implausible complaint 
vulnerable to the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.91 
Requiring a public-figure defamation plaintiff to allege a plausible claim 
helps to protect against expensive and baseless litigation.92 
Although defendant Lokki found her jewelry, she didn’t correct her 
GripeLex post. The Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. Court’s qualification does 
not let an intentional tortfeasor off the hook.93 Indeed, a plurality opinion
in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. dealing with a private
plaintiff’s defamation case over the “purely private concern” of an incorrect
credit report supported a state’s application of any liability standard to protect
or vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation: “[W]e hold that the state interest [in
compensation] adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages 
—even absent a showing of ‘actual malice.’”94 In a libel suit for damages, 
83. See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
84. See McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2017). 
85. Robert D. Sack, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan—50-Year Afterwords, 66 
ALA. L. REV. 273, 274 (2014) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 287, 285 n.26 
(1964)).
86. See id. (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285 n.26). 
87. See David A. Anderson, The Promises of New York Times v. Sullivan, 20
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2015) [hereinafter Anderson, Promises]. 
88. Sack, supra note 85, at 289 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2013)). 
89. E.g., Anderson, Promises, supra note 87, at 6. 
90. Id.
91. Sack, supra note 85, at 289 n.96 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678– 
79 (2009)).
92. Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 264 F. Supp. 3d 527, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (first 
quoting Biro v. Condé Naste, 963 F. Supp. 2d 255, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), and then quoting 
Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 702 (11th Cir. 2016)), vacated and remanded No. 
17-3801-cv, 2019 WL 3558545 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 2019). 
93.  See 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
94. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759, 761
(1985); see Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 919 (1983). 
626
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Baldder might achieve a judgment for compensatory damages and possible 
punitive damages.
The Sullivan decisions protect some incorrectness, at least from plaintiffs’ 
damages actions.95 A high-water mark in free speech, Sullivan tolerates 
some false speech to contribute to an overall flow of truthful speech.96 
Falsity may exceed the threshold. Left unanswered is the issue this Article
examines: whether under some circumstances, an injunction against a
defendant’s expression would escape doom as a forbidden prior restraint. 
The law and falsity have a tumultuous relationship. Lying is not punished,
as such.97 Perjury is a narrow criminal offence, not in realistic play for a
consumer who calls a contractor a thief.  No First Amendment protection
exists for fraud.98 And fraud-misrepresentation is a hedged and complex 
tort.99 In 2012 in its Stolen Valor Act decision, the Supreme Court voided 
a criminal statute that forbade falsely claiming a military medal.100  A citizen’s
lie must be relevant and material to strip him of citizenship, the Court held
in 2017.101 A state criminal statute against false campaign statements did not
survive strict scrutiny under the state constitution.102 Another decision held 
that government regulations of charities that barred fees above a certain 
percentage were not prior restraints.103 
Justice Breyer asked: 
Can we simply say that the First Amendment protects false statements? Sometimes 
it does.  Consider statements of religion, philosophy, history. “The earth is flat” 
would be protected irrespective of whether one believes it true or false.  But sometimes
it does not. Consider false commercial speech, fraud, perjury, false claims of terrorist
attack, impersonation of police officials, trademark infringement, and other instances 
where protection would be unwarranted.104 
95. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (quoting JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 33 (2d ed. 1859)). 
96. Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Truth-Seeking Value, 39 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 55, 59, 103–04 (2015). 
97. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012). 
98. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010). 
99. See 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 656, at 616. 
100. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 709. 
101. Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1922 (2017). 
102. Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1257 (Mass. 2015). 
103. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003). 
104. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW 
GLOBAL REALITIES 258 (2015) (citing Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 713–14). 
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Defamation is particularly conflicted. In Sullivan, Justice Brennan 
summarized the argument for free speech with his statement that discussion
of public affairs ought to be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”105 
On the other hand, a false statement can be harmful.  Justice Stewart
pointed out that “[t]he right of a man to the protection of his own reputation 
from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our 
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a 
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”106 Professor
Anderson added: 
No matter how much it values speech, however, a civilized society cannot refuse 
to protect reputation. Some form of libel law is as essential to the health of the
commonweal and the press as it is to the victims of defamation. Without libel law, 
credibility of the press would be at the mercy of the least scrupulous among it, 
and public discourse would have no necessary anchor in truth.107 
Professor Robert O’Neil wrote that: 
Despite the strong rhetoric about how public discourse needed to be “uninhibited,
robust[,] and wide open,” when the dust settled, there were still situations in which
free speech and press could be subordinated to “individual interests in economic 
ventures, standing in the community, or general good feelings.” . . . [L]ibel remains,
as it has always been, a unique area of First Amendment law . . . .108 
The Sullivan Court had quoted John Stuart Mill in a footnote: “Even a
false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public
debate, since it brings about ‘the clearer perception and livelier impression
of truth, produced by its collision with error.’”109  Negligent errors, the Court
added, are “inevitable” in debate.110  The Supreme Court’s last word on falsity
is that “some false statements are inevitable.”111 
The Supreme Court is also on the side of truth. “False statements of fact
are particularly valueless,” is one of the Supreme Court’s observations.112 
“[F]alse statements” the Court said, “may be unprotected for their own sake.”113 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court said that an “erroneous statement
of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection.”114 Indeed, the Court’s
decision in Gertz may be on both sides: on the one hand, “[T]here is no such
thing as a false idea” and, on the other hand, “[T]here is no constitutional 
105. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
106. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
107. Anderson, Reforming, supra note 81, at 490. 
108. ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 31, 35 (2001). 
109.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 (1964) (quoting MILL, supra note 95, at 33). 
110. Id. at 271. 
111. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012). 
112. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
113. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002). 
114.  418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
628
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value in false statements of fact. . . . which ‘are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas.’”115 
In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Court recognized that “[f]alse
statements of fact are particularly valueless [because] they interfere with
the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and [can] cause 
damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot easily be repaired by
counterspeech.”116 The Court found that false statements are “nevertheless
inevitable in free debate.”117  As a result, the Court concluded that “a rule
that would impose strict liability on a publisher for false factual assertions
would have an undoubted ‘chilling’ effect on speech relating to public figures 
that does have constitutional value.”118 “Freedoms of expression require
‘breathing space.’”119 
To advance truth in the long run, the Sullivan principles shield some 
false statements, some “honest” errors.120 “[O]therwise, reporters and editors
might well hold back in self-censorship from presenting evidence of misconduct 
out of fear some minor errors might result in ruinous monetary judgments 
in favor of an otherwise justly criticized plaintiff.”121 
Nevertheless, excusing present dishonesty in aid of future speech means
allowing a defamatory falsehood to escape and injure a plaintiff’s reputation 
without a remedy.122 Allowing a present falsehood to advance future truth- 
seeking “must always be carefully weighed against the ultimate cost to the 
truth-seeking enterprise.”123 
Trump’s inveterate mendacity has altered our attitude about truth versus 
falsity. As of late April 2019, the Washington Post Fact Checker has identified 
more than 10,000 of Trump’s misleading or false claims.124 Justice Stewart
115. Id. at 339–40; see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990)
(quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339–49). 
116. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 52.
117. Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340). 
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986)). 
120. RICHARD KLUGER, INDELIBLE INK: THE TRIALS OF JOHN PETER ZENGER AND THE
BIRTH OF AMERICA’S FREE PRESS 301 (2016). 
121. Id.
122. See Anderson, Reforming, supra note 81, at 534. 
123. Id. at 535. 
124. Glenn Kessler, Salvador Rizzo & Meg Kelly, President Trump Has Made More
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explained that we should be concerned because “the poisonous atmosphere 
of the easy lie can infect and degrade a whole society.”125  
Next, this article addresses how defamation litigation has changed. 
B. New Defamation 
The computer and the internet have altered defamation.126 Earlier
defamation defendants were newspapers and other corporate media.127 
These businesses and their employees had long-term professional and  
ethical commitments to accuracy as well as experienced staffs to ferret out
the truth and fact-checkers to confirm it.128  In addition, the defendants as
huge corporations that carried insurance could count on skilled lawyers to
defend a defamation lawsuit and perhaps insurance coverage to pay a damages
judgment.129  The Sullivan decisions desiccated the public-figure plaintiff’s
libel action against a media defendant.130 
In the internet age of social media that this article examines, newspapers
are not the defamation defendants.  Print journalism has declined. Fewer
newspapers and fewer professional journalists produce less printed news.131 
“American journalism and freedom of expression have been radically recast 
over the past quarter-century by the tech revolution, greatly to the detriment 
of traditional hard-copy print media.”132  Lay bloggers and other internet age
denizen are the defendants.133 People who previously lacked access
to widespread communication can now scream vitriol from their virtual
rooftops.134 
125. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
126. See Ardia, supra note 1, at 4–5; Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 3).
127. See Ardia, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
128. See id.; Merrill Fabry, Here’s How the First Fact-Checkers Were Able to Do 
Their Jobs Before the Internet, TIME (Aug. 24, 2017), http://time.com/4858683/fact-checking- 
history/ [https://perma.cc/ZKB5-XJ2L].
129. Anderson, Reforming, supra note 81, at 547–48. 
130. See id. at 509–10; Anderson, Promises, supra note 87, at 2–3; Sack, supra note 
85, at 288.  As Professor Murchison has shown, lapses and mistakes continue to occur.  See 
Murchison, supra note 96, at 60–61. 
131. See KLUGER, supra note 120, at xvi. 
132. Id.
133. See Ardia, supra note 1, at 5; Katherine Mangan, Blasted as Predators, Professors 
Are Fighting Back with Lawsuits, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 12, 2018), https://www.
chronicle.com/article/Blasted-as-Predators/243918/?key=Bj9VwqXvQvYd6fLOxLcWg3 
MYGE7aGBtTtbIQbnsxuUDQqzg44d6L-GnhdT2ltQNzN1Vfc (last visited May 22, 2019,
7:10 PM).
134. See Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 59, at 693–94. Other internet problem areas outside
this study are hate crimes and revenge porn. 
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Observers think that social media, like alcohol, is disinhibiting because 
it undermines judgment and exacerbates impulsive and emotional responses.135 
In the course of granting a plaintiff an interlocutory injunction against 
ISPs, the Dublin, Ireland, High Court judge wrote that: 
[T]he matter went “viral” as they say. All manner of nasty and seemingly idle
minds got to work on the plaintiff, and as seems to happen with apparent impunity 
nowadays on social media sites, said whatever things first came into their vacant,
idle and meddlesome heads, by posting statements and comments about the plaintiff, 
so vile and abusive that I ought not to repeat them here.136
Reenter Pam Lokki, Baldder’s short-fused condo-dweller defendant.  In
addition to her hot temper and bad judgment, she lacks a trained journalist’s 
professional education—including the benefit of Washington and Lee’s 
course, JOUR 344 Ethics of Journalism. She also lacks ready access to
a specialized lawyer. Her standard homeowners liability insurance policy
requires the carrier to defend when an insured is sued and to indemnify, that 
is to pay a settlement or judgment. But we expect Lokki’s insurance carrier
to decline coverage under its policy exemption for an intentional tort. 
As we said above, a defendant who criticizes a private-person plaintiff
does not enjoy the Sullivan privileges that would shelter a defendant for 
inadvertent error.137 Although Lokki owns part of her condo, her assets will 
not satisfy a large money judgment.  In Perez v. Dietz Development, LLC,138 
our taking-off point, Jane Perez was able to sustain her appeal to the Virginia 
Supreme Court because the ACLU of Virginia and Public Citizen hoisted 
their cudgels on her behalf as a consumer critic.139 Some consider if a plaintiff’s 
135. See Anirudh Regidi, Social Media Addiction Is Real, Powerful and Worse than 
Alcohol, but You Can Fight It with the Right Tools, FIRSTPOST (Apr. 21, 2017, 9:51 AM),
https://www.firstpost.com/tech/news-analysis/social-media-addiction-is-real-powerful-and-
worse-than-alcohol-but-you-can-fight-it-with-the-right-tools-3701495.html [https://perma.cc/
V3WT-3JZS] (discussing social media addiction).
136. Decision on Interlocutory Injunction Application at 3, McKeogh v. Doe [2012]
IEHC 95 (H. Ct.) (Ir.), https://inforrm.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/141943409-mckeogh-
v-doe-and-others.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3YE-C8NP]. See generally Steven Seidenberg, 
Lies and Libel: Fake News Is Just False, but the Cure May Not Be So Simple, 103 A.B.A
J. 48 (2017) (discussing the effects of social media). 
137. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343–48 (1974); Ardia, supra note 1,
at 13–14, 13 n.41. 
138. No. 122157, 2012 WL 6761997 (Va. Dec. 28, 2012). 
139. See Virginia Supreme Court Allows Online Critic’s Speech, VA. LIBERTIES (ACLU
of Va., Richmond, Va.), Spring 2013, at 1. 
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judgment for money damages may be uncollectible from a tortfeasor defendant; 
this consideration supports the plaintiff’s need for an injunction.140  
C. Prior Restraint, in the Meantime 
Between Near and Balboa, the prior restraint doctrine evolved and developed
in many contexts. To begin, the Supreme Court has neither defined a prior 
restraint nor developed its exceptions.  The prior restraint doctrine, Professor 
Wells concluded, is ad hoc, elastic, and unstable.141 
Miscellaneous restrictions on expression that the Court has held to be
prior restraints readily illustrate the point above that the prior restraint
doctrines are illogical and incoherent.142 “The prior restraint doctrine,”
Professor Fiss wrote, “should not be seen as a full or coherent expression 
of free speech values, but rather as a strategic device capable of effectuating 
a compromise, the chief value of which is negative—to block a decision 
against speech.”143 
In our adversary system, a lawyer is interested in her client’s success,
not in convincing the court to develop and articulate coherent doctrine.144 
A defendant’s lawyer has an incentive to label any restriction on a client’s 
expression a prior restraint because successfully pinning that disfavored label
on a restriction on a client’s expression is a major step toward upsetting
it. 
Precisely because of the cultural salience and social attractiveness of the very 
idea of the First Amendment, good advocates, whether in court or in public debate,
will try to find a First Amendment hook on which to hang all varieties of claims 
having little connection with what we might think of as the core goals of the ideas 
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.145 
140. See Cornwell v. Sachs, 99 F. Supp. 2d 695, 707 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“[T]he inability
to collect on a damage award may constitute irreparable injury.”). 
141. See Christina E. Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against
Expression, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 34, 67 (2000). 
142. See generally Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 
(1988) (finding that regulations of charities that barred fees above a certain percentage 
were prior restraints); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (discussing a 
criminal statute that forbade publication of a juvenile offender’s name); Se. Promotions, 
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (evaluating a refusal to rent a municipal theatre to a 
production of Hair); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (deliberating over a 
gross receipts tax on newspapers).  A dissent may stray even farther, see for example, the 
contractual “species of prior restraint” in Justice Stevens’s dissent in Snepp v. United States, 
444 U.S. 507, 526 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
143. OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES 
OF STATE POWER 136 (1996). 
144. S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 77 (2d ed. 1981). 
145. Frederick Schauer, Fish’s Five Theories, 9 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 21, 29 (2013). 
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In litigation, a judge can name a restriction on the defendant’s speech a
prior restraint to strike it down without stating additional reasons.146 The
prior restraint target is a desirable goal that is fuzzy at the edges. The Court 
has neglected Justice Cardozo’s warning to guard against “[t]he tendency 
of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic,” and beyond.147 Even 
analogy to prior restraint is beneficial to an opponent of a restriction on 
expression. Witness the Court’s analogy in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, which struck down statutory limits on corporate campaign
contributions because they conflicted with the donor’s free speech rights: 
This regulatory scheme may not be a prior restraint on speech in the strict sense of
that term, for prospective speakers are not compelled by law to seek an advisory
opinion from the FEC before the speech takes place. As a practical matter, however,
given the complexity of the regulations and the deference courts show to 
administrative determinations, a speaker who wants to avoid threats of criminal
liability and the heavy costs of defending against FEC enforcement must ask 
a governmental agency for prior permission to speak. These onerous restrictions thus
function as the equivalent of prior restraint by giving the FEC power analogous to
licensing laws implemented in 16th- and 17th-century England, laws and governmental
practices of the sort that the First Amendment was drawn to prohibit.  Because the
FEC’s “business is to censor, there inheres the danger that it may well be less 
responsive than a court—part of an independent branch of government—to the 
constitutionally protected interests in free-expression.”148 
Not only have courts called restrictions prior restraints when prior restraint
analysis does not fit, but also, some things that prior restraint analysis fits 
have evaded prior restraint’s bite.149 A Rule 26(c) protective order forbids
someone from disseminating discovery material that is speech;150 it threatens
punishment, including contempt.151 It fits the definition of prior restraint.  
Yet courts have not favored protective orders with prior restraint analysis.152 
146. See, e.g., DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL
REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 1121 (2010); see also Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of 
the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV.
L.REV. 1765, 1787–1800 (2004) (positing that First Amendment “magnetism” attracts lawyers’ 
opportunistic arguments, in short, the adversary system presses on boundaries). 
147. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921).
148. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 335 (2010) (quoting 
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57–58 (1965)). 
149. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976). 
150. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
151. See, e.g., Mullally v. City of Los Angeles, 49 F. App’x 190 (9th Cir. 2002) (being
unpublished, this case lacks precedential value).  Disclosure: I helped draft Mullally’s brief. 
152. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33–34 (1984) (noting that
a protective order is not a prior restraint). 
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Far from naming a protective order a prior restraint, one influential scholar
declined to apply any brand of First Amendment analysis to it.153 More
recently, another scholar has advised courts to apply intermediate-scrutiny
First Amendment doctrines to a protective order.154  But notably he  did  
not advocate prior restraint’s sudden and almost certain death sentence for
this useful discovery technique.155 
Prior restraint has its friends and defenders.156 Other scholars, however, 
suggest reform of this “needless bugaboo.”157 Professor Scordato would limit 
prior restraint to “physical interception” of speech, eliminating both injunctions 
and executive licensing from prior restraint.158 Professor Redish maintained
that prior restraint is procedural only: “A speaker must be afforded an
opportunity in a full and fair judicial hearing to contest any restraint before 
it is imposed. To prove the speech constitutionally unprotected, the government 
must show a truly compelling interest that outweighs the first amendment
right.”159 Fiss and Professor Barnett would distinguish the injunction from
executive licensing and liberate the injunction from prior restraint analysis.160 
Ms. Sarah Shyr, my former student, would allow an injunction under a statute,
for example for employment discrimination, but ban that remedy in judge-
made common law areas like this Article’s topic, defamation.161 Professor 
Jeffries and Professor Mayton argued for abandoning prior restraint as a
doctrine.162 While I am sympathetic to the abolitionist’s outright ban, this 
153. See Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L.
REV. 457, 459, 461–62, 473–74 (1991). 
154. See Dustin B. Benham, Dirty Secrets: The First Amendment in Protective-Order 
Litigation, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1783, 1811–13 (2014). 
155. See id. at 1811–12. 
156. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 503– 
12 (1970) (discussing some of the criticisms and shortcomings of prior restraint, but 
defending that the doctrine should not be abandoned all together); Blasi, supra note 61, at 
92–93; Howard O. Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A 
Reply to Professor Mayton, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 283, 292–96 (1982); Volokh, supra note 
2 (manuscript at 16–17).
157. William O. Bertelsman, Injunctions Against Speech and Writing: A Re-Evaluation, 
59 KY. L.J. 319, 332 (1971).
158. Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of
Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1, 30–31, 31 nn.102–03 (1989). 
159. Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 89 (1984). 
160. See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 69 (1978); Stephen R. Barnett, 
The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 544, 548, 551 (1977). 
161. Sarah Shyr, Note, Speech Regulation: Why an Injunction Should Be Permissible
Under Workplace Discrimination but Is Problematic Under Defamation, 16 WASH. & LEE 
J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 195, 218, 221–24 (2009). 
162. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 437 
(1983); Mayton, supra note 61, at 280–81; see also Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 16). 
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[VOL. 56: 615, 2019] The Defamation Injunction 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Article’s prescription is narrower—that under the proper circumstances, an
injunction may be an appropriate remedy for a defendant’s defamation.
This Article’s working definition of a prior restraint is: A prior restraint
occurs when the government forbids someone’s protected speech before
the person has disseminated that speech.163 That definition includes both
the litigated orders this Article examines and their disreputable ancestor, 
executive censorship through licensing. It does not include the variations 
on prior restraint cited in the footnote above. This Article uses the term prior 
restraint in two separate ways: procedural prior restraint and substantive 
prior restraint. 
D. Procedural Prior Restraint 
“The settled rule is that a system of prior restraint ‘avoids constitutional
infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to
obviate the dangers of a censorship system.’”164 A procedural prior restraint 
occurs when the process that the authorities’ followed to distinguish protected 
from unprotected expression falls below the First Amendment’s procedural 
threshold.165 A court may condemn an order as an improper prior restraint
because it forbids a person’s speech without the authorities having followed 
a careful enough decision process to determine accurately whether the speech 
is protected expression.166 
The Supreme Court’s leading procedural prior restraint decision is
Freedman v. Maryland.167 The Court dealt with Maryland’s since-repealed 
executive or administrative motion-picture licensing.168 The Court required
protective procedure for administrative censorship to evaluate material in
the contested borderland between the protected sexually explicit and the 
proscribed obscene subject matter.169 An official administrative or executive
censor, the Court held, must either grant the applicant permission or proceed 
163. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 544 (1993); Mayton, supra note 
61, at 281 (defining a prior restraint as “a restraint of speech imposed without the checks 
and examinations of judicial review”). 
164. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (quoting Freedman 
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)).
165. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 57–58. 
166. See, e.g., id. at 60 (holding that state licensing scheme of prior censorship was
unconstitutional for lack of adequate procedural safeguards).
167.  Freedman, 380 U.S. 51. 
168. See id. at 52–53. 
169. Id. at 58. 
635
POST RENDLEMAN PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2019 2:10 PM       
 
 
     
    
   
 
    
 









     
    
 




     
    





   






    
  
    
to court promptly.170 The censor has the burden of proof in court.171 
Permission to disseminate the publication cannot be denied until after a 
judge determines its obscenity.172 The Court, in effect, took the executive
censor’s ultimate licensing decision and gave it to the judge.173 
The Freedman Court left ex parte interim orders in a muddled and
cryptic state.  The Court decided Freedman before it decided Carroll v. Princess
Anne,174 which this Article examines below. In Carroll, the Court held that
an ex parte temporary restraining order forbidding a political rally violated 
the First Amendment.175 
E. Substantive Prior Restraint
This Article turns to what it names the substantive prior restraint.  If the
judge grants the plaintiff an injunction that regulates the defendant’s
expression or expression-related activity, the next step is characterization
of the injunction as either a prior restraint or not.176  As Wells shows with 
a careful examination of the abortion-clinic injunction in Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Center, Inc.,177 the prior restraint/no prior restraint decision may be
arbitrary and unprincipled.178 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s characterization
in Madsen rejects prior restraint analysis in a footnote and contests Justice 
Scalia’s vigorous dissent.179 A Washington and Lee School of Law classroom, 
a proper place to take the temperature of conservative America, regularly
rebuffs the Chief Justice and accepts Justice Scalia’s outspoken dissent
that favors the prior restraint analysis for an abortion-clinic injunction that 
his Chief rejected. 
An injunction is a routine remedy when a defendant’s expression has 
infringed a plaintiff’s copyright. The Supreme Court also recognizes exceptions
to the prior restraint doctrine.180 These are comprised of speech that is not 
protected expression: obscenity, fighting words, fraud, national security, 
and, our subject, defamation.181 
170. Id. at 58–59. 




175.  Id. at 181–85. 
393 U.S. 175 (1968). 
176. See, e.g., id. at 179–80. 
177.  512 U.S. 753 (1994) 
178.  Ardia, supra note 1, at 33; Scordato, supra note 158, at 6, 6 n.24 (quoting Jeffries, 
supra note 162, at 420); Wells, supra note 141, at 25–28. 
179. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763 n.2.
180. Benham, supra note 154, at 1806. 
181. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (discussing that 
defamation is not protected speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992); 
636
POST RENDLEMAN PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2019 2:10 PM       
 





   




    
     
   
    
    
   
    
 







   
    
  
  
     
       
     
[VOL. 56: 615, 2019] The Defamation Injunction 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Two generations ago, before New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court said
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire that libel is excluded from the First 
Amendment’s shelter because it is speech that has “no essential part  of  
any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.”182 
If the defendant’s speech is defamatory, the plaintiff may ask the judge 
to abjure prior restraint analysis and grant an injunction.183  However, the
Court’s excision of defamation from protected expression occurs in  the  
penumbra of the Sullivan privileges that protect a defendant’s alleged
defamation in the absence of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard.184 
If the exceptions do not exclude it, the plaintiff may move for an injunction. 
The defendant may call the plaintiff’s proposed injunction a prior restraint.
Then, if the court accepts the defendant’s prior restraint characterization, 
its next step is to apply the rule from the Supreme Court’s per curiam  
opinion in the Pentagon Papers case.185  “‘Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against 
its constitutional validity.’ The Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden 
of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.’”186  Then,
typically, the court finds that the restriction or injunction fails to carry the
“heavy burden of showing justification.”187 
Between Near and Balboa, the prior restraint doctrine broke down into
several subject-matter branches with differing emphasis and results.  One 
branch is free press/fair trial, where the courts attempt to dispel the mist that 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969); Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 51, 
at 1671. 
182. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (citing ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 503 (Harvard Univ. Press 1967) (1941)).  
The Court reaffirmed this point ten years later in Beauharnais v. Illinois.  343 U.S. 250, 
266 (1952) (writing that libel is not “within the area of constitutionally protected speech”). 
183. See, e.g., Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 343 (Cal. 2007) 
(“[A]n injunction issued following a trial that determined that the defendant defamed the 
plaintiff that does no more than prohibit the defendant from repeating the defamation, is 
not a prior restraint and does not offend the First Amendment.”). 
184. Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 59, at 716 n.130. 
185. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
186. Id. at 714 (first quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); 
then citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931); and then quoting 
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)). 
187. Id. (quoting Org. for a Better Austin, 402 U.S. at 419); see Scordato, supra note 
158, at 5, 5 n.14. 
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surrounds whether pre-trial publicity endangers a criminal defendant’s fair 
trial enough to merit a court order.188 
A second is obscenity. A generation ago, Professors Kauper, Emerson,
and Schauer all classified the prior restraint doctrine as a division of the
administrative control that authorities used to suppress obscene books and
motion pictures.189 In the meantime, however, prior restraint analysis seems 
to have either faded or departed from contemporary obscenity control 
as advance licensing dropped into the sunset and as the rise of internet porn
channeled the government’s obscenity control into the criminal courts.190 
In a third branch of prior restraints, parades and demonstrations, the prior
restraint doctrine has been elbowed aside by executive licensing. Courts 
analyze executive licensing under the Legislature’s and the Executive’s
decision-making power concerning time, place, and manner.191  “[F]or
government to regulate speech activity before the fact, incident to a time,
place, and manner scheme,” Professor Ron Krotoszynski wrote, “is to say 
that government may enact prior restraints against speech that fails to meet
the requirements of the regulatory rules.”192 
Another branch of prior restraint, illustrated by New York Times Co. v. 
United States, known as the Pentagon Papers litigation in 1971, and United 
188. See Neb. Press Ass’n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 539–40 (1976) (holding that the
trial court’s order restraining media coverage leading up to a trial for multiple murders was 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment); In re Dan Farr Prods., 874 F.3d 590, 597
(9th Cir. 2017) (granting mandamus to reverse pretrial silence order in trademark 
infringement lawsuit); WPTA-TV v. State, 86 N.E.3d 442, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (forbidding 
TV from broadcasting recording of sentencing was not a prior restraint or a violation of
the First Amendment); Order at 1–2, United States v. Manafort, 897 F.3d 340 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (Crim. Action No. 17-0201). See Hunter, supra note 156, at 287–91 The headlines 
tell the story of a 2018 trial judge’s mistaken silence order and his correction after learning 
of the error; Victoria Kim, Judge Lifts Controversial Order Requiring the L.A. Times to 
Alter Article About an Ex-Glendale Cop, L.A. TIMES (July 17, 2018, 6:20 PM), https://
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-balian-order-lifted-20180717-story.html [https://perma.
cc/4XDU-V25E]; Jennifer Medina, Judge Orders Los Angeles Times to Delete Part of Published 
Article, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/15/us/judge-los-
angeles-times-delete-article.html [https://perma.cc/F9XT-JYMR]; Debra Cassens Weiss,
Federal Judge Issues Gag Order in Case Involving Manafort and Gates, A.B.A. J. (Nov.
8, 2017, 11:59 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers_comments_are_restricted_ 
in_manafort_case [https://perma.cc/Y3B4-XN3G]. 
189. See EMERSON, supra note 156, at 503–04, 507, 511; KAUPER, supra note 45,
at 60–62, 82; FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY § 12.1, at 230–32 (1976). 
190.  See generally United States v. Hashime, 734 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2013). 
191. RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS
LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS 
OF GRIEVANCES 26 (2012).
192. Id. 
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[VOL. 56: 615, 2019] The Defamation Injunction 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
States v. Progressive, Inc. in 1978, is national security.193 The futility of an 
injunction to protect the government’s secrets was apparent even then.194 
In 2010, when WikiLeaks released sensitive national-security material, 
the authorities did not seriously consider an injunction.195 Edward Snowden
turned National Security Agency (NSA) files over to newspapers, including 
to Barton Gellman at The Washington Post.196 Snowden is in Russia; if
he returns to the United States, he is a candidate for a criminal prosecution
for espionage.197 However, Gellman, who negotiated with the government
as the material was published, told Terry Gross that his successful prosecution
would require a broad interpretation of the espionage statute that lawyers 
think would violate free speech.198 Discussing another reporter, President
Obama’s Attorney General observed that “any journalist who’s engaged
in true journalistic activities is not going to be prosecuted by this Justice 
Department.”199 Apparently the government did not consider either an injunction
or a criminal prosecution against either Gellman or The Washington Post.200 
“The Internet’s ability to cross national borders seamlessly and at a low cost 
concomitantly reduces the traditional power of nation-states to limit information
distribution.”201 Stay tuned. The Trump Administration, however, is hostile
193. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 713–14 (1971); United States v.
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 990–91, 1000 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
194. See Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 982 (N.D. Cal. 
2008); L.A. Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 55, 71 (1990) (citing
HOWARD MORLAND, THE SECRET THAT EXPLODED 202 (1981)). 
195. Derek E. Bambauer, Consider the Censor, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 31, 
37–38 (2011); Jerome A. Barron, The Pentagon Papers Case and the WikiLeaks Controversy:
National Security and the First Amendment, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 49, 67, 73 (2011).
196. Reporter Had to Decide if Snowden Leaks Were ‘The Real Thing,’ NPR: FRESH 




199. Sari Horwitz, Justice Is Reviewing Criminal Cases that Used Surveillance
Evidence Gathered Under FISA, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2013), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/justice-reviewing-criminal-cases-that-used-evidence-
gathered-under-fisa-act/2013/11/15/0aea6420-4e0d-11e3-9890-a1e0997fb0c0_story.html?
noredirect=on&utm_term=.0bf36bf7fea5 [https://perma.cc/W2VH-ADAV]. Attorney General
Holder later said that “[a]s long as I’m attorney general, no reporter who is doing his job 
is going to jail.” Charlie Savage, Holder Hints Reporter May be Spared Jail in Leak, N.Y.
TIMES (May 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/us/holder-hints-reporter-
may-be-spared-jail-in-leak.html [http://perma.cc/9LK5-9MC7].
200. See David D. Cole, Assessing the Leakers: Criminals or Heroes?, 8 J. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 107, 107–08 (2015). 
201. Bambauer, supra note 195, at 35. 
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to the press and reversing many of its predecessor’s policies.202  As this 
Article was in the final stages of being prepared for publication, the Trump
administration’s indictment of Julian Assange for violation of the Espionage 
Act was a prosecution the Obama administration had declined because 
of free press concerns.203 Related areas include domestic and international 
cyberbullying, revenge porn, hate speech, privacy rights including data 
breaches, and sex trafficking online. Websites develop and refine measures 
to stop or delete improper contributions.204 Internet defamation removal is an
industry and a law firm sub-specialty as a web-searcher learns quickly; it includes 
charlatans who sue impostor defendants to obtain improper orders to 
205remove. 
These developments in hand, we can return to the defamation injunction 
as a prior restraint. 
III. THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE: BALBOA ISLAND VILLAGE INN,
INC. V. LEMEN AND KINNEY V. BARNES 
Like Jay Near, Anne Lemen was a pest.206 Distressed by her restaurant-
bar neighbor, the Balboa Island Village Inn, she referred to its employees
and customers as “whores” and its food as “shitty.”207 She publicly accused
the Inn of closing hours, immigration violations, fostering child porn, prostitution,
and lesbian activity.208 The Inn sued her for several substantive breaches, 
including defamation.209 The Inn sought an injunction.210 After a trial, the
judge granted the Inn an injunction that, among other things, forbade Lemen 
from repeating several defamatory statements.211 
202. See Margaret Sullivan, Shocked by Trump Aggression Against Reporters and 




203. Charlie Savage, Assange Indicted Under Espionage Act, Raising First Amendment
Issues, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/us/politics/
assange-indictment.html [https://perma.cc/54LT-35B9]. 
204. See, e.g., Community Guidelines, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/477 
434105621119 [http://perma.cc/2AFG-U9AJ]. 
205. Eugene Volokh & Paul Alan Levy, Opinion, Dozens of Suspicious Court Cases, 
with Missing Defendants, Aim at Getting Web Pages Taken Down or Deindexed, WASH.
POST (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/
10/10/dozens-of-suspicious-court-cases-with-missing-defendants-aim-at-getting-web-pages-
taken-down-or-deindexed/?utm_term=.41d5510caa43 [https://perma.cc/MXX9-ZU2L].
206. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 341 (Cal. 2007)
207.  Id. 
208. Id. at 341–42. 
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The California Supreme Court held that the trial judge’s injunction was 
too broad and dissolved it.212 “[B]ut,” the majority wrote, “a properly limited
injunction prohibiting defendant from repeating to third persons statements
about the Village Inn that were determined at trial to be defamatory would 
not violate defendant’s right to free speech.”213 
The Texas Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Kinney v. Barnes is an 
important contrary opinion that rejects the California court’s reasoning.214 
The Texas Supreme Court held that damages are the appropriate remedy
for defamation in that state.215  A plaintiff’s damages judgment for defamation
is the prior restraint doctrine’s favored subsequent punishment.216 
Kinney sued his former employer, Barnes, for defamation after the Barnes 
allegedly defamed him on the internet by accusing him of paying bribes.217 
The injunction Kinney sought had two features: first, to remove the alleged
defamation, a take-down order; and, second, to forbid Barnes from repeating 
it.218 Kinney argued that the court should treat defamation as unprotected 
expression that is subject to an injunction like obscenity and commercial
speech.219 
Although the lower Texas courts had dismissed Kinney’s complaint, the
state’s Supreme Court reinstated it.220 The take-down order was not, the court
held, a prior restraint; if Kinney proved his case, the judge could employ
it.221  However, an injunction to forbid defendant’s future defamation fell 
under the no-injunction Maxim that the court located in the Texas State 
Constitution.222 The judge should not grant an injunction against unprotected
speech—defamation—if that injunction would chill future protected speech.223 
A judge may grant an injunction that is a prior restraint only to avoid 
danger.224  Finding that the changes wrought by the internet did not alter the 
212. Id. at 341. 
213. Id. at 342.
214.  443 S.W.3d 87, 97 (Tex. 2014). 
215. Id. at 99 (first citing Ex parte Tucker, 220 S.W. 75, 75–76 (Tex. 1920); then
citing Cullum v. White, 399 S.W.3d 173, 189 (Tex. App. 2011); and then citing Brammer
v. KB Home Lone Star, L.P., 114 S.W.3d 101, 108 (Tex. App. 2003)). 
216. Id. at 95. 
217. Id. at 89. 
218. Id. at 90. 
219. Id. at 96. 
220.  Id. at 90, 101. 
221. See id. at 101. 
222. Id. at 99. 
223. See id.
224. Id. at 95 (quoting Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tex. 1992)). 
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level of protection afforded to speech, the Texas Supreme Court retained
the Maxim that “Equity will not enjoin libel.”225 As the Texas court held, 
prior restraint rubric and the no-injunction Maxim counsel the court to 
prefer damages, the putative subsequent punishment, to the prior restraint,
the injunction.226 In short, the Texas court disapproved the identical 
injunction that the California court had approved.
The Balboa court’s and the Kinny court’s reasoning will emerge below 
as this Article continues its principal inquiry: What deference should the 
judge extend to the defendant’s expression when the plaintiff seeks an 
injunction to forbid the defendant’s defamation? 
IV. DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIONS
Setting aside executive licensing and a criminal prosecution for libel 
because they are, as we observed above, unlikely, this Article will analyze 
whether the time is ripe for other courts to pick up the Balboa court’s cue
and grant an injunction to protect a successful defamation plaintiff.
An injunction is the prior restraint; a damages judgment is the subsequent
punishment. 
A. Defamation Damages 
We begin with the murky subject of defamation damages. This subject
is complex and contradictory because of several variables and distinctions 
in federal constitutional law, state common law, and state constitutional
law.227 In defamation, presumed general damages are compensatory damages
for the plaintiff’s non-pecuniary general losses of reputation, shame, 
mortification, humiliation, loss of standing in the community, emotional
distress, and mental suffering.228  The jury may presume these damages
and award them to the plaintiff without the plaintiff presenting any evidence.229 
225. See id. at 95, 101. 
226. Id. at 100 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1990)); 
see Chevaldina v. R.K./FL Mgmt., Inc., 133 So. 3d 1086, 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 
(declining to issue an injunction for defamation unless the defamation was made in 
furtherance of another intentional tort). 
227. See Mike Steenson, Presumed Damages in Defamation Law, 40 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1492, 1494 (2014). 
228. See id. at 1502–03 (quoting JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 1704 (2018)).
229. Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 454 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760–61 (1985)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 559 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (stating that no actual harm is necessary 
to state a cause of action for defamation); id. § 570 (discussing recovery without proving 
actual injury).  A state may go beyond the Sullivan decisions and abolish the doctrine of 
presumed damages.  3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 574, at 336.  For example, 
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Second, the plaintiff may recover proved injury to his reputation plus
emotional distress.230 If people believed the defendant’s falsehood and
shunned the plaintiff’s business, the plaintiff may recover compensatory 
damages for pecuniary losses like lost employment or lost business.231 The
plaintiff may recover for the expense of defending his or her reputation with,
for example, corrective advertising.232 
Third, the plaintiff may recover punitive damages if the defendant’s 
misconduct exceeds the jurisdiction’s misconduct threshold, reckless disregard,
implied malice, or actual malice.233 The defendant’s knowing or reckless 
falsehood may trigger a punitive damages judgment to punish and deter the
behavior.234 
The Supreme Court has blended the Sullivan principles with the damages
measures. In a private plaintiff’s libel action, the United States Constitution 
does not bar punitive damages or presumed damages.235 If the plaintiffs
prove that their defendants knowingly or recklessly published a falsehood,
the plaintiffs may recover presumed general damages to their reputation
plus punitive damages.236 The result is complex and subtle. A private plaintiff
defamed on a matter of private or no-public concern may recover presumed
general damages to reputation and punitive damages.237 A private plaintiff
defamed on a matter of public concern must show defendant’s negligence 
or more serious fault to recover compensatory damages.238  A court may
impose damages liability for a defendant’s defamatory falsehood about a
private individual regarding a matter of public concern if the defendant made
in New Mexico, a plaintiff’s prima facie case for defamation must include proof of actual 
injury to reputation, proof of humiliation, and anguish.  Smith v. Durden, 276 P.3d 943, 951 
(N.M. 2012); see also Steenson, supra note 227, at 1492. 
230. Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 99 (citing Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 65–66
(Tex. 2013)).
231.  See Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 65–66. 
232. See 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 574, at 338. 
233. Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 99 (citing Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 65–66); 3 DOBBS,
HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 574, at 338–41 (first citing Den Norske Ameriekalinje 
Actiesselskabet v. Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n, 122 N.E. 463, 464 (N.Y. 1919); and then 
citing Prozeralik v. Capital Cities Commc’ns, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 34, 48 (N.Y. 1993)); see 1 
ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 10:3.5, 
at 10-24 to -25 (5th ed. 2018); Anderson, Tortious, supra note 64, at 77–79. 
234. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 751; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 349 (1974); Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 8 n.20).
235. See, e.g., Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 99. 
236. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
237. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979). 
238. See id.
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the statement negligently and it caused actual injury to the plaintiff’s
reputation or if defendant made it with “knowledge of [its] falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth.”239 A plaintiff who proves only the defendant’s
negligence may recover neither presumed general damages to his reputation 
nor punitive damages.240 
Justice Brennan expressed the policy base in a two-metaphor phrased
Defamation law affords “breathing space” to a defendant’s falsity to prevent 
“chilling” other later potential speakers.241 
Some policy and some clarity emerge from one court’s response to a 
defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s presumed damages for “mental 
suffering, personal humiliation, and impairment of personal and professional 
reputation and standing in the community without evidence assigning a
monetary value to the injury” bar punitive damages because presumed damages 
plus punitive damages comprise an impermissible double recovery.242 Both,
defendant reasoned, consist of “unquantifiable elements resulting from damaged
reputation.”243 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument, in effect, that presumed
damages, general damages to reputation, are punitive.244 
[I]t is often extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the average plaintiff in such
an action to present evidence which would support an award of compensatory
damages based upon the actual harm sustained. Presumed damages are similar
to the general damages awarded a personal injury plaintiff for the pain, suffering
and disability resulting from an injury.F 245 
From the fact that the plaintiff was injured by the defendant’s tort, the judge
lets the jury assume that presumed general damages or pain and suffering 
occurred. 
“[C]ompensation,” moreover, the court continued, “is not the purpose of
punitive damages.”246 Punitive damages punish and deter wrongdoers, but
presumed damages compensate victims. The defendant’s misconduct may 
call for punishment over and above an award of compensatory damages.
239. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348–49; see Herbert, 441 U.S. at 160; FREDERICK SCHAUER,
FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 171 (1982). 
240. Anderson, Tortious, supra note 64, at 78. 
241. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
242. Winters v. Greeley, 545 N.E.2d 422, 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
243.  Id. 
244. Id. at 427–28. 
245. Id.
246. Id. at 428. 
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Punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages do not “constitute 
an impermissible double recovery.”247 
A major part of many defamation plaintiffs’ compensatory damages 
comprises of damages for emotional distress and lost reputation. A defamation
plaintiff may recover punitive damages, which are explicitly based on policies 
of punishment and deterrence.248 How accurate is it to call defamation 
damages punishment to qualify as subsequent punishment under the prior 
restraint rule? Compensatory damages compensate and deter, but they are 
not called punishment. If the preferred alternative to the prior restraint of 
an injunction is the subsequent punishment of damages, then only punitive 
damages are purely punishment. The other forms of damages recovery are 
compensatory damages with, at best, a shaky claim to be punishment. 
Defamation damages have been controversial.249 In a movement called
tort reform, actual and potential tort defendants favor measures that eliminate 
their potential liability or reduce its consequences.250 Quite a bit of tort reform
is damages reform. Under the banner of free speech and the First Amendment,
the arguments that assail defamation damages include a lot of standard 
tort-reform rhetoric: There is too much liability. Damages are too high.
And juries are out of control.251 
Critics assert that defamation damages are surrogate punitive damages: 
“Compensatory damages for defamation are already highly subjective and
may even contain a hidden punitive component. To permit additional punitive 
damages, therefore, may punish the defendant twice and provide the plaintiff
with a windfall grossly out of proportion to actual injury.”252 
Just as modern-day tort reformers attack personal injury plaintiffs’ damages 
for pain and suffering, defamation reformers assail non-pecuniary compensatory
damages for defamation as imprecise, unpredictable, and potentially crushing. 
247. Id. at 429. 
248. See Anderson, Reforming, supra note 81, at 522–23. 
249. See generally, Sheldon W. Halpern, Values and Value: An Essay on Libel Reform, 
47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 227 (1990) (arguing that this controversy stems in part from the
actions of juries awarding damages). 
250. See e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: 
The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
1, 3–4, 7 (2002). 
251. See generally id.
252. RODNEY A. SMOLLA ET AL., ANNENBERG WASH. PROGRAM, PROPOSAL FOR THE
REFORM OF LIBEL LAW: THE REPORT OF THE LIBEL REFORM PROJECT OF THE ANNENBERG 
WASHINGTON PROGRAM 25 (1988). 
645
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State tort-reform capping statutes apply to defamation damages.253 Justice
White concurring in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
wrote that limiting the damages that the plaintiff could recover may be wiser 
because presumed damages to reputation and punitive damages are particularly
questionable.254 Dissenting in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Justice Marshall
favored limiting a private-figure libel plaintiff to only actual damages.255 
Anderson’s proposal to reform defamation damages maintained that 
presumed general damages should be eliminated completely.256  A defamation 
plaintiff could recover for an injured reputation or emotional harm only if
the plaintiff proved an actual loss.257 Another defamation reformer, Professor 
Halpern, maintained that “although equipped to deal with life and liberty, 
the jury’s hands are too indelicate to be entrusted with matter touching on 
a fragile [F]irst [A]mendment.”258 Plaintiffs’ recoveries of “apparently open-
ended and unstructured awards of presumed damages are at the center of 
the antipathy toward the jury.”259 He argued that presumed damages and
punitive damages should be eliminated in defamation, except to allow punitive 
damages based on clear and convincing evidence of intent to harm.260 
Van Alstyne argued that the threat of punitive damages chills expression 
so much that they should be abolished.261 Professor Barron responded that 
the possibility of punitive damages empowers the “individual plaintiff to 
transform himself from David to Goliath.”262 
Punitive damages, it was said, are “an excessive chill on free expression
and may be devastating to defendant.”263 They “bear no relation to reality, 
sometimes serving to vent distaste for the nature or character of the defendant 
253. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hebert, 830 N.W.2d 704, 704, 710 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) 
(citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(3) (West 2019)) (capping judgment against a government 
employee). 
254. 472 U.S. 749, 771–72 (1985) (White, J., concurring). 
255. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 84 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
256. See Anderson, Reforming, supra note 81, at 490. 
257. See id. at 542–43, 547; David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and 
Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 774–75 (1984); Anderson, Tortious, supra note 64, 
at 79–82. 
258. Halpern, supra note 249, at 247. 
259. Id. at 243. 
260.  Id. at 245, 247, 249. 
261. Van Alstyne, supra note 66, at 808–09; see Anderson, Reforming, supra note 81, at 
542–43. 
262. Jerome A. Barron, Punitive Damages in Libel Cases—First Amendment Equalizer?, 
47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 105, 122 (1990). 
263. Id. at 115 (quoting SMOLLA ET AL., supra note 252, at 25). 
646
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instead of fulfilling any rational interest in deterrence.”264 Punitive damages
may be abolished by a state constitution265 or statute.266 
Judicial tort reform through the Sullivan line of decisions was the most
important defamation reform.267 Judge Sack, the author of the leading book
on defamation, asked whether the Sullivan rules “worked”: 
My impression, and it is no more than that—albeit in light of my reading of many,
many appellate cases in this area decided since Sullivan—is that, overall and with
some remarkable exceptions, it has. The press’s reporting on public figures appears
to be largely free from intimidation by the threat of defamation lawsuits.268 
The reforms eventually succeeded.269  Also, beginning in the 1990s, the
Supreme Court began judicial tort reform of punitive damages under the 
United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.270 
Baldder is a private, not a public, plaintiff. He is suing Lokki, a private 
defendant. The subject of Lokki’s liability is either her intentional private 
criticism or the “public” issue of consumer protection.271 If Baldder makes it 
to the end of the libel litigation labyrinth, Lokki’s intentional, perhaps
malicious, libel will likely qualify Baldder to recover his pecuniary losses,
presumed general compensatory damages to his reputation, and perhaps 
punitive damages to punish Lokki.
264. SMOLLA ET AL., supra note 252, at 25.
265. E.g., Stone v. Essex Cty. Newspaper, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161, 169 (Mass. 1975)
(citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974)); Wheeler v. Green, 593 P.2d 
777, 788–89 (Or. 1979). 
266. Brantley v. Zantop Int’l Airlines, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1032, 1035–36 (E.D. Mich. 
1985).
267. 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 577, at 349.
268. Sack, supra note 85, at 288. 
269. Ardia, supra note 1, at 11 & nn.31–32 (first citing John Koblin, The End of 
Libel?, OBSERVER (June 9, 2010, 1:23 AM), https://observer.com/2010/06/the-end-of-libel/
[https://perma.cc/GGV3-FALD]; and then citing Eric P. Robinson, The End of Libel? Or 
Just Libel Trials?, BLOG L. ONLINE (June 22, 2010), https://bloglawonline.blogspot.com/ 
2010/06/end-of-libel-or-just-libel-trials.html [https://perma.cc/ZX4J-GAS4]).
270. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499–502, 506 (2008);
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349–53 (2007); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 559 (1996); see also Doug Rendleman, A Plea to Reject the United
States Supreme Court’s Due-Process Review of Punitive Damages, in THE LAW OF REMEDIES:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE COMMON LAW 533, 534–36 (Jeff Berryman & Rick Bigwood eds., 
2010); Doug Rendleman, Common Law Punitive Damages: Something for Everyone?, 7 
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1, 9–15 (2009). 
271. See Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., 655 A.2d 417, 428 
(N.J. 1995) (finding that consumer fraud is a public issue). 
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Do the differences between an injunction and damages mean that a court
should favor the plaintiff’s damages recovery and disfavor his injunction?
This Article turns to the ways the injunction remedy differs from the damages
remedy.272 It will discuss several ways an injunction differs from damages: 
the inadequacy prerequisite, preventive relief, interlocutory relief, juryless
procedure, drafting an injunction, motions to modify-dissolve an injunction, 
and contempt. In a little more detail, a judge’s decision to grant a plaintiff 
an injunction differs from the decision to award a plaintiff damages: To 
receive an injunction, first, the plaintiff must show inadequacy-irreparability.273 
Second, a successful plaintiff receives an injunction that is preventive 
relief. Third, the judge may grant a deserving plaintiff an interlocutory
injunction before the plenary trial.274 Fourth, the process leading to an injunction 
will not include a jury.275 Fifth, the judge must draft an injunction. After
drafting and entering an injunction, the judge must administer it, which takes 
two paths.276  Sixth, when an injunction is in effect, either the defendant or 
the plaintiff may move to modify or dissolve it.277 Seventh, when the defendant 
violates an injunction, contempt will be the remedy.278 A plaintiff’s damages
judgment for a sum of money, on the other hand, enables the plaintiff to
collect from the defendant’s assets, in the absence of voluntary payment, 
through the impersonal techniques of execution, garnishment, and judgment 
lien.279 The judge ought to grant a defamation plaintiff an injunction with
the differences and consequences in mind. 
B. Inadequacy-Irreparability 
One prerequisite for granting a plaintiff an injunction is the plaintiff’s 
demonstration that the remedy at law, here damages, will be inadequate and 
that without an injunction, the defendant’s wrong will cause him irreparable
injury.280 The judge grants the plaintiff an injunction to shield the plaintiff’s 
interests that he ought to be able to enjoy in fact because money will be an
inadequate substitute for those rights. 
272. First Amendment scholars may refer to the difference between the damages and
injunction remedies as a difference in form.  See EMERSON, supra note 156, at 504.  This 
Article uses more specific and descriptive remedies vocabulary. 
273. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
274.  E.g., Zant v. Dick, 249 S.E.2d. 508, 509 (Ga. 1982). 
275. See infra Section IV.E. 
276. See infra Section IV.D.
277. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(4).
278.  See generally RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at chs. 8–12. 
279.  See generally DOUG RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND LIENS IN 
VIRGINIA chs. 3–5 (3d ed. 2014).
280. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
648
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In eBay v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court established what it called 
a traditional four-point test.281 
The first two of the eBay Court’s four points are that plaintiffs must 
show that they are at risk of an irreparable injury and that damages will be
an inadequate remedy.282 This Article combines the two tests that the Court
stated separately because, as a practical matter, the two tests are similar,
if not identical. Unfortunately, the Court left lawyers and trial judges at 
large by not giving any context to the eBay test. As the eBay test works its
way through the process, however, its consequences have been deleterious to
plaintiffs seeking injunctions.283 
To some extent, contemporary courts’ preference for money damages 
“persists today.”284 The reason the Virginia Supreme Court gave to disapprove
the plaintiff’s interlocutory injunction in Perez v. Dietz Development, LLC
was that damages were an adequate remedy.285 
But are damages really a satisfactory and adequate remedy for a defamation 
plaintiff? A defamation plaintiff, like our hypothetical Baldder, will likely 
undergo emotional distress, lost business, and general damages to reputation.286 
Since a defamation plaintiff does not encounter lost reputation or emotional
distress in money, a jury or a judge will be challenged to value the plaintiff’s 
loss and to convert it to money. A business plaintiff’s impaired reputation 
281. Id. at 394. With respect, many remedies scholars, including this author, maintain
that the Court ignored more than a generation of cogent scholarly criticism of the irreparable
injury rule. See FISS, supra note 160; DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE 
INJURY RULE (1991); Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Resurrected?: Does a Recalibrated
Irreparable Injury Rule Threaten the Warren Court’s Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343 (2002) [hereinafter Rendleman, Irreparability]. For criticism, see 
RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 86; Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, 
The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 203, 204 (2012). 
282. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391. The other two points that the eBay Court tells an 
injunction plaintiff to demonstrate are that the balance of hardships and the public interest 
favor granting him an injunction.  Id. 
283. See THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 102–03 (2013); Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 281, at 234; Christopher B.
Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA
L. REV. 1949, 1983–84 (2016). 
284. Ardia, supra note 1, at 24–25; see Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 99, 101 (Tex. 
2014).
285. No. 122157, 2012 WL 6761997, at *1 (Va. Dec. 28, 2012); see also Metro. Opera 
Ass’n v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union, 239 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“[I]njunctions are limited to rights that are without an adequate remedy at law . . . .”).
286. 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 574, at 336–40. 
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may generate business losses, but a plaintiff’s lost future business profits
are notoriously difficult to prove and recover.287 Money does not restore,
an injunction prevents. “Glass, China, and Reputation, are easily crack’d, and 
never well mended,” observed Poor Richard.288  “[T]he [object of defamation’s]
ability to respond through the media will depend on the same complex factor
on which the ability of a private individual depends: the unpredictable event
of the media’s continuing interest in the story,” Justice Brennan wrote.289 
In the legal profession’s modern jargon, a court cannot monetize a plaintiff’s
interest in reputation because the values are incommensurable.290 
The defendant may be insolvent, unable to pay damages, a factor that
observers consider to support a court’s decision to grant the plaintiff 
an injunction.291 The majority in Balboa maintained that damages do not 
affect either a pauper or a millionaire because the pauper cannot pay at all 
and the millionaire can pay without any deterrent effect.292  The Texas court
explicitly rejected that point; it maintained that the defendant’s economic 
status should not change the plaintiff’s remedy.293 
The inadequacy of damages and the irreparability of the plaintiff’s injury 
from a defendant’s defamation are palpable under Professor Laycock’s
view that the judge should grant the plaintiff an injunction unless he could
take the money-damages judgment and buy the equivalent of his impaired
interest.294 A plaintiff’s reputation and emotional distress are not for sale.  
Neither the plaintiff’s reputation nor the plaintiff’s emotional distress is 
impaired in money terms.  Neither can be replaced by money.
If the factfinder does measure damages to reputation and emotional distress 
in money, both are uncertain and speculative. “Both because the thing lost is
287. See, e.g., Mindgames, Inc. v. W. Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 652, 654–55, 658 (7th Cir.
2000); Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 358 (Cal. 2007); Saks Fifth Ave., 
Inc. v. James, Ltd., 630 S.E.2d 304, 310–13 (Va. 2006); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Injunctions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 157, 170 (2007) (identifying the 
plaintiff’s difficulty of measuring and proving damages from defamation). 
288. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK 51 (Peter Pauper Press, Inc., 
1986).
289. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971). 
290. MARGARET JEAN RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 184–206 (1996). 
291. See Cornwell v. Sachs, 99 F. Supp. 2d 695, 703 (E.D. Va. 2000); LAYCOCK, supra 
note 281, at 75–76; Ardia, supra note 1, at 26 & n.105 (first citing Willis v. O’Connell, 231 F. 
1004, 1014 (S.D. Ala. 1916); and then citing Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1159 
(Pa. 1978)); Chemerinsky, supra note 287, at 170.  But see Willing, 393 A.2d at 1158 (deciding 
not to issue an injunction against an insolvent defendant’s defamation because damages were 
an adequate remedy). 
292. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, 156 P.3d at 358. 




LAYCOCK, supra note 281, at 37. 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
irreplaceable and because the loss is hard to measure,” Laycock wrote, 
“damages are a seriously inadequate remedy for defamation.”295 
Under any irreparability-inadequacy test, the judge must decide whether to
stand aside and watch the defendant inflict harm on the plaintiff’s reputation, 
only to award the plaintiff a money substitute later. Bringing the inquiry
into the wireless world, Professor Ardia asks whether a defamation plaintiff 
needs an injunction even more in the internet age.296 A negative answer came 
from the Texas court: The internet doesn’t change the plaintiff’s preferred
money-damages remedy for defendant’s defamation.297 
Money damages will usually be inadequate to compensate a defamation 
plaintiff’s unpredictable lost reputation and emotional distress, as well as
an unprovable future lost business.298 The plaintiff will not encounter lost
reputation and emotional distress in money. These damages are difficult
for a court to convert to money, showing that money will normally be an
inadequate remedy.299 By the usual standards, a defamation plaintiff’s
damages remedy is inadequate.  Without an injunction, a plaintiff will encounter 
irreparable injury.300 
C. Preventive Relief
To safeguard the plaintiff’s perishable rights, the judge grants the preventive
remedy of an injunction that looks to the future to halt or forbid the defendant
from harming the plaintiff.301 In contrast, money damages are retrospective.302 
They compensate the plaintiff after an injury by substituting money for the 
defendant’s past harm to the plaintiff’s interest.303 
The defendants’ side of the plaintiffs’ preventive coin is that an injunction,
even one to refrain, circumscribes her liberty, range of possible conduct,
activity, or like here, expression. In our hypothetical, the judge’s injunction 
will limit Lokki’s ability to excoriate Baldder with falsehoods. 
295. Id. at 165. 
296. Ardia, supra note 1, at 4–6. 
297. Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 100-01. 
298. See Mindgames,  Inc. v.  W. Publ’g Co.,  218 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 2000);
LAYCOCK, supra note 281, at 165. 
299. See LAYCOCK, supra note 281, at 165. 
300. See Bertelsman, supra note 157, at 322; Estella Gold, Does Equity Still Lack 
Jurisdiction to Enjoin a Libel or Slander?, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 259 (1982). 
301. See IT Corp. v. Cty. of Imperial, 672 P.2d 121, 125 (Cal. 1983). 
302. Republic of Para. v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 628 (4th Cir. 1998). 
303.  See id.
651
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A preventive injunction is not punishment.304 Ardia wrote that an injunction
is a “coercive sanction.”305 Coercive is correct because an injunction’s threat
of contempt will structure its defendant’s incentive to respect the plaintiff’s 
rights.306 An injunction forbids a defendant’s future activity at peril of
contempt for a breach, to say it is a sanction is, however, premature. The 
sanction will be contempt, perhaps criminal contempt, which comes later 
after the defendant violates the injunction.307 The judge will not punish 
injunction defendants unless they are convicted of criminal contempt.308 
Defamation victims cannot rely on counter speech to repair the damages 
a false statement causes to their reputation. “A lie gets half way around
the world before the truth has a chance to get its pants on,” is sometimes
attributed to Winston Churchill.309  If the plaintiff’s damages remedy 
is inadequate, the plaintiff needs an injunction’s preventive relief. 
D. Interlocutory Relief
A plaintiff’s interlocutory injunction counters the axiom of litigation 
that delay is the defendant’s friend.  To protect the plaintiff expeditiously
from irreparable injury, the judge follows incomplete procedure short of a 
plenary trial.310 
To persuade the judge to grant an interlocutory preventive relief, an 
injunction, plaintiff alleges the defendant’s imminent or ongoing irreparable 
injury to an interest that the plaintiff alleges he has a right to enjoy in fact 
and that cannot be compensated with money.311 If the judge finds that
damages are an inadequate remedy, the judge may take procedural shortcuts
to hasten to protect the plaintiff’s interest with an interlocutory order before a
full hearing.312 The judge suspends the procedural stages of pleading and
discovery to protect the plaintiff from the defendant’s course of interlocutory
irreparable injury.313 
304. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (saying that an injunction deters,
prevents future violations, but does not punish). 
305. Ardia, supra note 1, at 61. 
306.  See id. 
307. See United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 295 (1947). 
308.  Id. at 295–97. 
309. Marianne M. Jennings, The Role of the Teaching Scholar in Politically Charged 
Times, 3 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF. 191, 203 & n.37 (2018). Professor Anderson refers to a
public figure’s self help or reply as an unsatisfactory alternative. See Anderson, Reforming, 
supra note 81, at 526. 
310. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bennert, 980 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D. Me.
1997).
311. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
312. See, e.g., DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 360 (9th ed. 2018). 
313. RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 312, at 319, 360. 
652
POST RENDLEMAN PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2019 2:10 PM       
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Although the inadequacy-irreparability tests for interlocutory and final 
injunctive relief use the same words, the prerequisite that courts actually 
administer to consider a plaintiff’s motion for an interlocutory order is more 
demanding.314 Judges are stingy with injunctions at the interlocutory stage, 
yet they are more generous at the final stage. “[C]ourts at the preliminary
[injunction] stage routinely find that damages will be an adequate remedy
for injuries they would consider irreparable after a full trial.”315 Because
the judge grants an interlocutory injunction after incomplete procedure that 
risks error, judges may find lack of irreparable injury to reject an interlocutory
injunction that they would be quite likely to grant as a final injunction after
plenary trial.316 
The federal procedural system and the states that have adopted the federal 
rules know two kinds of interlocutory orders: the temporary restraining order 
(TRO) and the preliminary injunction.317 Plaintiffs will file many, if not
most, internet defamation lawsuits in state courts.318 Defamation is a state
common law tort.319 If the defendant and the plaintiff live in the same state,
diversity of citizenship to file in, or remove to, federal court will be absent.320 
The defendant’s federal defense, that the plaintiff’s injunction would be a
prior restraint that violates the First Amendment, does not create a federal
question for federal jurisdiction.321 The plaintiff may file suit in the federal
court’s diversity jurisdiction, or the defendant may remove a state lawsuit
to federal court; if so, the federal court should follow federal procedure, 
including Rule 65, respect the state substantive defamation law, and decide
the defendant’s federal First Amendment defense.322 
314. See 14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Ass’n v. VRT Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 712, 
715–16 (Ct. App. 1998). 
315. LAYCOCK, supra note 281, at 113; see JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING
REMEDIES §33.2, at 288 (3d ed. 2014). 
316. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bennert, 980 F. Supp. 73, 75–76
(D. Me. 1997); LAYCOCK, supra note 281, at 111–14, 117. 
317. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
318. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 369–70 (1974) (White,
J., dissenting). 
319. Organovo Holdings, Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 102, 114 (Del. Ch. 2017). 
320.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). 
321. See id. § 1331 (2012); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., JOHN LEUBSDORF & DEBRA 
LYN BASSETT, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.4, at 65 (6th ed. 2011); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 18, at 111 (8th ed. 2017). 
322. See generally McKee v. Cosby, 236 F. Supp. 3d 427 (D. Mass. 2017), aff’d, 874 
F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2017); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
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Although many states have adopted the federal rules, some states’ 
interlocutory injunction terminology varies.323 The points and citations herein
employ the federal terms but apply also to state courts with appropriately 
adjusted terminology. Lex, the forum for Baldder v. Lokki, has adopted
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for its state courts. 
Ex parte procedure, where the judge grants the plaintiff a TRO based
on only the plaintiff’s verified allegations and affidavits or declarations, is
contemplated under state systems and the federal rule.324 However, the Supreme 
Court has required more procedural protection when the defendant’s activity 
is speech- or expression-related.325 
In Carroll v. Princess Anne, the Supreme Court struck down a Maryland
state judge’s ex parte order against the defendants’ rally or public meeting 
in stating:
The 10–day order here must be set aside because of a basic infirmity in the procedure 
by which it was obtained. It was issued ex parte, without notice to [defendants] and
without any effort, however informal, to invite or permit their participation in the
proceedings. . . . [T]here is no place within the area of basic freedoms guaranteed
by the First Amendment for such orders where no showing is made that it is impossible 
to serve or to notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity 
to participate.326 
If the Maryland judge cannot forbid those defendants’ public meeting 
without notice, then, a fortiori, another judge cannot grant a plaintiff like 
Baldder an ex parte order suppressing a defendant like Lokki’s internet activity.
For, in the latter, the noise and traffic considerations in public meetings and 
street demonstrations are absent. Also, the ex parte order that the Minnesota
judge granted against Jay Near would be an unconstitutional violation of 
proper First Amendment procedure today following Carroll. 
The federal rule for a TRO anticipates that some TROs will follow attenuated 
adversary procedure.327 Federal procedure contemplates a second interlocutory 
order, the preliminary injunction.328 A judge will grant a plaintiff a preliminary 
injunction after notice to the defendant and an unspecified amount of adversary 
procedure.329 
323. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). But see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1(a)(1) (West 
2018).
324. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
325. See, e.g., Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 
(1968).  Ex parte temporary orders may be constitutional but are not wise and should not 
be granted.  See Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 44). 
326. Carroll, 393 U.S. at 180. 
327. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
328. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a).
329. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 333–41. 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
In addition to notice, what procedure must a judge follow to grant a
plaintiff an interlocutory injunction that affects the defendant’s speech,
which may or may not be protected expression? There are two techniques 
to reduce or eliminate error in interlocutory injunction procedure. First,
there is the preliminary injunction standard, a test that includes a calculation 
of how likely the plaintiff’s claim is to succeed on plenary hearing.330 
Second, there is the injunction bond.331 
May a judge grant a plaintiff an interlocutory injunction that forbids a 
defendant’s defamation following adversary, but less than plenary, procedure? 
“No” answer two prominent scholars, Redish, a generation ago, and Ardia 
in 2013; these scholars disapprove of all interlocutory defamation injunctions.332 
“Full adjudication” is required, wrote Ardia.333 Since the judge at this
point in the litigation process has not conducted the plenary hearing, in 
this view, the decision on the merits is tentative.334 Under one formulation
of the preliminary injunction standard, the judge must find that the 
plaintiff’s ultimate success on the merits is likely.335 This is not sufficient
for Ardia who insists that the judge should not forbid a defendant’s expression 
after a finding of the plaintiff’s “likelihood of success” on the merits.336 
The California court in Balboa and a New Jersey court in Chambers v. Scutieri
required a trial as a prerequisite for an anti-defamation injunction.337 
I am unable to accede fully because, for me, waiting that long to enjoin 
favors the defendant more than necessary.  A wily defendant can use pleading, 
discovery, and a motion for summary judgment to delay a plenary hearing 
for a year or more leaving the defendant’s defamation hanging in the air.
The judge, in my view, should require a defamation plaintiff seeking a 
330. See id. at 333; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
331. See id. at 333–34. 
332. See Ardia, supra note 1, at 38–41; Redish, supra note 159, at 87–89; see also 
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Every injunction issued before a final 
adjudication on the merits risks enjoining speech protected by the First Amendment.”).  
But see Wells, supra note 141, at 64–66. 
333. Ardia, supra note 1, at 38–41, 59 n.256. 
334. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 334. 
335. See id. at 333, 339. 
336. Ardia, supra note 1, at 59; see also Bertelsman, supra note 157, at 337 (arguing
that there is no reason not to issue an injunction after a plenary hearing). 
337. Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 343 (Cal. 2007); Chambers v.
Scutieri, No. A-4831-10T1, 2013 WL 1337935, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 4, 2013). 
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preliminary injunction either to show that success on the merits is 51%
likely, or consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with the merits.338 
Other scholars would require some judicial finding before a judge could
forbid a defendant’s speech.339 Under a sliding-scale preliminary-injunction 
standard, the judge may grant a plaintiff a preliminary injunction after finding 
“sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground 
for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the” plaintiff.340 
Whether a judge should enjoin a defendant’s expression after finding that 
the plaintiff showed a “fair ground of litigation” remains an open question.341 
The Dublin High Court, following that standard, granted the plaintiff an interim
injunction against the ISPs where the third parties’ defamation was lodged.342 
The judge, in my view, should not grant an anti-defamation preliminary
injunction based on a less than 50% “fair ground of litigation.” This position
eliminates the second branch of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ sliding- 
scale preliminary injunction standard.343 A court should adopt a variable-
threshold test that requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a strong probability
of success on the merits for a preliminary injunction in a free speech case.344 
Observers use imprecise language to describe appropriate prior restraint
procedure because they are discussing executive and administrative systems
as well as criminal and civil procedure. For the civil procedure we are 
discussing, the more balanced approach to a plaintiff’s interlocutory relief 
against a defendant’s defamation, and the one I favor, is Schauer’s for
obscenity.345  Schauer read Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess 
Anne with Freedman v. Maryland to disapprove ex parte procedure altogether
and to require adversary procedure before restricting a defendant’s expression 
338. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a); see also Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 532 (2003) (arguing 
that courts should eschew a preliminary injunction for an early trial on the merits). 
339. Wells, supra note 141, at 64–66. Volokh’s article agrees on the central point of
approving an anti-libel injunction if the court follows adequate procedure.  See Volokh, 
supra note 2 (manuscript at 42–43). 
340. Sonesta Int’l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir.
1973).  The question of whether the sliding scale preliminary injunction standard survives 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24, 51 
(2008), seems to have been decided, at least at the Court of Appeals level, in favor of the 
sliding scale.  See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 76–80 (2d Cir. 2010); Cornwell v. 
Sachs, 99 F. Supp. 2d 695, 702, 714 (E.D. Va. 2000) (enjoining defamation preliminarily 
as false advertising); Jean C. Love, Teaching Preliminary Injunctions After Winter, 57 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 689, 689 (2013). 
341. Sonesta Int’l Hotels, 483 F.2d at 250. 
342. McKeogh v. Doe [2012] IEHC 95 (H.Ct.) (Ir.). 
343.  Salinger, 607 F.3d at 76–80. 
344. R. Grant Hammond, Interlocutory Injunctions: Time for a New Model?, 30 U.
TORONTO L.J. 240, 278, 280 (1980). 
345. SCHAUER, supra note 189, §§ 12.1–.7, at 228–46. 
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[VOL. 56: 615, 2019] The Defamation Injunction 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
with a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.346 Factual 
evidence should, if possible, be tested by cross-examination.
As examined below, in almost all states and the federal system, there
will be no jury at the plenary trial for an injunction.347 An adversary bench
hearing with cross-examination of factual evidence followed by a judicial 
finding of the defendant’s fault and the plaintiff’s likely success on the merits
that the defendant’s statement was defamatory and false should suffice.348 
For a preliminary injunction . . . , the court must hold an adversarial hearing that
resembles, as closely as possible, a full trial, including adherence to evidentiary
rules, live testimony in addition to documents and affidavits, and an opportunity for 
cross-examination. . . . [P]rocedural protections and aggressive appellate review . . .
must also be available, as well.349
Courts have recognized that withdrawing the injunction remedy for libel is
primarily based on concern about incomplete interlocutory procedure that 
may not apply to injunctions granted after adversary procedure.350 
Professor Leubsdorf asked, could a plaintiff “get a preliminary injunction 
against defamation without [the judge’s] consideration of the merits, and 
would this amount to a prior restraint forbidden by the First Amendment?”351 
This article answers Leubsdorf’s first question: a judge should not grant a
plaintiff a preliminary injunction without considering the merits. If the 
judge did, the order would fail as a procedural prior restraint. 
A plaintiff who receives an interlocutory injunction will post an injunction 
bond.352 The bond requirement cautions a plaintiff against a hasty and ill-
considered application for interlocutory relief.353 And if an interlocutory 
injunction turns out to be incorrect, the bond is available to compensate
346. Id. at § 12.1, at 231, 232 n.21 (first citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965); then citing Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968); 
then citing Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S, 717 (1961); and then citing Tenney v. Liberty
News Distribs., Inc., 215 N.Y.S.2d 663 (App. Div. 1961)). 
347. See infra note 359 and accompanying text. 
348. See Wells, supra note 141, at 66. 
349. Id. at 66 & n.326; see Ardia, supra note 1, at 38–41, 59.
350. See, e.g., Alsworth v. Seybert, 323 P.3d 47, 56 (Alaska 2014); CapStack Nashville
3, LLC v. MACC Venture Partners, No. 2018-0552-SG, 2018 WL 3949274, *3–5 (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 16, 2018).
351. John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 33, 40 (2007) (first citing Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980); and 
then citing Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)). 
352. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c). 
353. See RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 312, at 480–82. 
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the defendant for her losses while the incorrect interlocutory order 
circumscribed her conduct.354 
The American litigation system does not have much experience with 
injunction bonds in defamation litigation. The judge, it seems to me, ought 
to set the bond after carefully evaluating the defendant’s potential loss from
an incorrect interlocutory injunction. A judge calculating a defendant’s
recovery of damages from a plaintiff’s injunction bond should consider
and evaluate that an incorrect order impinges on the defendant’s First
Amendment right to free expression. 
An example: After a disappointed car buyer excoriated the automobile 
dealer on a website, he was preliminarily enjoined to stop.355 During the
preliminary injunction period, the dealer’s lawyer threatened to have the 
customer-defendant “jailed or fined for contempt.”356  After finding that
the preliminary injunction was improper and dissolving it, the judge, in
addition to $766.45 of out-of-pocket defense costs, awarded the car buyer
$4,000 for mental anguish and $2,000 for loss of free speech rights from 
the dealer’s injunction bond.357 
E. The Absence of a Jury 
An injunction is an equitable remedy that is not included under most
constitutional guarantees of a jury trial.358  Except  in the state courts of  
Texas and North Carolina, an injunction defendant is not entitled to a jury 
for either an interlocutory or a final injunction.359  The Supreme Court held
in Alexander v. Virginia that a jury trial is not required for civil obscenity, 
a close relative of defamation.360  The plaintiffs in three of the defamation
decisions this Article examines, Tory v. Cochran, Kinney v. Barnes, and Balboa 
Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, forwent damages and sued for injunctions
only.361 
354. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c); RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 360–61, 365; see also
Cornwell v. Sachs, 99 F. Supp. 2d 695, 714 (E.D. Va. 2000) (requiring a $50,000 bond); 
RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 312, at 480–82. 
355. Crown Pontiac, Inc. v. Ballock, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1256 (N.D. Ala. 2003). 
356.  Id. at 1256–57. 
357. Id. at 1258–59. 
358. See, e.g., 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES–EQUITY– 
RESTITUTION 70 (2d ed. 1993). 
359. Eric J. Hamilton, Note, Federalism and the State Civil Jury Rights, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 851, 857–58, 885–86 (2013). 
360. 413 U.S. 836, 836 (1973) (per curiam). 
361. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 735–36 (2005); Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. 
Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 342 (Cal. 2007); Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tex. 2014);
see also Chambers v. Scutieri, No. A-4831-10T1, 2013 WL 1337935, at *5 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Apr. 4, 2013) (adjudicating a case in which the plaintiff sued for injunction 
only, not damages). 
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In Tory and Balboa, the California lawsuits, if the defamation plaintiff’s
demand for an injunction succeeds through pleading and discovery to
plenary trial, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant would be entitled to a 
jury.362 The judge will find the facts. The absence of a jury at the plenary 
trial for an injunction is one reason not to disapprove an interlocutory anti-
defamation injunction that followed the adversary procedure discussed
above. In Kinney, in the Texas state court, there would be a jury right.363 
If a defamation plaintiff demands both damages and an injunction, as 
hypothetical plaintiff Baldder does, his demand for damages is one at
common law that, with the exceptions above, brings a constitutional jury
right in its train.364 In the federal system and many of the states, the jury 
will find the facts leading to the defendant’s liability for damages and then, 
on the plaintiff’s motion, the judge may grant or deny the plaintiff a final
injunction that is consistent with the jury’s findings of fact.365 The jury will
determine whether the defendant said or wrote the statements that the 
plaintiff alleges to be defamatory, but the question of whether the First
Amendment protects the defendant’s expression is a question of law for 
the judge.366  The jury will play no role in that constitutional decision. 
“Equitable cleanup” is another approach to the jury trial that may be 
available in some state systems.367 Once a plaintiff’s case is properly filed 
for an equitable remedy, an injunction, the Equity judge will clean the case
up by conducting a bench trial and also ruling on the plaintiff’s demand for 
damages.368 
Many First Amendment and defamation scholars disfavor the jury in 
free speech and defamation litigation because they think that jurors lack 
sensitivity to free speech values.369  In the words of libel-reformer Professor 
362. See Tory, 544 U.S. at 736; Balboa Island Vill. Inn, 156 P.3d at 341–42. 
363. See Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 2 n.4 (Tex. 1993); Hamilton, supra note 359, 
at 857–58, 885–86. 
364. RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 312, at 382–85. 
365. See Beacon Theatres, Inc., v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501–11 (1959); Chambers, 
2013 WL 1337935, at *8 (finding that no jury trial is required for an injunction against defendant’s 
defamation); Hamilton, supra note 359, at 869 fig.1. 
366. See Redish, supra note 159, at 64–65. 
367. Hamilton, supra note 359, at 864, 890–91, 895–96. 
368. Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 456–57 (1932); Hamilton,
supra note 359, at 856, 864, 869 fig.1. 
369. See Anderson, Reforming, supra note 81, at 540–41; Jeffries, supra note 162, at 
428 n.60 (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83  HARV. L. 
REV. 518, 528–29 (1970)); see also Monaghan, supra, at 527.  But see CHAFEE, supra note 182, 
at 503; Ardia, supra note 1, at 63–65; Redish, supra note 159, at 65–66. 
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Halpren, “exposure to the vicissitudes of capricious juries” leads to “inflated
demands and verdicts” and “apparently open-ended and unstructured awards
of presumed damages [that] are at the center of the antipathy toward the
jury.”370 
However, Ardia and Professor Siegel disapprove of the judge granting 
an injunction before a jury finds the elements of defamation.371  Their 
requirement of full adjudication and a jury finding of defamation is 
consistent with their disapproval of an interlocutory injunction that forbids 
defamation.372 However, the professors’ prerequisite of a jury finding of 
defamation changes the traditional jury doctrines and departs from the 
typical practice that the judge may grant an injunction.373 
The First Amendment is a non-majoritarian protection for minority rights.374 
It shields people who expresses unpopular ideas from a majority’s decision 
to suppress their expression.375 “A common passion or interest,” James
Madison wrote in Federalist 10, “[will] be felt by a majority[,] . . . and there
is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party.”376  A jury 
that represents the community consensus may implement the majority’s 
impulse to suppress speech instead of protecting a weird or eccentric
defendant with splinter views. In addition, a judge who should be better versed
in First Amendment lore will also be subject to appellate review. Plaintiffs
Cochran, Kinney, and the Balboa Island Village Inn spurned damages and 
sued their defendants for an injunction only.377 In addition to probably not
expecting to collect damages judgments from their defendants, they may have 
known something about the jury in free speech and defamation adjudication.378 
370. Halpern, supra note 249, at 232, 240, 243. 
371. Ardia, supra note 1, at 39–41, 64 & n.278 (citing RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE
AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 27 (2003)); Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, 
and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 655, 726–35 (2008).  Judge Becker, 
who favored an injunction after a jury decision against the defendant, was constrained 
by Pennsylvania precedent that forbids an injunction against defamation.  See Kramer v. 
Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 678–79 (3d Cir. 1991). 
372. Ardia, supra note 1, at 38–41. 
373. See Chambers v. Scutieri, No. A-4831-10T1, 2013 WL 1337935, at *7–8 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 4, 2013) (finding that no jury trial is required for an injunction 
against defendant’s defamation); Ardia, supra note 1, at 63–65. 
374. See Terrence Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 
1164 (1977).
375. Id.
376. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 70 (James Madison) (Floating Press 2011) (1787). 
377. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 736 (2005); Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 
87 (Tex. 2014); Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 342 (Cal. 2007). 
378. If a plaintiff sues for defamation and demands an injunction, but not damages, 
the judge may decline an injunction and award him damages instead under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
54(c). 
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In addition, requiring plenary jury procedure seems to me to under-
protect a defamation plaintiff. If, as in Baldder v. Lokki, someone is using
a gripe-site to excoriate a home-improvement contractor falsely as a thief, 
that contractor’s business will decline or disappear almost immediately.  
Because delay favors the defendant, a defendant’s skillful lawyer may be
able to protract pleading, discovery, and summary judgment for a year or
more while the plaintiff’s business dries up.379 
A jury finding of defamation should not be a prerequisite for an injunction. 
A plaintiff like Johnnie Cochran or the Balboa Island Village Inn should 
be able to spurn the gold and sue a defendant for only an injunction. If a 
plaintiff sues a defendant for both damages and an injunction, a judge should 
be able, after the adversary procedure discussed above, to grant him an
interlocutory injunction. If one litigant demands a jury, the judge should 
be able to grant an appropriate final injunction following a jury trial and a
plaintiff’s verdict.
Before taking up an injunction, we will detour slightly to consider 
a defamation plaintiff’s alternatives, non-monetary remedies short of an
injunction. 
V. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIAL APPROACHES
Below this Article examines a plaintiff’s remedies for the defendant’s 
defamation: a declaratory judgment, nominal damages, a special verdict, 
an apology, a retraction, and a private settlement. Restitution, monetary
relief based on defendant’s benefit, instead of plaintiff’s loss, has not generated
much interest in defamation.  Professor Dobbs speculated that may be because
libel plaintiffs “are much better off with the vague general or presumed
damages and the unmeasurable emotional distress damages.”380 
A. Declaratory Judgment 
Does the plaintiff really need an injunction? A declaratory judgment is 
a litigated judicial order that defines the parties’ rights under the applicable 
379. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE: THE LANDSCAPE
OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS, at v (2013). 
380. 2 DOBBS, supra note 358, § 7.2, at 297.
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law.381  Some maintain that a declaratory judgment will suffice instead of
an injunction.382 
A declaratory judgment does resemble an injunction in the sense that
defendants usually obey both.383 An important difference, however, between
an injunction and a declaratory judgment is that the judge may enforce an
injunction, but not a declaratory judgment, with contempt.384 
A declaratory judgment may be a foundation for an injunction.385  For
a mixed example, an inventor who wonders whether her idea might, if 
commercially developed, induce a patent owner to sue her for infringement
may seek a declaratory judgment that the patent-owner defendant’s patent
is invalid and that her proposed product does not infringe any of the 
defendant’s valid patents.386 Based on a declaration, the inventor might, 
or might not, move for an injunction that forbids the defendant from suing 
her on its patent. Sometimes a declaration suffices. A judge applying equitable 
discretion could make a contextual decision that a declaratory judgment 
will fit the plaintiff’s needs because the contempt sanction is not needed
for a particular defamation defendant.387 
The Court in Sullivan held that the Constitution limits state authority to 
award damages for libel.388 Libel-reform scholars asserted that declaratory
judgments would protect the press from pesky plaintiffs’ libel actions.389 
They argued that few libel plaintiffs recover anything, since most of their 
lawsuits fail because the defendants lack Sullivan malice.390 Their research 
showed that most libel plaintiffs really only wanted to clear the public record 
and restore their impaired reputations.391 Libel-reformers’ proposals eliminated
money damages in favor of a terminal declaratory judgment of falsity that
is not a foundation for damages.392 
381. Doug Rendleman, Prospective Remedies in Constitutional Adjudication, 78 W.
VA. L. REV. 155, 167 (1976). 
382. See Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J.
1091, 1109, 1113 (2014). 
383. See id. at 1112. 
384. See id. at 1093–94, 1102–04. 
385. See id. at 1111 & n.102 (first quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (2012); and then citing
UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACTS § 8 (1922), 12A U.L.A. 528 (2011)). 
386. See id. at 1105, 1111 & n.102 (first quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2202; and then citing 
UNIF. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACTS § 8 (1922), 12A U.L.A. 528 (2011)). 
387. See id. at 1110. 
388. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
389. See RANDALL P. BEZANSON, GILBERT CRANBERG & JOHN SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW 
AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 224 (1987).
390. See id. at 180. 
391.  Id. at 177, 213. 
392. Id. at 211, 224. 
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In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., Justice Brennan advocated declaratory
judgment statutes to lead to declarations of falsity.393 Judge Pierre Leval 
suggested a libel action for a declaratory judgment of falsity without examining
Sullivan malice and without awarding damages.394 Professor Bezanson 
developed the idea that if no money damages were awarded, then there 
should be no Sullivan privilege bars for a plaintiff’s declaratory judgment 
of falsity against a defendant’s libel.395 
Representative Charles Schumer introduced a bill in Congress that provided
for a no-fault, no-damages declaratory judgment of falsity-defamation, 
which included the defendant’s option to convert a plaintiff’s damages action 
into a no-damages declaratory judgment.396 Potential defendants in media-
dominated or media-influenced bodies developed legislative defamation-
reform statutory proposals.397 
The Annenberg Washington Program’s Libel Reform Project proposed 
a comprehensive proposal similar to Schumer’s bill.398 First, the alleged 
libel victim must demand a retraction.399 The potential defendant’s retraction 
or opportunity to reply precludes the victim’s suit.400 Second, if the victim
does file a libel suit, either the plaintiff or the defendant can convert it into
a no-fault no-damages declaratory judgment action of falsity or not.401 
The judge would try the declaratory judgment promptly. No money damages 
would be permitted except attorney fees.402 Third, if neither party chooses
a declaratory judgment, which seems unlikely, the prevailing plaintiff’s
damages recovery is limited to pecuniary loss, harm to reputation and personal
393. 418 U.S. 323, 365–66 (1974). 
394. Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping
Sullivan in Its Proper Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287, 1288 (1988); see also Michael Kent 
Curtis, Monkey Trials: Science, Defamation, and the Suppression of Dissent, 4 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 507, 562 & n.314 (1995) (arguing to eliminate damages, try truth versus 
falsity, and for the loser to pay the winner’s attorney fee). 
395. See BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 389, at 221–24. 
396. H.R. 2846, 99th Cong. (1985), 131 CONG. REC. 16,942 (1985). 
397. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.STATE LAWS,UNIFORM CORRECTION 
OR CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION ACT 1 (1993); SMOLLA ET AL., supra note 252, at 7. 
398. Rodney A. Smolla & Michael J. Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal:
The Case for Enactment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 25, 32–34 (1989). 
399. Id. at 32. 
400. Id. at 33. 
401. Id.
402. See BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 389, at 211. 
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suffering and anguish, and excludes recovery of both presumed general
damages and punitive damages.403 
First Amendment protected free speech is not free. Sheltering someone’s
injurious and tortious speech has harmful consequences to third persons, 
harm that is neither borne equally nor distributed fairly.404 Recognition
of the argument that “many libel plaintiffs do want money” and that, for a
plaintiff’s actual damages, “money provides vital compensation” has militated
against converting the traditional defamation tort into a no-fault, no-damages 
declaratory judgment system in the interest of warming the “chilling effects” 
of successful defamation lawsuits against media defendants.405 “[F]rom
the defendant’s point of view, a declaration of falsity would not mean very 
much.”406 
As an exclusive remedy, the symbolic victory of a declaratory judgment 
falls short of the compensatory and deterrence goals the tort system seeks 
in the libel tort. The libel-reformers’ legislative proposals “fizzled out.”407 
403. Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 398, at 32; see SMOLLA ET AL., supra note 252, 
at 12; see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, supra note 397, at 
3. North Dakota adopted the Uniform Act.  Uniform Correction or Clarification of
Defamation Act, N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-43-01 to -10 (West 2010). The Commission
on Obscenity and Pornography recommended greater use of civil declaratory procedures
to avoid the effect of subsequent criminal punishment on future speech. See COMM’N ON 
OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND
PORNOGRAPHY 63 (1970). The Commission’s report states that: 
A declaratory judgement procedure . . . would permit prosecutors to proceed 
civilly, rather than through the criminal process, against suspected violations of
obscenity prohibition. If such civil procedures are utilized, penalties would be 
imposed for violation of the law only with respect to conduct occurring after a 
civil declaration is obtained. The Commission believes this course of action to
be appropriate whenever there is any existing doubt regarding the legal status of 
materials; where other alternatives are available, the criminal process should not 
ordinarily be invoked against persons who might have reasonably believed, in
good faith, that the books or films they distributed were entitled to constitutional 
protection, for the threat of criminal sanctions might otherwise deter the free 
distribution of constitutionally protected material.
Id.
404. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT.
REV. 81, 88–90 (2012). Professor Schauer gives the example of the tortious speech in
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), that the Supreme Court exonerated from damages
liability. See David S. Han, Rethinking Speech-Tort Remedies, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 
1137–38. 
405. C. Thomas Dienes, Libel Reform: An Appraisal, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 15–17 
(1989) (citing BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 389, at 93); see 3 DOBBS,HAYDEN
& BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 577, at 347–48; see also Donald L. Magnetti, “In the End, Truth
Will Out,” . . . Or Will It?, 52 MO. L. REV. 299, 349–51 (1987) (stating that the Schumer 
bill is “not a viable solution”).
406. Halpern, supra note 249, at 237. But see Anderson, Reforming, supra note 81, at
545, 548. 
407. Han, supra note 404, at 1140, 1154–56. 
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Professor Han published a proposal in 2014 in the Wisconsin Law Review.408 
Han maintains that either legislatures or courts ought to remake the law
by dropping as blunt and rigid the all-or-nothing binary approach to a
plaintiff’s recovery of defamation damages and replacing it with a flexible,
nuanced, and complex approach that balances and adjusts plaintiff’s damages 
by considering free speech principles and tort principles.409 With the respect 
due to his thoughtful and thoroughly researched proposal, it is dead on arrival. 
The declaratory judgment as an alternative or foundation remedy is
potentially useful. Many websites will remove material following a declaratory
judgment that it is defamatory.410 Moreover, some libel plaintiffs might
prefer the reputation-restoring value of a declaratory judgment of falsity 
or a public retraction over losing a damages action outright because they
had failed to prove Sullivan malice.
B. Nominal Damages and Special Verdicts 
The litigation system provides possible solutions that are variations on the 
declaratory judgment.
First, a plaintiff’s verdict and a recovery of nominal damages may resemble
a declaratory judgment because it labels the defendant’s publication as false 
and vindicates the plaintiff.411 Professor LeBel wondered, however, whether
nominal-damages litigation was an efficient way to use the court system.412 
Second, in Ariel Sharon’s libel suit against Time Magazine,413 the trial
judge instructed the jury to return special verdicts on the separate questions
of falsity, libel, and Sullivan malice.414 The jury found that the magazine’s
statements were false and defamatory, but it insulated the magazine from 
liability to Sharon for damages because Time’s Sullivan malice was lacking.415 
408. Id. at 1135–99. 
409. See id. at 1192–94. 
410. See Aaron Morris, How to Stop Defamation When You Can’t Afford an Attorney,
INTERNET DEFAMATION BLOG (July 5, 2016), http://internetdefamationblog.com/how-to-
stop-defamation-when-you-cant-afford-an-attorney/#more-11 [https://perma.cc/Y325-JMSL]. 
411. Afro-American Publ’g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Grossman
v. Goemans, 631 F. Supp. 972, 974 (D.D.C. 1986) (quoting Arilie Foundation, Inc. v. 
Evening Star Newspaper Co., 337 F. Supp. 421, 431 (D.D.C. 1972)) (awarding $2500 nominal
damages for defamation); see Robertson v. McCloskey, 680 F. Supp. 414, 416 (D.D.C. 1988).
412. See Paul A. LeBel, The Infliction of Harm Through the Publication of Fiction:
Fashioning a Theory of Liability, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 318 & n.149 (1985). 
413. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
414. See Magnetti, supra note 405, at 360–61. 
415. Id. at 361. 
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The litigants’ reactions were, to say the least, mixed. Plaintiff Sharon 
felt that the widely publicized verdict of falsity meant that he was vindicated 
because he won a moral victory.416 However, Time issued a statement that
Sharon’s suit never should have been in court and that “Time has won it.”417 
Exonerating an intentional or malicious tortfeasor is a serious step.  The
Comment in the Second Restatement of Torts, suggests that a damage
judgment for compensatory or punitive damage may vindicate the injured 
party better than a simple determination of legal rights leading to nominal
damages.418 
C. Retraction, Reply, Apology, Settlement 
In addition to a declaratory judgment, other possible personal orders that
might be defamation remedies include retraction, reply, and apology. In
Kinney v. Barnes, Kinney asked for an apology and a retraction but dropped
those remedies in the trial court.419 States have voluntary retraction statutes
that allow a libel defendant to mitigate a plaintiff’s damages, usually punitive
damages.420 A reply statute is another possibility.421 However, a court-ordered
retraction or reply through an injunction ordering the defendant to recant
or to print the plaintiff’s reply is forced speech that may violate the First
Amendment.422 In any event, there is reason to doubt that a defendant’s
retraction effectively undoes the plaintiff’s damage or restores his reputation.423 
“We are not persuaded, however,” wrote the Iowa court about internet
defamation, “that the Internet’s ability to restore reputations matches its ability 
to destroy them.”424 
The apology as part of a personal order, an injunction or coercive contempt, 
has generated scholarly interest. Some is positive.425 But some is negative;
416. See id.
417. Id. (quoting Statement from Time Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1985, at B4, col. 1). 
418. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 90 cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1979).
419. Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tex. 2014). 
420. Anderson, Reforming, supra note 81, at 547. 
421. See generally 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 576, at 346–47; 
Magnetti, supra note 405, at 346–49. 
422. See, e.g., Miami-Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); Kramer 
v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 682 (3d Cir. 1991) (no forced retraction); William W. Van 
Alstyne, The Möbius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C. L. 
REV. 539, 543–44 (1978). 
423. See Halpern, supra note 249, at 241. 
424. Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 454 (Iowa 2013). 
425. See, e.g., John G. Fleming, Retraction and Reply: Alternative Remedies for
Defamation, 12 U.B.C. L. REV. 15, 30–31 (1978); Walter V. Schaefer, Defamation and the 
First Amendment: The Coen Lecture, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (1980); Daniel W.
Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 69–71 
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[VOL. 56: 615, 2019] The Defamation Injunction 
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an apology, which the defendant may fake, is not a substitute for adequate 
compensation.426 In an empirical experimental study, judges were “largely
unmoved by apologies.”427 My views coincide with the skeptics. A defendant’s
apology, pressured by the leverage of an injunction or coercive contempt, is 
forced and lacks a ring of genuineness and sincerity.428 An observer may 
take a defendant’s voluntary apology under the shadow of probable liability
with a grain of salt.
Many potential defamation plaintiffs ask their potential defendants for
correction, retraction, or an apology.429 Of course, because of a defendant’s
personal or professional ethics or as a part of a private settlement, a libel 
defendant can correct or retract an error, even apologize. Many newspapers 
regularly correct factual errors.  To settle a lawsuit, a libel defendant can agree,
as the National Enquirer did, to publish a retraction written by the victim’s
lawyer and to establish an annual prize.430 
If a declaratory judgment will not always suffice and if retraction, reply, 
and apology are not apposite, then what kind of personal order will be 
appropriate?  “The present law of libel is a failure,” Anderson insisted.431 
“It denies most defamation victims any remedy, and at the same time chills 
speech by encouraging high litigation costs and occasional large judgments.
The route to reform is obvious: provide a remedy that will simplify litigation
and reduce the threat of windfall verdicts.”432 Anderson examines several 
reform proposals, but he does not mention the injunction.433  The defamation
reformers jumped from damages to the declaratory judgment, leapfrogging
(1994) (arguing that although “plaintiffs may prefer money to an apology,” apologies should
be complete defenses to dignitary torts). 
426. Lee Taft, On Bended Knee (with Fingers Crossed), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 601, 
610–11 (2006).
427. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Contrition in the Courtroom:
Do Apologies Affect Adjudication?, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1189, 1214–16, 1215 tbl.3 (2013). 
428. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 735–37. 
429. See, e.g., Roth v. Greensboro News Co., 6 S.E.2d 882, 885 (N.C. 1940). 
430. Jim Dwyer, Lies About Hoffman Yield Prize for Playwrights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
26, 2014, at A1. 
431. Anderson, Reforming, supra note 81, at 550. 
432. Id. “If libel law is to be worth saving, it must provide not merely nominal remedies,
but remedies that protect reputation effectively, at the least possible cost to speech.” Id. at
492. 
433. See generally id. at 537–50 (focusing instead on reconsidering constitutional law,
litigation costs, and general politics of reform).
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over this Article’s subject, an injunction.434   We turn next to an injunction 
to prevent the defendant’s future defamation. 
VI. THE ANTI-DEFAMATION INJUNCTION
Granting an injunction that forbids the defendant’s defamation will hinge
upon the judge’s consideration of the public-private distinction, drafting
an anti-defamation injunction, enforcing it, and administering it through
motions to modify-dissolve, contempt, finding a violation, and application 
of the collateral bar rule. 
A. Public-Private 
The judge’s decision to grant the plaintiff an injunction that forbids the 
defendant’s defamation includes two public interest-private interest issues. 
The Sullivan decision contributed important principles to free speech
generally. The Court emphasized that the First Amendment’s central meaning 
is a citizen’s right to discuss public issues, in particular to criticize a public 
official.435  While  Sullivan’s overarching principle shaped free speech
generally, the Court needed at least a quarter of a century of constitutional 
common law development to implement its principle.436  The Supreme Court
has tried to impose the First Amendment constitutional principles that protect 
speech onto the state law of defamation’s that protects reputation.437 The
Court has developed dividing lines with the phrases “public” “official,” 
“figure,” “private,” and “interest.”438 The public-private distinction serves an
important purpose, but it is not satisfactory. In borderline cases, and some 
that are not really borderline, courts’ results are unpredictable and random; 
the characterization often appears to be driven by results.439 The Court has
created an unsatisfactory body of rules that are unstable, complex, frustrating, 
and ambiguous.440 
434. See, e.g., Han, supra note 404, 1139 n.15. 
435. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964). 
436. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Wechsler’s Triumph, 66 ALA.L.REV.229, 252 (2014) 
[hereinafter Anderson, Triumph]. 
437. George C. Christie, The Uneasy and Often Unhelpful Interaction of Tort Law
and Constitutional Law in First Amendment Litigation, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1003, 1010–11 
(2015).
438. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 463, 470 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
439. See, e.g., Anderson, Promises, supra note 87, at 17–18; Volokh, supra note 2
(manuscript at 37–40). 
440. See Sack, supra note 85, at 291; see also Anderson, Promises, supra note 87, at 
16, 23; Anderson, Triumph, supra note 436, at 240–41. See generally Christie, supra, note 
437 (arguing that tort and constitutional principles are not well integrated). 
668
POST RENDLEMAN PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2019 2:10 PM       
 
     
  
 
     
 
         
   
   
  
 
   
   
     
   
        
   
 
        
  
    
      
    
   
            
    
 
  
         
       
  
  
       
       
  
[VOL. 56: 615, 2019] The Defamation Injunction 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Ardia raises the first public-private issue.  He maintains that, to qualify 
for an injunction, the defendant’s defamation must involve private, but not
public, issues.441 In other words, the judge may not enjoin a defendant’s
defamation that relates to a public issue.442 
In my opinion, tort law, including defamation, is public law, perhaps public
law in disguise.443 Requiring the defendant’s private defamation as a
prerequisite for an injunction would complicate the issues and unnecessarily 
reduce the number of liability decisions that qualify for an injunction. As 
an observer who favors an injunction against the defendant’s proved
defamation, I do not agree to limit the remedy to private defamation. 
Nor, I think, does the Supreme Court. In 2011, in Snyder v. Phelps, the 
Court exonerated members of the Westboro Baptist Church from a tort
damages judgment on free speech grounds.444 The majority opinion observed 
that: 
While these messages [“America is Doomed,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “Thank God 
for Dead Soldiers,” “You’re Going to Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” etc.] may fall
short of refined social or political commentary, the issues they highlight—the political 
and moral conduct of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation,
homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic clergy—are
matters of public import.445 
Both Jay Near’s newspaper and Anna Lemen’s protest activity raised public-
policy issues, in particular the way the local authorities were administering 
the prohibition and alcohol-control laws.446 In addition to liquor with attendant
issues of obedience to the law, both raised issues of business regulation, 
consumer protection, and public morality.447  The Near Court emphasized
the public features of the plaintiffs’ side of the public nuisance litigation.448 
By today’s standards, the Court’s public policy reasoning was backwards;
441. Ardia, supra note 1, at 68. 
442. Id. at 68 & n.308 (quoting Siegel, supra note 371, at 736 n.434); see also Bertelsman, 
supra note 157, at 337–39; Gold, supra note 300, at 253–58. 
443. See Doug Rendleman, Remedies: A Guide for the Perplexed, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
567, 573–74 (2013). 
444. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 443 (2011). 
445. Id. at 454. 
446. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 704 (1931); Balboa Island 
Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 342 (Cal. 2007). 
447. See Near, 283 U.S. at 704 (involving gang activity, gambling, bootlegging,
racketeering, and law enforcement’s failure to perform their duties); Balboa Island Vill., 
156 P.3d at 342 (involving child pornography, prostitution, drug sales, alcohol sales to 
minors, and business operating hours). 
448. Near, 283 U.S. at 721–22. 
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we think that public policy supports the person who criticizes the government 
rather than the targets of his criticism. By the Court’s standard in Snyder, 
Jay Near’s and Anna Lemen’s intemperate statements were “matters of
public import” despite their anti-Semitism and gay-bashing.449 Lokki’s
defamation of Baldder may be characterized as public in the sense that her
issue is consumer protection although her factual charge is incorrect. 
Requiring a private interest as a prerequisite for an injunction is a rope 
of sand, a guidepost on the road to nowhere. Public versus private is not
a workable or useful distinction. It is unstable, indeterminate, meaningless, 
and subject to manipulation. For example, a farmer’s billboard accused 
Reynolds Metals’ alumina plant of polluting the air with fluorides.450 
Preliminary injunction granted, said the judge, no legitimate public concern.451 
The judge’s view that air pollution is not a public issue is incredible today.
Internet decisions in state courts continue the inconsistency and confusion.  
A sex tape is in the public interest.452 An assertion of sexual abuse and failure
of justice is, however, a matter of private concern.453 Nor is a charge of child
molestation a matter of public concern.454 The best that can be said is that 
there is a large grey area between public and private and that courts’ decisions 
and explanations are result-oriented and contextual.455 
The law needs a principle of confinement to prevent judges from granting
injunctions against speech that is directly related to the political and social
policy process. It took twenty-five years to work out the uncertain borders 
around Sullivan’s limitations of damages.456 If courts approve a limited
injunction remedy in private libel, it may take a while for courts to fence
it in. If public-private is too subjective, a specific point in the process like
barring an injunction when the defendant’s expression is election-related
may serve to curtail this problem.
Second, a public-figure plaintiff suing to recover damages for the
defendant’s defamation must prove New York Times Co. v. Sullivan “actual 
malice.”457 As Judge Sack has observed, “actual malice” is a term of First
449. See Snyder, 562 U.S. at 454. 
450. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 224 F. Supp. 978, 979 (D. Or. 1963). 
451. Id. at 985. 
452. Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
453. W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1158 (N.J. 2012). 
454. Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 436 (Iowa 2013). 
455. See, e.g., Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment,
Attorney Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1629 n.365, 1631–33 (2009) 
(discussing the explanations courts give when refusing to apply Sullivan to defamation of 
the judiciary). 
456. See, e.g., Anderson, Triumph, supra note 436, at 252. 
457. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). A defamation plaintiff 
who is not a public figure may recover damages for the defendant’s negligent defamation. 
See 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 564, at 301. 
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Amendment art that does not have the common meaning of either “actual”
or “malice.”458 
Must a public-figure defamation plaintiff prove Sullivan malice as a 
prerequisite for an injunction? The California court in Balboa did not decide
that issue. Instead, in a footnote, it observed that the lawsuit did not involve
a public figure.459 Dean Chemerinsky assumed that a public-figure injunction
plaintiff like the late Johnnie Cochran, would be required to prove Sullivan
malice.460 The issue the Supreme Court granted cert to consider in Tory 
v. Cochran involved Johnnie Cochran as a public figure.461 Although Cochran’s
death after oral argument obscured the public-figure issue, the majority’s
decision that the injunction was too broad did not meet the public-figure 
issue.462 Justice Thomas’s dissent reprobated the majority for straining to
reach the over-breadth issue.463 
Making a contrasting point about a declaratory judgment, like an 
injunction a non-monetary remedy, Professor Bezanson argued that if a
declaratory judgment defendant had no risk of money damages, then the
defendant should not be entitled to invoke the Sullivan privilege rules to 
bar a plaintiff’s declaratory judgment against the defendant’s libel.464 The
plaintiff would not need to prove the defendant’s actual malice to secure
a declaratory judgment that he or she had been defamed.465 
A damages verdict awards the plaintiff money damages, perhaps a large
amount. It affects the defendant’s pocketbook, not directly the defendant’s 
future conduct.  An injunction, on the other hand, forbids the defendant from 
continuing or repeating the defamation.466 An injunction affects the
defendant’s conduct in the future by ordering the defendant not to violate 
the plaintiff’s legal rights.467 If the defendant obeys an anti-defamation
injunction, the defendant’s pocketbook will not be nicked.468 
458. Sack, supra note 85, at 283–84 (quoting Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron’s, 442 F.
Supp. 1341, 1349–1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Anderson, Triumph, supra note 436, at 
240–42. 
459. Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 343 n.1 (Cal. 2007). 
460. Chemerinsky, supra note 287, at 165–66. 
461. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 736 (2005). 
462. Id. at 737. 
463. See id. at 739–40.
464. See BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 389, at 222. 
465. See id. at 220–25. 
466. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 350 (Cal. 2007).
467. Id.
468. Obeying a takedown injunction may not be completely costless. 
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Do the damages and injunction remedies differ enough to warrant applying
the Sullivan privileges in a plaintiff’s action for damages but not in one
for an injunction? So long as the plaintiff has established the defendant’s 
defamation, which lacks First Amendment protection, I think so.
B. Drafting an Injunction 
If the judge decides to grant a defamation plaintiff an injunction, the
next task is to draft it.
A properly drafted injunction is the antidote to the fatal First Amendment
flaws of vagueness and overbreadth. 
When the language of a regulation [or injunction] is vague, speakers are left to
guess as to the contours of its proscriptions.  They are left without “fair notice” of the
regulation’s [or injunction’s] reach. Commonly, this uncertainty will lead them to
“steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas 
were clearly marked.”469 
“A clear and precise enactment [or injunction] may nevertheless be ‘overbroad’
if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.”470 
An injunction may govern a defendant’s conduct that the civil law does 
not. One example is a buffer zone injunction around an abortion clinic 
that forbids defendants’ picketing on the public sidewalk or street leading 
to the clinic.471 In the absence of the injunction, the defendants’ picketing
would be protected free expression.472 Other injunctions forbid defendants’
ancillary and preparatory conduct that, except for the injunction, would not 
be a crime or a tort.473 
Staying with Baldder v. Lokki, below are four examples of possible
expression-related injunctions for a defendant’s improper expression in 
defamation.474 
Lokki has called Baldder a thief on GripeLex, a consumer-grievance 
website. The judge finds that thief is false and defamatory. Baldder moves
for an injunction with two parts: first, to forbid Lokki from repeating the 
libel and, second, to order her to remove it from GripeLex. We will examine 
both parts of the injunction, although the part of the injunction that requires
469. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 266 (3d Cir. 2002)
(quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)). 
470. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972). 
471. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 753 (1994).
472. See id. at 762, 765. 
473. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 597 (Cal. 1997). 
474. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 1127–28 (discussing three obscenity injunctions);
Ardia, supra note 1, at 52–57 (discussing four defamation injunctions).  Ardia says “tailoring” 
for what I call drafting.  See Ardia, supra note 1, at 29. 
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Lokki to remove or take down the false statement from GripeLex presents
fewer drafting issues.  The alternative injunctions follow. 
First, the judge may abate her tort by forbidding Lokki from saying
anything at all about Baldder, in effect, a silencing order. If Lokki were 
the proprietor of the website, the judge could order it shut down. A few years 
ago, I called an obscenity silencing and shutdown injunction a “hardcore 
prior restraint.”475 
The trial judge’s injunction in Tory v. Cochran was in  this first class  
because it forbade Tory from saying anything about Cochran in public.476 
Justice Breyer, striking the injunction down, referred to it as an “overly 
broad prior restraint,” in effect reversing the injunction for two separate
reasons.477 The trial judge’s injunction in Tory was too broad because it 
forbade defendant’s potential speech that is not defamatory.478  It was a  
prior restraint because it forbade expression that the defendant had not uttered. 
Suppose defendant Tory changed his mind and heaped effusive praise on 
the plaintiff, such as, “Johnnie Cochran is the world’s greatest lawyer”? 
The trial judge in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe had enjoined
the defendants from distributing leaflets, a proscription that forbade a lot 
of defendants’ protected speech, probably including distributing The Chicago 
Tribune, a daily newspaper.479 An injunction that requires the defendant 
to be silent is an improper prior restraint.480 
Second, the judge may grant Baldder an injunction that forbids Lokki 
from “defaming or libeling” Baldder.  Under Federal Rule 65(d)(1)(C) or
a state’s equivalent, the injunction itself should also define defamation and
libel.481  If, for example, Baldder charges Lokki with contempt of an anti- 
defamation injunction for calling him a turkey, she may defend contempt by
showing that turkey is name calling, but not defamatory.482 
475. Doug Rendleman, Civilizing Pornography: The Case for an Exclusive Obscenity 
Nuisance Statute, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 509, 551–52 (1977) [hereinafter Rendleman, Civilizing].
476. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 736 (2005). 
477. Id. at 738. Professor Mayton argues that orders that are prior restraints are those
the judge would reject for other reasons, overbreadth, or vagueness, an approach that leaves the 
prior restraint doctrine nugatory with no work at all to do.  See Mayton, supra note 61, at 
268. 
478. Ardia, supra note 1, at 65–68; Chemerinsky, supra note 287, at 171–72 (arguing
that a Tory-type injunction against all of a defendant’s future speech against a plaintiff is 
too broad). 
479. Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 417 (1971). 
480. See Tory, 544 U.S. at 738. 
481. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1)(C); Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 34). 
482. See 3 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 7, § 572, at 325–27. 
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The injunction in Near was in the second class.483 As the Minnesota
Supreme Court correctly observed, it resembled an order forbidding further
defamation.484 Jay Near ceased publishing his newspaper after the trial judge’s
preliminary injunction.485 But he could have continued to publish. And,
if the plaintiffs charged him with contempt, Near could have argued that he
had published a non-libelous paper that did not violate the injunction.486 
A court today ought to rule that a no-defamation injunction is both too 
broad and too vague. It forbids the defendant’s expression that had not already 
been found to be defamatory, and it provides the defendant with insufficient
notice of expressions that would violate it.487 
A New Jersey court expressed a contrasting view in Chambers v. Scutieri.488 
That court approved an injunction that forbade the defendant from “continuing
acts of extortion” and “future extortion or attempted extortion.”489 The
appellate court said that the injunction was not too broad because it followed 
the criminal law.490 In addition, it was not too vague.491 With respect,
that decision seems vulnerable. The legal conclusions the court approved
seem to be both too vague and too broad for a constitutional injunction. 
Third, is a removal or takedown injunction. In Kinney v. Barnes, the Texas
court said that the trial court could approve an injunction that ordered the 
defendant to delete a comment that the court had found to be defamatory
483. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 705–706 (1931). 
484. Id. at 706.  The United States Supreme Court majority may have thought it was 
a shutdown injunction, but the dissent did not. See id. at 735–36 (Butler, J., dissenting); 
see also Ave. Book Store v. City of Tallmadge, 459 U.S. 997, 998–99 (1982) (White, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Fehlhaber v. North Carolina, 675 F.2d 1365, 1365– 
66 (4th Cir. 1982). 
485. See Near, 283 U.S. at 703–07. 
486. Rendleman, Civilizing, supra note 475, at 555. In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 
the Supreme Court misstated Near as a silencing injunction, in this article’s first class. See 
354 U.S. 436, 445 (1957). It said that the Minnesota statute in Near allowed a court to 
enjoin a defendant from publishing “future issues of a publication because its past issues 
have been found offensive.”  Id.
487. See Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l 
Union, 239 F.3d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding the terms “fraudulent or defamatory”
were too vague because it did not specify what defamatory statements); Ardia, supra note 
1, at 53. Ardia’s class three injunction would ban certain enumerated statements, maybe
not defamatory. It would fail as too broad because it enjoins speech not previously
adjudged to be defamatory. Ardia, supra note 1, at 54–55; see CapStack Nashville 3, LLC 
v. MACC Venture Partners, No. 2018-0552-SG, 2018 WL 3949274, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
16, 2018) (refusing an interlocutory injunction to forbid defendants from “making defamatory
and libelous statements about Plaintiffs.”).
488. Chambers v. Scutieri, No. A-4831-10T1, 2013 WL 1337935, at *1 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Apr. 4, 2013). 
489.  Id. at *1, *15. 
490. See id. at *15. 
491.  Id. at *7, *15. 
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from its website.492 Because such an order did not forbid the defendant’s
future protected speech, it seems to me that the court correctly held that it
was not a prior restraint.493 
Fourth, in Balboa, the California Supreme Court approved an injunction
that forbade Lemen from repeating statements the court had previously found
to be defamatory.494 This, Ardia maintains, with my approbation, is not an
improper prior restraint.495 As discussed above, in Kinney, the Texas court 
explicitly rejected this fourth type of injunction.496 
The judge, in the better view, may enjoin only speech that the defendant 
has published, “specific statements the court or jury has found are
defamatory.”497 This Article’s hypothetical judge may forbid Lokki from
again calling Baldder a thief. The judge may also order her to remove libel 
she has posted on GripeLex.
The judge’s injunction that forbids the defendant from repeating only 
proved defamation is not a prior restraint because it only forbids the defendant
from repeating or persisting in defamation, something that the judge has 
adjudicated to be bereft of First Amendment protection.498 If Lokki calls 
Baldder a “nutcase” or “an incompetent bungler,” Baldder must either move 
to modify the injunction to include those terms or start a second lawsuit.  
The Texas court, plus many of my Washington and Lee law students, think
that this type of anti-defamation injunction will be ineffective because the
defendant can employ synonyms and wordplay.499  We return to this objection 
below. 
492.  443 S.W.3d 87, 87 (Tex. 2014). 
493. Id. at 99. 
494. Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 342 (Cal. 2007). 
495. Ardia, supra note 1, at 56–57 (citing Balboa Island Vill. Inn, 156 P.3d 339); see 
also Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Developments in the Law—Injunctions, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 994, 1009 (1965). For those favoring “narrow” injunctions, see Bertelsman, supra
note 157, at 321–22; Gold, supra note 300, at 253–56; Steve Tensmeyer, Constitutionalizing 
Equity: Consequences of Broadly Interpreting the “Modern Rule” of Injunctions Against 
Defamation, 72 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 43, 51 (2017) (referring to approving such an 
injunction as “the modern rule”); Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 48). 
496.  Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 87. 
497. Ardia, supra note 1, at 67. Dean Erwin Chemerinsky wrote that such an injunction 
is also a prior restraint.  Chemerinsky, supra note 287, at 165–66. But he changed his position
later. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Tucker Lecture, Law and Media Symposium, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1449, 1460–61 (2009). As a scholar, he departed from his earlier position as
an advocate and favored my working hypothesis, enjoining defamation sometimes. Id. He 
did not document his conclusion in detail.  See id.
498. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, 156 P.3d at 344–45; Ardia, supra note 1, at 38–41. 
499.  Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 97. 
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The obligor or who-must-obey issue is the final point about drafting an 
injunction. An injunction typically requires three groups to obey: first, 
defendants; second, defendant’s agents plus agent-synonyms; and, third, 
others with notice of the injunction “in active concert or participation” with
defendants.500 
The California court in Balboa said an injunction that forbids a defendant’s
defamation would not be effective against any nonparties.501 This seems 
correct. An injunction will forbid the defendant’s expression that is also a
tort, outside the First Amendment’s ambit.
In contrast, because the defendant had hired picketers to oppose the plaintiff, 
the New Jersey court approved an injunction that also covered non-defendants, 
apparently the defendant’s agents.502 On balance, I think that court went too
far. A nonparty who repeats the defendant’s defamatory statement should
be added as a party defendant who is entitled to show meaning and context 
separate from the enjoined defendant.503 The plaintiff may add a website like
GripeLex as a relief defendant that, although not a tortfeasor, is necessary
for effective relief. 
An injunction that forbids defamation should only apply to named 
defendants. A nonparty, even the defendant’s agent, should have the
opportunity to re-litigate the defamation issue in a separate lawsuit or to 
be added as a party defendant in the underlying lawsuit. In short, a court 
should not require a nonparty to obey the defendant’s anti-defamation 
injunction. 
500. FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2); Doug Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to 
Injunctions, 53 TEX. L. REV. 873, 896–97 (1975) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2)). 
501. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, 156 P.3d at 352–53. 
502. Chambers v. Scutieri, No. A-4831-10T1, 2013 WL 1337935, at *15 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Apr. 4, 2013). 
503. Chemerinsky, supra note 287, at 161–62. 
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C. Enforceability 
The internet is international. An injunction that forbids defendant’s internet 
defamation may not be effective because the injunction may be followed
by copying and mirror sites, some overseas.504 Potential defendants may 
be beyond the court’s jurisdiction over persons and territory.505 
The structure of the internet means that take-down orders are potentially 
ineffective because others can copy and store the content.506  In March 2019,
ISPs were unable to stop international dissemination on Facebook of the 
massacre in the mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand.507 
Ardia wrote that the judge should not grant an injunction that will be
futile.508 He favors an injunction only for a “limited community,” a “limited 
audience,” in other words only for the defendant’s banners, handbills, 
flyers, and billboards but not for the defendant’s internet defamation.509 
Ardia’s objection seems pessimistic to me. An out-of-state defendant’s 
defamation may be contact enough for in personam jurisdiction over it in
504. Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
505. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 565–66 (1976); Ardia, supra
note 1, at 7; Douglas Rendleman, Free Press—Fair Trial: Review of Silence Orders, 52 N.C. 
L. REV. 127, 151 (1973). 
506. See Damien Cave, Australian Gag Order Stokes Global Debate on Secrecy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/world/australia/australia-
gag-order-court.html [https://perma.cc/B8QG-3ELK]; A. Odysseus Patrick & Rick Noack,
With Australian Gag Order Lifted on Cardinal Pell Abuse Trial, Details Finally Spill Out, 




507. Charlotte Graham-McLay, Austin Ramzy & Daniel Victor, Christchurch Mosque
Shootings Were Partly Streamed on Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/03/14/world/asia/christchurch-shooting-new-zealand.html [https://perma.cc/
D92D-8QF4] (“Harrowing first-person footage, apparently from a camera worn by a gunman
as he attacked the Al Noor Mosque in the center of the city, was streamed on Facebook — 
a grim milestone in the evolution of terrorism that raised questions about how tech companies
can block extremists from using social media to spread hate and inspire violence.”). 
508. See Ardia, supra note 1, at 78, 80–83; Normann Witzleb, ‘Equity Does Not Act 
in Vain’: An Analysis of Futility Arguments in Claims for Injunctions, 32 SYDNEY L. REV. 503, 
503–04 (2010).
509. Ardia, supra note 1, at 81–82. 
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the plaintiff’s state.510 Most defendants will obey the law as defined in a
personalized injunction.511 
The judge should not hinge an injunction on whether the defendant will 
obey because that holds the plaintiff’s substantive rights hostage to the
defendant’s potential obduracy. Finally, the perfect is the enemy of the good.
That the judge cannot prevent all of the defendant’s violations does not 
mean that the judge should not forbid any of them. In an imperfect world
of second-best remedies, Ardia’s requirement that an injunction must be 
effective asks too much of a real-world judicial solution.
D. Administering the Injunction 
Having granted the plaintiff an injunction, the judge must administer it.  
The two formal phases of administering an injunction are the motion to 
modify-dissolve and contempt for violation.
1. Motion to Modify-Dissolve 
Once the judge has granted the plaintiff’s motion for an injunction, both
the defendant and the plaintiff may move to modify or dissolve it because
either the law or the factual setting has changed.512 
A judgment for money damages, as distinguished from an injunction, is 
entitled to res judicata preclusion.513  The rules circumscribe a judgment
loser’s ability to reopen or escape a money judgment.514 If the time to reopen 
it has expired, an incorrect money judgment perpetuates error.  If the
defamation judgment above was for money damages and several years had 
passed when the appellate court reversed the substantive rule, the plaintiff,
relying on preclusion, would keep the money.515  On the other hand:
It is one thing to say that, once a money judgment has been paid and appeals have
been exhausted, the transaction is over, and quite another to say that a party may be 
required under threat of contempt sanctions to continue complying with an injunction
that no longer makes legal or factual sense.516 
Suppose a defendant orally accused a plaintiff of being “a queer.”  She
is enjoined not to repeat that epithet. Then the state’s courts hold that an
510. See Gubarev v. Buzzfeed, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1152, 1160–61 (S.D. Fla. 
2017).
511. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 625; Bray, supra note 382, at 1112–13. 
512. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5).
513. See, e.g., Reed v. McKune, 298 F.3d 946, 950–51 (10th Cir. 2002). 
514. See HAZARD, LEUBSDORF & BASSETT, supra note 321, § 15.15, at 719. 
515. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 18 cmt. 
a, n.a (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (citing Marriot v. Hampton (1967) 101 Eng. Rep. 969, 969). 
516. HAZARD, LEUBSDORF & BASSETT, supra note 321, § 15.15, at 719. 
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oral accusation of homosexuality is not slander per se.517 The judge should 
respond to the defendant’s motion by dissolving the injunction because the 
law has changed and the defendant’s conduct enjoined is no longer a tort
contrary to law. The California court in Balboa discussed the defendant’s
use of the California version of this motion when the factual or legal context 
changes.518 
Blasi argues against an injunction as a prior restraint that an injunction’s 
duration is not limited.519 The availability of the defendant’s motion to
modify or dissolve an injunction refutes that argument. If a defamation 
judgment was an injunction and the substantive rule changes, the defendant’s
motion to dissolve it should succeed. 
The coin has two sides. In our hypothetical, the judge has granted 
plaintiff Baldder an injunction that forbids defendant Lokki from calling 
Baldder a thief. Suppose that after the judge grants the injunction, Lokki 
learns that Baldder stole another condo owner’s coin collection.  He is indeed
a thief.  After his peculations are uncovered, may Lokki refer to Baldder
as a thief? Once the truth is out, Lokki’s motion to dissolve the injunction 
is a less risky technique than ignoring the injunction and risking contempt.  
It should succeed.520 
Emerson equated the injunction in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson with 
executive censorship because “the practical effect of the injunction was 
that the publishers, in order to avoid risk of summary punishment for contempt, 
had to clear material in advance with the judge.”521 The Texas court said 
that the defendant’s opportunity to move to avoid an anti-defamation
injunction did not answer the concern that it was an improper prior restraint.522 
517. Yonaty v. Mincolla, 945 N.Y.S.2d 774, 777–79 (App. Div. 2012). See generally
Case Comment, Tort Law—Defamation—New York Appellate Division Holds that the
Imputation of Homosexuality Is No Longer Defamation Per Se.—Yonaty v. Mincolla, 126
HARV. L. REV. 852, 852 (2013) (quoting Yonaty, 945 N.Y.S.2d at 776).
518. Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 353 (Cal. 2007). 
519. See Blasi, supra note 61, at 19. 
520. California rejects the collateral bar rule. Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 739 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The defendant could violate the injunction and raise the erroneous 
injunction as a defense to criminal contempt. Id. at 740 (citing People v. Gonzalez, 910 P.2d
1366, 1375 (Cal. 1996)). 
521. EMERSON, supra note 156, at 506; see also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 
U.S. 697, 712 (1931) (“[T]he renewal of the publication . . . would constitute a contempt 
and . . . would lay a permanent restraint upon the publisher, to escape which he must satisfy the
court as to the character of a new publication.”).
522. See Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 98 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Balboa Island Vill. 
Inn, 156 P.3d at 353). 
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Could an injunction threaten censorship because the defendant could move 
to the trial judge to construe, modify, or dissolve it? Would the defendant’s
motion to construe, modify, or dissolve an injunction threaten free expression 
as much as executive-licensing censorship?523 I do not think so. An injunction 
that forbids the defendant from repeating proved defamation may become
improper because the defendant’s mental state may change, the law may
change, the context may change, or the false statement may become true.524 
Although the Texas court disagreed, the judge’s response to a defendant’s 
post-injunction motion to modify or clarify because of a legal or factual 
change is a part of the injunction process that should be available for an
injunction against the defendant’s defamation.525 The risk that the judge may
develop a proprietary attitude toward an injunction is one the system needs to
accept.526 
2. Contempt
Contempt is the plaintiff’s remedy when a defendant violates an
injunction.527 Courts distinguish civil contempt, composed of compensatory
contempt and coercive contempt, from criminal contempt.528 This distinction
guards the boundary between civil procedure for civil contempt and the more 
demanding criminal procedure for criminal contempt.529 
A judge imposes compensatory contempt and criminal contempt after 
the defendant has violated the injunction and it is too late to coerce the 
defendant to obey it.530 Compensatory contempt and criminal contempt both
lead to substitutes for the plaintiff’s substantive right, a money award or a
criminal sanction.531 On the other hand, a judge employs coercive contempt
523. See Ardia, supra note 1, at 54 (quoting Near, 283 U.S. at 713); see also Wilson 
v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116, 122–23 (Cal. 1975); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and 
the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 727–30 (1978); 
Harvard Law Review Ass’n, supra note 495, at 1008–09, 1011–12. 
524. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, 156 P.3d at 356 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting); see also Tensmeyer, supra note 495, at 56–58 (“[I]f what was adjudicated was 
something narrower, such as certain words in a certain context, an injunction may extend 
only to uses of those words in that context.”). 
525. See Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 95 (quoting Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc. 647
S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. 1983)); Gold, supra note 300, at 256 & n.118. Motions to modify-
dissolve, Professor Volokh’s Article adds, are expensive and time consuming. Volokh, 
supra note 2 (manuscript at 31–32). 
526. Balboa Island Vill. Inn, 156 P.3d at 357 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(quoting Near, 283 U.S. at 713). 
527. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 629. 
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to achieve the defendant’s obedience to the plaintiff’s rights that the 
injunction protects.532 In all three forms of contempt, defendants may lose
money; in coercive contempt and criminal contempt, contemnors may also 
lose their liberty.533 
3. Violation
Our discussion of contempt begins with the issue of whether the defendant
violated the injunction.
A Balboa injunction that forbids the defendant from making specific 
statements may not stop the defendant’s defamation.534 Perhaps, as mentioned
above, an injunction  that forbids specific statements would be futile because 
the defendant will resort to variations, synonyms, and wordplay.535 Would
the defendant’s synonym of the defamatory remark violate the injunction? 
Returning to Lex, Lokki thinks she can circumvent the injunction that 
forbids her from calling Baldder a thief with synonyms crook, embezzler,
or larcenist. So Lokki calls Baldder a larcenist instead of a thief. Baldder 
files a show cause motion to charge her with contempt.  Should the judge
construe thief to include larcenist?536 
How literally should the judge read an injunction to decide whether the 
defendant contemnor’s conduct violated it? The difference between the civil 
contempt and criminal contempt affects my answer.
Civil contempt, compensatory contempt or coercive contempt, seems to
me to be the more likely remedy for a defendant’s violation of an anti-
defamation injunction. The plaintiff might be entitled to a more expansive 
and liberal reading of an injunction in civil contempt that will not lead to 
punishment. 
An example: A federal judge considered whether an injunction that forbade
a defendant’s trademark infringement, “PLAY-MEN,” in a printed magazine
applied several years later to her infringement in an internet website.537 
The judge replied that it did:
532. See id.
533. See id.
534. See supra Part III. 
Compare Ardia, supra note 1, at 30 (rephrasing an anti-perjury injunction to forbid 
535.  Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 97 (Tex. 2014). 
536. 
“lie,” “untruth,” “deceptive,” and “prevarication”), with Chemerinsky, supra note 287, at 
171–72. 
537. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996). 
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The purpose behind the Injunction was to restrict the ability of Defendant to
distribute its product in the United States, where it has been found to infringe
upon the trademark of Playboy.  Allowing the Defendant to contravene the clear
intent of the Injunction by permitting it to distribute its pictorial images over the 
Internet would emasculate the Injunction. The Injunction’s failure to refer to the 
Internet by name does not limit its applicability to this new medium. Injunctions 
entered before the recent explosion of computer technology must continue to 
have meaning.538 
The judge found that defendant had violated the injunction and imposed
a combination of civil contempts: a second injunction, compensatory contempt, 
a coercive contempt fine payable to plaintiff, plus costs and attorney fees.539 
Suppose the judge grants the plaintiff an injunction against the defendant’s
specified defamation. The judge’s injunction has both prohibitory and 
mandatory provisions: it forbids or prohibits the defendant from calling
the plaintiff a thief and it requires or mandates the defendant to remove or 
take down the defamatory accusation on the gripe site.540 We will use this
example to examine the three forms of contempt, compensatory contempt
briefly, coercive contempt, and criminal contempt. 
Suppose that after the judge forbids Lokki from repeating her defamation, 
defendant pickets Baldder’s business with a sign calling him a thief. Baldder
may file show cause and the judge may impose compensatory contempt to 
order the defendant to pay the plaintiff money to compensate him for his 
loss from her defamation. The judge should base the plaintiff’s award of 
money for compensatory contempt on his damages for her tort of defamation 
because a judge should usually measure a plaintiff’s compensatory contempt 
award to resemble the underlying tort damages.541 
With compensatory contempt, the judge awards the plaintiff the defendant’s
money that the judge had previously vetoed as an inadequate remedy.542 
Here, defendant’s synonyms for thief like crook, embezzler, or larcenist might
lead to a compensatory contempt award just as they would lead to an award 
of compensatory damages if sued over separately. Although, in addition to 
committing a tort, the defendant has violated a court order, criminal contempt 
seems to me to be less likely than compensatory contempt for a defendant’s 
tort that is not also a statutory crime. 
Compensatory contempt and criminal contempt parallel, respectively, 
the plaintiff’s civil action for damages and the state’s criminal prosecution.543 
538. Id. at 1037.
539.  Id. at 1037–41, 1044. 
540. See, e.g., Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 99. 
541. See Doug Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiff’s Remedy When a 
Defendant Violates an Injunction, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 971, 985–86. 
542. Id. at 971. 
543. Id. at 971–92. 
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On the other hand, coercive contempt is unique to enforcement of an 
injunction.544 The judge using coercive contempt will pressure the defendant
to let the plaintiff enjoy his substantive right to be free of defamation. This 
keeps the promise the judge made when she decided that money damages
were an inadequate remedy for the plaintiff and the judge’s decision to grant
an injunction instead of awarding damages. 
The judge will employ coercive contempt to achieve the defendant’s 
obedience.545 The purpose of coercive contempt is to secure the plaintiff’s
very rights for which money damages will be an inadequate remedy.546  The
judge has many coercive contempt options. One such option is for a judge
to re-enjoin the defendant with a schedule of fines that will be imposed for
future violations.547 
Suppose that defendant Lokki had posted her defamation on the GripeLex 
website and the judge’s mandatory injunction orders her to remove it, to 
“take it down” in the vernacular. Lokki refuses to delete her false statement
from the gripe-site. The judge may use coercive contempt to require her 
to comply. The judge’s chief coercive contempt tools are either to confine 
Lokki in jail or to impose a staged, usually daily, money fine.548  Both
techniques coerce Lokki to honor the plaintiff’s rights.  Several days of fines
or a short time in the county jail may convince her to remove the offensive
remark. Coercive contempt measures end when the contemnor obeys the
order.549 They remain civil contempt because she can obey and the fines
sanction will end; in the always-quoted metaphor, defendants like Lokki
“carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets.”550 
In coercive contempt, the usual ban on incarcerating a defendant without
criminal procedural protection is suspended.551 Coercive contempt confinement
has an awesome potential for abuse because it concentrates power in one trial 
544. See id. at 971. 
545. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 769. 
546. Rendleman, supra note 541, at 971. 
547. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 769–70. 
548. See id. at 769.  Volokh’s Article discusses coercive contempt to enforce a take-
down order. Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 14, 35). It makes an interesting point 
that would forbid coercive contempt confinement for a First Amendment-related violation
because there has not been any criminal procedure. Id.
549. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 769–70. 
550. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). 
551. Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Contempt Confinement: The
Terminally Stubborn Contemnor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 190 (1991). 
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judge without a jury to enter an order and then to incarcerate the defendant 
to enforce the order without the traditional checks of criminal procedure.552 
My conclusion about coercive contempt for a defendant’s breach of an
anti-defamation injunction is a mixed one.  On the one hand, the defendant’s
defamation is not protected speech.  After adversary procedure, the judge 
has found that the defendant’s libel tort exists and that money damages
are inadequate for the plaintiff. Compensatory contempt indemnifies the 
plaintiff’s past injury, but it does not forbid the defendant’s future violation.
The preventive relief of an injunction is an important remedy for an aggrieved 
plaintiff. The judge ought to be willing to coerce the defendant to secure the
plaintiff’s right to be free of the defendant’s tort. 
On the other hand, the judge’s focused power in coercive contempt is
troublesome. The defendant’s expression is involved, albeit expression outside
the First Amendment’s protective ambit.  The coercive-contempt judge should
engage in careful fact finding and consider lesser coercive measures than
jail, for example, a daily money fine. Just as the judge can appoint someone 
to make a deed when a specific-performance defendant refuses, the judge 
should consider appointing a surrogate to excise the offending remark.553 
Another possibility is to add the third party as a relief defendant, not liable 
under substantive law, but necessary for effective relief.  Trial judges and
appellate courts should consider a stay and a prompt appeal before a 
defendant’s coercive contempt confinement begins.554 
Although I do not think that criminal contempt is the most likely solution 
here, a defendant who violates an injunction can be charged with, and convicted 
of, criminal contempt. An injunction, among other things, is the equivalent 
of a personalized criminal statute. The judge wields criminal contempt, like 
compensatory contempt, after the defendant has disobeyed the injunction.555 
In the federal system and in some states, the public authorities maintain 
criminal contempt.556 The purpose of criminal contempt is to punish and
deter the defendant’s disobedience and disrespect.557 Although a contemnor’s
criminal contempt fine or imprisonment does not benefit the plaintiff 
552.  Id. at 190, 208. 
553. See, for example, FED. R. CIV. P. 70 and state equivalents. 
554.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a)–(b) (2012). 
555. Rendleman, supra note 541, at 971. Volokh’s Article emphasizes criminal contempt
a lot more than this Article. It builds much of its analysis on criminal contempt punishment; 
many of its conclusions are about criminal contempt.  See Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at
63).
556. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 800 (1987);
RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 872–76. 
557. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 629.
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directly, it deters the defendant by structuring incentives to avoid repeating
the breach which benefits the plaintiff indirectly.558 
Here we return to the question of whether the defendant violated the
injunction, this time in criminal contempt. The Article returns to the federal 
judge who was deciding whether an injunction against the defendant’s
trademark infringement in a printed magazine applied several years later 
to its infringement in defendant’s internet website.559  A criminal-contempt
judge should not rely on purpose and intent to read an anti-defamation
injunction spaciously.560 Contempt or criminal punishment for speech, as
such, even false speech, ought to be exceptional.561 The criminal contemnor
ought to be entitled to the same literal interpretation of an injunction that 
a court would accord to a criminal statute. 
Thief, for example, should not include larcenist to qualify the defendant 
for criminal contempt. The plaintiff should move for civil contempt and to
modify the injunction to include the defendant’s variation or synonym among 
the injunction’s forbidden terms.  If the defendant violates a modified injunction,
that misconduct could be charged as criminal contempt.
In Kinney v. Barnes, the plaintiff sought an injunction that forbade “the 
same or similar” libel.562 If the court had granted those terms, “the same”
libel could support either civil contempt or criminal contempt, but “similar” 
libel would support civil contempt but not criminal contempt.563 
4. The Collateral Bar Rule 
The collateral bar rule is an important feature of criminal contempt.
When the defendant is charged with criminal contempt for breaching an 
injunction, the collateral bar rule prevents the defense that the injunction 
is substantively incorrect.564 Under the collateral bar rule, a criminal
contemnor cannot argue to refute criminal contempt that the injunction is 
substantively erroneous, even that it is unconstitutional.565  The defendant
558. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441–42 (1911). 
559. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1037 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
560. See id. at 1040. 
561. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012). 
562. Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 89 (Tex. 2014). 
563.  Id. at 93, 97. 
564. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967) (quoting Fields v. City of
Fairfield, 143 So. 2d 177, 180 (Ala. 1962)). 
565. Id.
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must follow a direct attack, either a motion to modify or dissolve the
injunction or an appeal, not a collateral attack in criminal contempt.566 
Suppose, first, that the judge has forbidden the defendant from calling 
the plaintiff a thief. The defendant pickets the plaintiff’s office with a sign
calling the plaintiff a thief. If it turns out that the plaintiff is a thief, the 
contemnor would be acquitted of criminal contempt, except for the collateral 
bar rule. 
Suppose, second, that an injunction forbids the defendant from picketing 
within 500 feet of the plaintiff’s abortion clinic. Suppose, as is likely, that
a 500-foot buffer zone violates the First Amendment because it forbids too 
much expression. But because of the collateral bar rule, the judge may
nevertheless convict the defendant who picketed 475 feet from the clinic of
criminal contempt for expression that, in retrospect, the First Amendment 
allows. 
In its leading collateral bar rule decision, Walker v. Birmingham, the 
Supreme Court approved the collateral bar rule as a state rule of judicial 
administration that reprobated the contemnor’s disrespect for the court and 
court orders.567 But the Court was unwilling to accept the collateral bar rule
without qualification.  It introduced two exceptions: the transparently invalid
exception and the timely challenge exception.568 
If the injunction the defendant violated is so far off the mark substantively
that the court can label it “transparently invalid,” then defendants can
violate it, interpose its incorrectness in criminal contempt, and take their 
chances that the injunction is incorrect.569 Similarly, if defendants lacks
a procedural opportunity for a “timely challenge” to the injunction, then, 
also, they may violate it and argue against it on the merits.570 
566. See generally RENDLEMAN, supra 146, at 875–903 (discussing the Collateral Bar
Rule); Rendleman, Irreparability, supra note 281, at 1377–78; Doug Rendleman, More on
Void Orders, 7 GA. L. REV. 246, 248–49 (1973) [hereinafter Rendleman, Void Orders];
Doug Rendleman, Toward Due Process in Injunction Procedure, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 221, 
225–27 [hereinafter Rendleman, Toward]; John R.B. Palmer, Note, Collateral Bar and 
Contempt: Challenging a Court Order After Disobeying It, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 221– 
24 (2002).
567. Walker, 388 U.S. at 320. 
568.  Id. at 315, 318. 
569. In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1347 (1st Cir. 1986), modified, 820 
F.2d. 1354, 1354–55 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (finding that a prior restraint on pure 
speech by the press was presumptively unconstitutional, thus satisfying the “transparently 
invalid” exception). Although the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, it dismissed 
the case because the special prosecutor lacked standing. United States v. Providence Journal
Co., 484 U.S. 814 (1987). 
570. Rendleman, Void Orders, supra note 566, at 262–65; Rendleman, Toward, supra 
note 566, at 228–29. 
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Several state courts, including both Texas’s and California’s, reject
the collateral bar rule.571 In an abortion-clinic contempt appeal, a Texas
Supreme Court justice observed that “I cannot see how justice is served by 
leaving imprisoned those found to have violated an order shown to be 
unconstitutional.”572 In California, a person affected by an injunctive
order “may conclude that the exigencies of the situation or the magnitude 
of the rights involved render immediate action worth the cost of peril.”573 
Justice Baxter’s concurring opinion in Balboa developed California’s
rejection of the collateral bar rule.574 A defamation-injunction defendant may 
violate the injunction and defend criminal contempt by arguing successfully 
that the injunction was a prior restraint.575 
What should be the role of the collateral bar rule in criminal contempt 
for breach of an injunction that forbids the defendant’s defamation? Suppose 
a Balboa anti-defamation injunction is not a forbidden prior restraint and 
passes the constitutional test. California and Texas law allow a criminal-
contempt contemnor to violate it and then to argue as a defense to contempt 
that the injunction conflicts with the First Amendment.576 
Suppose another state judge in a state with the collateral bar rule enjoins 
a defendant’s defamation. Then is it improper or unconstitutional for that 
state judge to wield the collateral bar rule to prevent the defendant contemnor
from arguing against the injunction in contempt? 
Scholars’ answers vary. Professor Hunter wrote that the collateral bar
rule strengthens an injunction.577 Blasi opposes injunctions in both collateral 
bar rule and non-collateral bar rule jurisdictions.578 He argues that an injunction 
571. Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 2 n.4 (Tex. 1993); People v. Gonzalez, 910 P.2d 
1366, 1375 (Cal. 1996); In re Berry, 436 P.2d 273, 281 (Cal. 1968). 
572.  Tucci, 859 S.W.2d at 1 n.4. 
573. Berry, 436 P.2d at 281; see also Gonzalez, 910 P.2d at 1375. 
574. See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 353 (Cal. 2007) (Baxter,
J., concurring). 
575. Id. The dissenting opinion in Balboa maintained that Justice Baxter asked too 
much of defendant. Id. at 361 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion 
in Tory v. Cochran also relies on California’s rejection of the collateral bar rule.  544 U.S.
734, 739–40 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
576. See Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 98 (Tex. 2014) (“We think it is no answer 
that a person must request the trial court’s permission to speak truthfully in order to avoid 
being held in contempt.”); see also Balboa Island Vill. Inn, 156 P.3d at 353 (Baxter, J.,
concurring). 
577. See Hunter, supra note 156, at 286–87. 
578. See Blasi, supra note 61, at 92–93. 
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or contempt court should retain the presumption against prior restraints.579 
Jeffries, who does not oppose injunctions forbidding defamation, wrote 
that a state can have the collateral bar rule and grant an injunction that is 
not a banned prior restraint if the defendant can take or could have achieved 
prompt review.580 Mayton favors the collateral bar rule for breach of a litigated 
injunction but not for an injunction after “summary and incomplete”
process.581 Redish also agrees, if the defendant has had a full and fair hearing, 
the judge may apply the collateral bar rule in contempt.582  Wells can take 
the collateral bar rule or leave it; it is not clear to her that the collateral bar 
rule causes an injunction to deter more than a criminal statute.583 
Barnett wrote that a court should not apply the collateral bar rule to
criminal contempt for violation of an injunction against expression.584  He
maintained that allowing adjudication of constitutionality in contempt 
protects expression better.585 In my view, Barnett’s view is the better argument. 
The states without the collateral bar rule are wiser. A state that adheres to
the collateral bar rule should suspend it if a defendant is charged with criminal 
contempt for an alleged violation of an anti-defamation injunction.586 Where
the defendant’s expression is at issue, re-litigating the injunction’s correctness
and the truth of the defendant’s charged violation in criminal contempt is not 
too great a price for constitutional, legal, and factual accuracy. 
This Article has compared an injunction to a damages judgment, asked 
whether the remedies differ enough to mean that a court should favor damages 
over an injunction, and argued that the differences do not always warrant
different treatment. It has taken the reader through the injunction process,
examined whether the judge might grant an injunction to a successful defamation 
plaintiff, and concluded that an injunction might be propitious. We are
ready to analyze the leading prior restraint scholarship. 
VII. SCHOLARS’ ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRIOR RESTRAINTS
In dealing with important scholars’ formidable arguments for the prior
restraint doctrine, this Article continues to inquire whether disfavoring an
579. See id.
580. See Jeffries, supra note 162, 433. 
581. Mayton, supra note 278, at 278 n.204. 
582. See Redish, supra note 159, at 96–97, 96 n.155. 
583. See Wells, supra note 141, at 62–64, 62 n.305.  Volokh also seems to take an 
intermediate position on the collateral bar rule.  See Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript 
at 25, 34). 
584. See Barnett, supra note 160, at 556–58. 
585. See id.
586. See EMERSON, supra note 156, at 505–06; Redish, supra note 159, at 96–99, 96 
n.155. 
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injunction against the defendant’s defamation makes sense from a legal
and policy standpoint.
Blasi’s Article celebrating Near’s golden anniversary asked whether to 
regard an injunction as a repressive technique to regulate speech that is similar 
enough to executive licensing to be treated the same way.587 Blasi concluded 
that an injunction resembles executive licensing in unsatisfactory ways 
because both adjudicate abstractly in advance and contain an internal dynamic 
contrary to our premises about limited government.588 
Emerson had expressed his “rational basis for the [prior restraint]
concept”: 
A system of prior restraint is in many ways more inhibiting than a system of 
subsequent punishment: It is likely to bring under government scrutiny a far 
wider range of expression; it shuts off communication before it takes place;
suppression by a stroke of the pen is more likely to be applied than suppression 
through a criminal process; the procedures do not require attention to the safeguards 
of the criminal process; the system allows less opportunity for public appraisal and
criticism; the dynamics of the system drive toward excesses, as the history of all
censorship shows. . . . [A] system of prior restraint presents inherent dangers that
make it highly disfavored as a form of regulation.589 
Blasi’s and Emerson’s reasons for the prior restraint doctrine, Redish
wrote, were based on fallacies, speculation, unfounded factual assumptions, 
and confusion of substance and procedure.590 Their reasons “are irrelevant to
[F]irst [A]mendment concerns, are equally true of subsequent punishment 
schemes, or are exclusively applicable to administrative rather than judicial
restraints.”591 Jeffries, who took Redish’s analysis another step, argued that 
the prior restraint doctrine has lost its analytical force and should be retired.592 
To some extent, Blasi’s and Emerson’s critiques present a different frame 
of reference than this Article.  Emerson more than Blasi emphasized alternatives 
that this Article sets aside, executive licensing and a criminal prosecution.593 
This Article assumes that executive licensing is obsolete for the internet 
expression it considers. Moreover, this Article maintains that a criminal
587. Blasi, supra note 61, at 14. 
588. See id. at 24, 93.
589. EMERSON, supra note 156, at 506. 
590. Redish, supra note 159, at 73. 
591. Id. at 59. 
592. Jeffries, supra note 162, at 434. Volokh writes that a specific injunction, granted 
after adequate adversary procedure, is not a prior restraint. Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript 
at 16–17). 
593. See EMERSON, supra note 156, at 163. 
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prosecution also seems unlikely for internet defamation.  Emerson compared 
executive licensing as a prior restraint to a criminal prosecution; he included 
an injunction almost as an incidental form of prior restraint.594  Similarly
in their paired con and pro articles, Mayton and Hunter compare executive 
licensing with a criminal prosecution.595 
Blasi’s “excessive use” and Emerson’s “overuse” or wider-range arguments
in reality compare executive licensing, the prior restraint, with a criminal
prosecution, the subsequent punishment.596 Under executive licensing, 
censorship will be more routine than a criminal prosecution: “[T]he censor’s 
business is to censor.”597 In addition to being superannuated in the internet 
world that this Article examines, executive censorship is unrelated to
an injunction, a judicial remedy. Routine administrative censorship of the 
internet posting activity that this Article examines is not happening now 
and will not happen in the future in the United States.598 
Both Blasi and Emerson de-emphasized alternatives that this Article
considers and compares: an injunction and a damages judgment. An 
injunction is this Article’s prior restraint. A judgment for money damages, 
punitive damages more certainly than compensatory damages, fills its bill 
as subsequent, as it were, punishment. Emerson disapproved executive 
licensing and an injunction as prior restraints; he preferred a criminal sanction
as a subsequent punishment and a superior alternative to a prior restraint.599 
He did not focus on the damages judgment as a subsequent-punishment
alternative to a prior restraint in the form of an injunction.600 
This Article, on the other hand, does not compare executive licensing 
and an injunction, prior restraints, to a criminal prosecution, subsequent
punishment. It examines the libel tort leading to a civil remedy, an injunction
or a judgment for money damages, sometimes both. It compares the two 
civil remedies for libel, an injunction and money damages. 
594. Id.
595. See generally Hunter, supra note 156; Mayton, supra note 61. 
596. See generally EMERSON, supra note 156; Blasi, supra note 61. 
597. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965). 
598. China, among other nations, censors the internet. See Craig Timberg & Jla 
Lynn Yang, Google Is Encrypting Search Globally. That’s Bad for the NSA and China’s Censors., 
WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/
03/12/google-is-encrypting-search-worldwide-thats-bad-for-the-nsa-and-china/?utm_term=.
f85612b2b3fc [https://perma.cc/J8LJ-FGBP]. China erected its Great Firewall for internet
censorship.  Id.  Google in turn challenges the censorship by encrypting internet searches 
from China. Id. Other nations that censor the internet are Vietnam and Saudi Arabia.  Id. 
599. See EMERSON, supra note 156, at 504 (“Even if the communication is subject to 
later punishment or can otherwise be restricted, it cannot be proscribed in advance through 
a system of prior restraint.”). 
600. Id.
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The best way to understand the difference between an injunction and a 
civil money judgment, or the less likely criminal prosecution, is chronological.
If someone’s misconduct is imminent but has not occurred or, if ongoing,
is likely to continue or to be repeated, then a plaintiff may sue that person 
for an injunction as a preventive remedy.  The private plaintiff or, less likely, 
the government authorities may sue a defendant for an injunction to forbid
that defendant’s future misconduct.
After the defendant’s defamation, the civil plaintiff may sue the defendant
seeking a money judgment. The authorities would also maintain the less-
likely criminal prosecution after the defendant’s misconduct. 
A civil plaintiff or a prosecutor does not choose initially between either
an injunction, an action for money damages, or a criminal prosecution.  
The remedies are sequential: the injunction comes before the defendant’s 
misconduct, the damages action or the criminal prosecution after it. 
Arguments that are valid against executive licensing do not apply to an
injunction. These include Blasi’s and Emerson’s “more,” “wider,” and “stroke 
of a pen,” points as well as their arguments based on “audience reception,”
“limited government,” and the inevitability of “excesses.”601 
In addition, two of Blasi’s points, the lack of public appraisal and the
momentum to excess, are well grounded in relation to executive censorship, 
but not an injunction. Blasi’s argument that a prior restraint improperly
allocates authority between the state and the individual also appears to object 
more to executive licensing than to a private plaintiff’s injunction.602 It makes
a point about the size of the First Amendment, not the remedy.  His arguments
that an injunction, like executive licensing, “adversely affects” the way the 
public receives the defendant’s messages, and that both are at odds with
our premises about limited government, also only restate his earlier points 
about executive licensing and express his conclusion.603 
Blasi argued that an injunction resembles executive licensing because it 
contains an “internal dynamic” that leads to its “excessive” use.604  This
seems to equate a judge with a professional censor and to maintain that a
judge considering a plaintiff’s motion for an injunction will be as insensitive 
to free speech values as a bureaucratic censor. 
601. EMERSON, supra note 156, at 504, 506; Blasi, supra note 61, at 43, 58, 63, 70.
602. See Redish, supra note 159, at 72–73. 
603. Blasi, supra note 61, at 64. 
604. Id. at 52–54. 
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A little professional pride may be appropriate in response. A trial
judge’s education and earlier experience should militate against, perhaps 
obviate, insensitivity to First Amendment principles. The judicial process
emphasizes adversary presentation and arguments, decisions constrained
by constitutions, statutes or precedents, and written opinions with reasons.  
“The institution of the judiciary,” Jeffries wrote, “is peculiarly well suited— 
in personnel, training, ideology, and institutional structure—to implement 
the ideals of the First Amendment.”605 Moreover, an insensitive Equity judge 
would be equally insensitive presiding over a defendant’s tort or criminal 
prosecution. Finally, as discussed above, civil procedure leading to an 
injunction should be more professional and careful than executive licensing 
and censorship, even that disciplined by Freedman v. Maryland’s procedure.606 
The speculative argument that an injunction is easier to obtain than a criminal
prosecution fails for want of proof.
Blasi argued against prior restraints because adjudication is “abstract.”607 
That adjudication leading to an injunction will be abstract is questionable.  
In federal court, a plaintiff seeking an injunction must have “standing,” a 
test designed to prevent an abstract dispute from reaching judgment.608 
Before a United States court may grant an injunction, a plaintiff with standing 
must take the initiative and show the judge that an injunction is appropriate.609 
Moreover, special maturity rules for an injunction should ensure an “imminent,”
concrete, and non-abstract dispute.610 
To be preventive, an injunction has to be predictive.611 In our hypothetical,
to convince the judge to grant a motion for an injunction, Baldder must 
show that Lokki has called him a thief, and he must convince the judge that,
unless the judge orders her not to, Lokki is likely to continue or repeat the 
tort. When the judge enjoins the defendant from repeating a published 
statement that she has already found to be defamatory, abstractness does 
not seem to be a major risk. Finally, the factual issue in contempt, whether 
the contemnor violated the injunction, further reduces the abstract nature
of the dispute.
605. Jeffries, supra note 162, at 427; see Mayton, supra note 61, at 250–51; see also
Suzanna Sherry, Response, Liberty’s Safety Net: Comments on “Judicial Activism,” 16 
GREEN BAG 2D 467, 476 (2013) (“I believe that federal judges as a group are among the 
most ethical, professional, and disinterested decision makers we have.”). But see Hunter, 
supra note 156, at 292 (warning not to prefer judges over professional censors). 
606. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
607. Blasi, supra note 61, at 24. 
608. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–05 (1983) (distinguishing standing
for an injunction from standing for damages). 
609. See id. at 105. 
610. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 528 (8th Cir. 1975). 
611. See Blasi, supra note 61, at 11. 
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Blasi maintained that an injunction operates “in advance” to prevent
speech.612 The injunction, Emerson argued, “shuts off communication before 
it takes place.”613 Similarly, Professor Kalven wrote that the prior-restraint 
doctrine protects a person’s opportunity for “civil disobedience.”614 
“[E]verything,” he wrote, “or virtually everything, is entitled to be published
at least once.”615 Professor Bickel’s metaphor to express this argument was
that “[a] criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes.”616 The United States 
Supreme Court and the Texas Supreme Court repeated that metaphor stating 
that, “[a] threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication ‘chills’ speech,
prior restraint ‘freezes’ it at least for a time.”617 
In contrast, it is argued that a criminal statute or prosecution allows 
speech.618 This assures that everything will be heard. Thus, the argument
proceeds, a court should disfavor an injunction and favor a criminal prosecution.
The defendant’s criminal prosecution occurs after her expression is 
disseminated while an injunction will have prevented that dissemination.
Take prior restraints out of the refrigerator to inquire whether the chill-
freeze metaphor and its variations are accurate. The chill side of the metaphor 
is not always a low temperature. If a criminal statute carries a draconian 
sanction for conviction, say forty years for littering, and if the person is 
certain that the government will prosecute her, then the subsequent punishment 
in the form of a criminal statute may freeze a potential violator’s ardor.619 
612. Id.
613. EMERSON, supra note 156, at 506. 
614. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Supreme Court 1970 Term–Foreword: Even When a Nation 
Is at War, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 34 (1971). 
615. Id. 
616. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
617. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); see Kinney v. Barnes, 
443 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tex. 2014) (quoting BICKEL, supra note 616, at 61). 
618. Neb. Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. at 596 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374
(1947)).
619. See KAUPER, supra note 45, at 61 (heavy subsequent sanctions operate the same 
way as a prior restraint); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 29.3, 964
(9th ed. 2014) (stating that a potential defendant may prefer to learn in advance instead of 
risking punishment because a severe criminal sanction deters as much as an injunction); 
SCHAUER, supra note 189, § 12.1, at 228–29 (arguing for a preference for civil adjudication
because heavy fines or prison terms chill a potential defendant’s expression, lead to self-
censorship, more than an injunction); Mayton, supra note 61, at 253, 265, 275–76; Schauer,
supra note 523, at 728; Scordato, supra note 158, at 8–9. 
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A tort defendant concerned about the prospect of being potentially 
mulcted with certain litigation expenses and possible titanic compensatory
damages for the plaintiff’s lost reputation and emotional distress may also 
experience some goose bumps.620  A potential tort defendant’s fear of being
required to defend and pay damages may lead to self-censorship.621 
Compensatory damages compensate; they do not punish. So a potential
money judgment for compensatory damages draws the punishment side 
of subsequent punishment into doubt.622 However, the judge may have 
instructed the jury to consider punishment and deterrence in deciding whether 
to award and how to measure punitive damages, which can be considered
to be the prior restraint doctrine’s subsequent punishment. 
The freeze side of the metaphor assumes that an injunction will be
effective because the defendant will comply with it. This overstates the
effect of an injunction because it assumes that an injunction is an absolute
bar that halts speech.  Many defendants do obey.623 If all defendants obeyed 
their injunctions, however, we would live in a better world. An injunction 
will not prevent all defendants’ disobedience. The dolorous reality is that 
some defendants disobey injunctions and that plaintiffs and courts must 
respond with contempt.624 
To say that an injunction shuts off communication assumes an injunction 
is like a stone wall that halts the defendant’s progress or speech.  A better 
metaphor is that an injunction resembles a stop sign. The driver or the
defendant must put on the brakes, stop, or obey.625 The driver should stop.
The defendant should obey. 
An effective legal rule identifies and defines potential miscreants’ 
misconduct without over- or under-deterring them. The rule should deter 
people from harmful activity without discouraging their wholesome activity. 
620. See Harvard Law Review Ass’n, supra note 495, at 1009. 
621. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339, 350 (1974); Tarkington, supra
note 455, at 1582. 
622. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 385 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Patterson v. Colorado ex 
rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)).
623. See, e.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 336 (1967) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) (citing Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1992)). 
624. Walker, 388 U.S. at 307. Similarly, if a criminal statute led to universal obedience,
we would live in a more predictable, orderly, and peaceful world without criminal violations
and prosecutions. 
625. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 127. The original injunction metaphor was 
Professor Charles Wright’s: “The injunction is not a set of handcuffs. In itself it cannot 
prevent the defendant from doing the criminal act.” Charles Alan Wright, The Law of 
Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DET. L.J. 376, 390 n.65 (1955); see also John M.
Golden, Injunctions as More (Or Less) than “Off Switches”: Patent-Infringement Injunctions’
Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1410–13, 1410 n.43, 1413 n.60 (2012). 
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The legal system can express disapprobation and warn of consequences 
with a criminal statute, a civil damages rule, or an injunction. 
The chilling effect argument against an injunction to forbid a defendant’s
defamation is that an injunction against one defendant’s proved defamatory 
“speech may impermissibly chill [the defendant’s or third persons’] otherwise 
lawful speech, to the detriment of First Amendment values.”626 In short,
an injunction against one defendant’s unprotected defamation will over-
deter others in the future by encouraging risk-aversive potential defendants to
steer clear of potential trouble by eschewing protected expression.  A specific
no-injunction rule for defamation eliminates the possibility of discouraging 
the risk-aversive. 
Scholars have criticized the chilling-effect doctrine beginning in 1978
with Schauer’s examination of its loose, metaphorical assumptions.627 
More recently, Professor Kinsley argued for it to be replaced with more 
detailed and functional analysis.628 
The argument, or the fear, that an acceptable first decision may lead to 
an unacceptable second decision is called a slippery slope argument.629  In
brief, the chilling effect metaphor is a slippery slope argument that the first
decision will over deter. A no-injunction rule in defamation forces the judge 
to dispense with an injunction for a successful and meritorious defamation 
plaintiff because the judge must be concerned about a hypothetical future 
risk-aversive defamation defendant who, if sued, could prevail on the 
substantive issue of defamation. 
“The Principle of the Dangerous Precedent,” Cornford wrote from the 
decision maker’s perspective, “is that you should not now do an admittedly 
right action for fear you, or your equally timid successors, should not have 
the courage to do right in some future case, which, ex hypothesi, is essentially 
different, but superficially resembles the present one.”630 
The discussion of the chilling effect slippery slope argument started with
the first decision maker’s concern about a second decision maker.  It moves
to hypothetical future expression, the relation between the first decision
626. FISCHER, supra note 315, § 28.0, at 227 (stating, but not endorsing, the argument).
627. See Schauer, supra note 523, at 693. 
628. See generally Jennifer  M. Kinsley,  Chill, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 253–54
(2016) (advocating for replacement of chilling effect doctrine). 
629. See generally WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING
ABOUT THE LAW 172–81 (2007) (discussing the consequences of one decision on another). 
630. F.M. CORNFORD, MICROCOSMOGRAPHIA ACADEMICA BEING A GUIDE FOR THE
YOUNG ACADEMIC POLITIAN 31–32 (1923). 
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maker and the risk-averse potential speaker who is concerned about what 
the second decision maker might do with or to him.631 
Kinsley argues that the chilling-effect doctrine, based on unsupportable 
conjecture is unjustified in law.632  The judge’s conjectures about the proposed 
injunction, phrased in terms of this Article, are: First, that the unknown
second person would be aware of the first prohibition, the proposed injunction, 
if granted.633 Second, the person would understand how the proposed injunction 
would apply to second person’s desired speech.634 Third, the second person
would “conform” to the proposed injunction instead of risking similar 
treatment.635 
The first judge may have reason to worry about the second person. The 
Alabama jury’s large verdict in Sullivan threatened press reports of the
Civil Rights movement.636 Defamation is factually contextual, and it has
fuzzy substantive edges. Court decisions cannot be predicted with complete 
accuracy. “Even as society has internalized the values of free speech in
abstract form, the particular applications of the principle of free speech 
remain counterintuitive to most people.”637 This may lead a decision maker
to err on the side of suppression. If a precise definition “requires for its 
application the understanding and internalizing of a corpus of principles 
beyond the comprehensive capacities of [risk-aversive lay potential speakers,]
the interpreters, enforcers, and administrators, then each instance of lack
of understanding increases the slippery slope risk.”638 
However, a line exists between unprotected and protected expression.
Calling a home repair contractor a thief is palpably on the unprotected
defamatory side of that line. In the first decision, the judge ought to emphasize 
whether the libel-victim plaintiff is entitled to an effective remedy. The 
judge should regard with cynical incertitude the present tortfeasor’s crocodile 
tears of concern that an injunction against this defendant will discourage 
or deter a hypothetical risk-aversive potential speaker. As Schauer wrote, 
“slippery slope claims deserve to be viewed skeptically, and the proponent 
of such a claim must be expected to provide the necessary empirical
support.”639 
The chilling-effect argument posits the sequence that a decision against 
one speaker’s unprotected expression will deter another later speaker’s
631. See Kinsley, supra note 628, at 272–73. 
632.  Id. at 274. 
633. Id.
634. Id.
635. Id. at 273–74. 
636. GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 141 (5th ed.) (2016). 
637.  Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 377 (1985). 
638.  Id. at 375. 
639. Id. at 382. 
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protected speech. Although this deterrence has not been demonstrated by 
social science, scholars maintain that there is something to it.640 However, 
others’ future conduct that is deterred does not occur; measuring deterrence 
is difficult because it purports to measure conduct that will not happen.641 
Deterrence of a potential future speaker is complex and a subject of 
speculation.642 What deterrence effect has a criminal statute, a threat to 
prosecute someone for a potential crime?  What about an actual criminal
prosecution or a criminal conviction? Does a civil damages tort rule, a 
threat to sue someone for civil tort damages, or a civil tort damages money
judgment differ? Would a threat to sue someone for an injunction or a
lawsuit seeking an injunction, followed by an actual injunction deter?643 
Will a judge’s injunction freeze a person’s speech more than a prosecutor’s
chilling threat to charge or indict someone for a crime?
Moreover, some threats will be hollow bluffs or unwarranted; some 
lawsuits, both criminal and civil, will fail. Finally, perhaps a court will hold
that the criminal statute, the civil damages rule, or the injunction violates 
the First Amendment’s free speech principles. 
Human nature, events, the law, and the litigation process are too varied, 
complex, and volatile to be explained by a binary chill/freeze metaphor
about an unknown future speaker’s unknown expression. If a metaphor is 
needed, the more accurate one is the stop sign metaphor above. 
An injunction, the tort law of defamation, and a criminal statute articulate 
the governing law and warn a potential speaker or injunction defendant 
what conduct or activity to avoid. The more functional approach is to compare 
an injunction to a tort standard or to a criminal statute not to a damages
judgment or a criminal prosecution.644 
A preventive or do not injunction will be less costly to the defendant
than either a criminal conviction or a tort damages judgment. A potential 
libel defendant may even favor pre-publication adjudication because one 
may prefer to learn in advance before acting instead of speaking out and 
risking punishment.645 A declaratory judgment, as well as an injunction, 
640. Anderson, Reforming, supra note 81, at 532–33. 
641. LAWERENCE FREEDMAN, STRATEGY: A HISTORY 159 (2013).
642. In their paired con and pro articles, Mayton and Hunter spar and speculate about 
expense and deterrence between a criminal statute and an injunction. Compare Mayton, 
supra note 61, at 245, with Hunter, supra note 156, at 283. 
643. See Kinsley, supra note 628, at 274–75. Volokh is skeptical about claims of
deterrence.  See Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 25, 34, 63).
644. OWEN M. FISS, INJUNCTIONS 51 (1972). 
645. See POSNER, supra note 619, § 3.9, at 70. 
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is a pre-publication adjudication.646 The declaratory judgment will not
frequently arise in our subject, internet defamation, where the publication 
has already occurred. Perhaps, Jeffries observed, if we assume, as we
should, that the judge’s decision to grant or deny a plaintiff an injunction 
is presumptively correct, then an injunction that adjudicates in advance 
whether someone’s proposed expression will be defamatory may be a
propitious idea.647 If a person must be a defendant, then one may prefer
being an injunction defendant as a lesser threat than any of the other 
possibilities. If a judge decides that a potential defamation defendant’s 
proposed publication is improper, then the potential defendant can withhold
remarks, obey the injunction, and avoid the risk. Viewing the dispute from 
the defendants’ side, after the judge grants the plaintiff a declaratory 
judgment or an injunction, the defendant goes home. But after the judge 
enjoins defendants and convicts them of criminal contempt, they may not. 
When factual, legal, or contextual fuzziness emerges, the judge probably 
has remedial equitable discretion to delay a plaintiff’s request for an 
interlocutory injunction until a fuller presentation and even to decline to 
grant a plaintiff a permanent injunction in favor of awarding him damages.648 
A litigated, personalized, and targeted injunction based on specific facts 
articulates the law and applies it to the situation in context. An injunction 
“is the product of a concrete judicial proceeding prompted by particular 
events.”649 It singles out the defendant as a party. It adjudicates by finding
facts. An injunction forbids the defendant’s misconduct by defining the
proscribed speech or activity. It is drafted to fit the situation.650 It “does not
embody the broad and abstract commands of a statute,” or, for that matter,
a tort standard.651 
The prior restraint doctrine may discourage litigants from seeking 
injunctions that would accurately distinguish improper expression from 
legitimate expression. An injunction is analogous to a personal substantive 
tort standard or to a personal criminal statute. The defendant may heed the
warning. Defendant’s misconduct may never occur, or it may not be repeated.
A correct injunction may end or prevent the defendant’s unprotected defamatory
expression. The injunction’s advice may also facilitate the defendant’s 
reconsideration, mid-course correction, and dissemination of protected 
646. See Bray, supra note 382, at 1095. 
647. See Jeffries, supra note 162, at 412 n.14. 
648. See generally Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages 
of Equitable Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J. 1397, 1404 (2015).
649. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 610 (Cal. 1997). 
650. See Bray, supra note 382, at 1095. 
651.  Gallo, 929 P.2d at 610. 
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expression better and more accurately than a generally phrased tort standard
or criminal statute. 
After the judge grants the plaintiff an injunction, the injunction is the 
equivalent of a personal criminal statute because the defendants’ violation 
may subject them to contempt, perhaps criminal contempt.652 The point
was made above that an injunction defendant’s criminal contempt prosecution 
for a tort is not the most likely response. An injunction defendant may
violate the injunction and defend against contempt, just as someone may
violate a criminal statute and defend against prosecution. If the defendant 
breaches an injunction, the defendant’s prosecution for, and perhaps 
conviction of, criminal contempt and punishment is parallel to the criminal 
prosecution that leads to the criminal sentence that is also punishment. 
Like a defendant’s criminal contempt, a defendant’s criminal prosecution 
is retrospective; it looks to the past and follows the alleged misconduct.653 
Injunction defendants are punished only if they are convicted of violation 
of the injunction and the judge imposes a criminal contempt sanction.654 
The likelihood of an injunction defendant being charged with contempt 
and the type of contempt that will be charged are subject to speculation.  
Bickel wrote that a defendant who breaches an injunction “may be assured
of being held in contempt.”655 Mayton agreed that contempt is “swift and
certain.”656 A constitutional law treatise speculated that courts may tend 
to punish prior restraint violations more harshly because “[c]ourts are more
adamant in punishing contempt of their orders than . . . criminal statutes,” 
in which they have no “personal stake.”657  In short, however, we lack proof,
even evidence, whether a criminal prosecution is more likely than a charge
of contempt. 
652. See Michael C. Macchiarola, “Hallowed By History, But Not By Reason”: Judge 
Rakoff’s Critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Consent Judgment Practice, 16 
CUNY L. REV. 51, 75 (2012) (citing David M. Weiss, Reexamining the SEC’s Use of 
Obey-the-Law Injunctions, 7 BUS. L.J. 6 (2006)). 
653. See Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 174 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957)), aff’d, 445 U.S. 308 (1980). 
654. See, e.g., Vance, 445 U.S. at 322–23 (White, J., dissenting); FISS, supra note 644, at
725–26; see also Mayton, supra note 61, at 277 (discussing that punishment for violating
an injunction follows a criminal contempt proceeding). 
655. BICKEL, supra note 616, at 61. 
656. Mayton, supra note 61, at 275. 
657. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.16(e), at 
1305–06 (8th ed. 2010). 
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How severe will contempt be if an injunction defendant is charged with 
contempt? If violations of intellectual-property injunctions are any indication, 
civil compensatory contempt seems more likely than criminal contempt.658 
Compensatory contempt confesses that the injunction failed to secure the 
defendant’s conduct, and it substitutes the inadequate remedy of 
compensation.659 
The federal model requires the public authorities provide notice to
prosecute criminal contempt.660  If a state follows that approach, a charge
of criminal contempt for calling a home repair contractor a thief a second
time seems to me to be less than certain. Contempt may be limited and
light, Blasi wrote, without specifying the branch of contempt.661 
Emerson compared censorship through the prior restraint of executive 
licensing with a criminal prosecution, not with an injunction.662  “[T]he
procedures do not require attention to the safeguards of the criminal process,” 
he wrote.663 Redish’s arguments against prior restraint favor the procedural 
protections in a criminal prosecution.664 We will consider in particular the
protections of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and access to a jury. 
A defamation defendant’s criminal prosecution for libel is, as observed
above, less likely than compensatory contempt.665  The defamation litigation
this article examines is civil, in tort, for an injunction or money damages.  
The plaintiff’s usual civil burden of proof is by a preponderance of the
evidence.  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt will not be required in the
plaintiff’s underlying suit for an injunction.
The defendant who allegedly violates an injunction may be charged with
civil contempt or, less likely, with criminal contempt. The plaintiff may
charge the defendant with civil contempt, compensatory contempt or 
coercive contempt, neither of which requires criminal procedural protections
like proof beyond a reasonable doubt.666 The burden of proof in civil contempt
is usually clear and convincing.667 
658. See Golden, supra note 625, at 1410–13, 1410 n.43, 1413 n.60.  Volokh’s emphasizes 
criminal contempt.  Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 63).
659. See Rendleman, supra note 541, at 971. Volokh’s Article mentions compensatory 
contempt which it calls a “financial sanction” and a “fine.” Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript 
at 14 n.48, 35–36). 
660. Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 794–95 (1987); RENDLEMAN,
supra note 146, at 872–73. 
661. See Blasi, supra note 61, at 27. 
662. See EMERSON, supra note 156, at 506. 
663. Id. 
664. See Redish, supra note 159, at 63–66, 99–100. 
665. Golden, supra note 625, at 1410–13, 1410 n.43, 1413 n.60. 
666. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 629, 659. 
667.  Id. at 726–27, 798–99, 860–61, 867. 
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If it happens, an injunction defendant’s trial and punishment for criminal
contempt will not be summary. The procedural protections for a contemnor 
charged with criminal contempt will not differ much from the statutory
crime defendant’s because the criminal-contempt process will follow 
almost all of the procedural protections for a statutory criminal conviction, 
including an appointed lawyer for an indigent defendant.668 Proof beyond
a reasonable doubt will be necessary to convict the defendant of criminal 
contempt.669 The criminal contempt contemnors will be entitled to a jury 
trial if they will be eligible for a sentence that exceeds six months’ 
confinement.670 
The government should not punish a defendant until after a judicial
decision that the defendant’s conduct was not protected by the First Amendment.
That decision will occur after a trial for either criminal contempt, which 
seems unlikely, or, even less likely, for a statutory crime.  In criminal 
contempt, the defendant’s alleged misconduct, breach of the injunction, 
will have occurred.671 
Arguments against an injunction as a prior restraint, even though later 
sanctions or damages are possible, turn out to be founded on an illusory
distinction.672 A charge of criminal contempt that follows an injunction and 
the defendant’s dissemination of expression is not “prior” at all because the
defendant’s punishment for criminal contempt will occur after the alleged 
breach.673 
The collateral bar rule, where applicable, may prevent criminal contempt
contemnors from arguing that their expression deserves First Amendment
protection. That is a major reason for a court to reject the collateral bar 
rule in criminal contempt for a defendant’s alleged breach of an injunction 
that forbids defamation.674 
668. See id. at 629; Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 30–31). 
669. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 659. 
670. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968).  If the contemnor’s misconduct would 
also be a statutory crime, the contemnor will be entitled to a jury in federal court, a situation not
anticipated here.  18 U.S.C. §§ 3691–92 (2012). 
671. RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at 629. Volokh emphasizes a jury and proof beyond
a reasonable doubt in criminal contempt. See Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 27–28,
35).
672. See Ardia, supra note 1, at 34–38. 
673. Id. at 36. Volokh makes the important point that criminal prosecutions and criminal 
contempt follow speech and are not prior. See Volokh, supra note 2 (manuscript at 16). 
674.  See id. at 36–37, 37 n.161. 
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Anyone who has read this far will not be surprised that, under limited 
circumstances, I favor an injunction to forbid a defendant’s proved 
defamation. 
At first blush, the reader may conclude that I am sailing my small craft
into a small craft warning. In 1962, Kauper wrote that, “[i]t is, nevertheless, 
true that the Court has repeatedly said that freedom from prior restraint is 
the most important feature of freedom of the press, and certainly history
supports this conclusion.”675 A little later Professor Magnetti reminded us
that: 
[G]iven the United States Supreme Court’s consistent zealous protection of first 
amendment rights in recent decisions, it is difficult to imagine that the prior 
restraint doctrine will give way to the availability of injunctive relief as a feasible
remedy to a plaintiff harmed by a continuous calculated campaign to destroy his 
reputation.676 
In 1994 in CBS, Inc. v. Davis, the Supreme Court wrote: “Subsequent 
civil or criminal proceedings, rather than prior restraints, ordinarily are the 
appropriate sanction for calculated defamation or other misdeeds in the
First Amendment context.”677 In 2012, rejecting one of this Article’s
featured decisions, Balboa, Judge Pregerson wrote that:
It, of course, is difficult to defend any absolute position, even this one that injunctions
never should be permitted in defamation cases.  But it seems less extreme if it is 
remembered that never in the 216 year history of the First Amendment has the 
Supreme Court found it necessary to uphold a prior restraint in a defamation case
or any other.678 
Finally, Judge Sack wrote that injunctions against speech and press are
“virtually extinct.”F 679 
Scholars in earlier generations, including iconic Roscoe Pound, have
expressed sentiments similar to mine that favor limited injunctions, in
675. KAUPER, supra note 45, at 85. 
676. Magnetti, supra note 405, at 332. 
677. CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994). 
678. Oakley, Inc. v. McWilliams, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
679. Sack, supra note 85, at 278. 
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different ways and using different vocabularies.680 Courts in other nations
grant injunctions against defendants’ defamation.681 
Although they are not congruent with every point I have made above, 
strong recent scholarship by Ardia, Volokh, and Dean Chemerinsky supports 
a limited defamation injunction.682 And the Kentucky court, while rejecting 
a preliminary injunction against defamatory speech, followed Balboa in
approving a tailored final injunction after a plenary decision.683 The Delaware 
Chancery court, citing state Supreme Courts, federal Courts of Appeals and 
lower courts, noted a trend: an injunction is possible against defamation found 
in an adversary hearing.684 
As Pomeroy wrote in 1887, “a remedy which prevents a threatened
wrong is, in its essential nature, better than a remedy which permits a wrong
to be done, and then attempts to pay for it.”685  A steady functional analysis
points toward a changing or changed frame of reference. To those sources, 
this article adds careful analysis of defamation damages and remedies,
injunctions, contempt, and equitable issues. 
An injunction has many advantages. It identifies and singles out the 
defendant and the misconduct. It follows adversary judicial procedure.  
Drafting a satisfactory injunction is daunting.  An injunction that is too narrow
may have limited effect. An injunction that is too broad may be too vague 
680. See, e.g., Bertelsman, supra note 157, at 337; Gold, supra note 300, at 259 &
n.129; Harvard Law Review Ass’n, supra note 495, at 1011–12; Harvard Law Review Ass’n, 
Developments in the Law—Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 944 & n.489 (1956);
Jeffries, supra note 162, at 409; Mayton, supra note 61, at 281; Roscoe Pound, Equitable 
Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 665 (1916); 
Robert Allen Sedler, Injunctive Relief and Personal Integrity, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 147, 150 
(1964). A “[s]pecial note on remedies for defamation other than damages” suggests that 
injunctive relief “might meet the need” of certain defamation cases after the court has “formally 
determined” defamation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, at xv, § 623 cmt. B(3) (AM.
LAW INST. 1976). After hesitation, I decided to cite my own Complex Litigation casebook 
and its prior editions. See generally FISS, supra note 644, at 127–55; OWEN M. FISS &
DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS ch. 4 (2nd ed. 1984); RENDLEMAN, supra note 146, at ch. 
13. 
681. See JEFFREY BERRYMAN, THE LAW OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES 83 (2d ed. 2013). See 
generally Hilary Young, The Scope of Canadian Defamation Injunctions (2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
682. Ardia, supra note 1, at 83–84; Chemerinsky, supra note 497, at 1460–61; Volokh,
supra note 2.
683. See Hill v. Petrotech Res., Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 313 (Ky. 2010). 
684. Organovo Holdings, Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 102, 123–24 (Del. Ch. 2017). 
685. 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, POMEROY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AND EQUITABLE
REMEDIES: A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1357 (1887). 
703
POST RENDLEMAN PAGES2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/11/2019 2:10 PM       
 
 
   
       
     





      
 
   
         
    
 
 
   
 
 
     
 
     
   
 
 
      
 
    
    
 
   
    
 
     
         
 
    
              
  
   
  
or forbid protected activity. An injunction should be drafted to fit the 
situation.  It is preventive, not retrospective.  It says “go, and sin no more.”686 
It is neither damages nor punishment. A potential speaker may prefer
adjudication in advance. 
In short, if my proposals are adopted, the judge may augment usual civil 
injunction procedure before granting a plaintiff an anti-defamation injunction. 
An anti-defamation injunction will be preceded by notice to the defendant 
and an opportunity for the defendant to be heard in defense. An interlocutory 
injunction should follow an adversary hearing before the judge, and cross-
examination is preferred. A careful judge will consider nuance and context,
exercise equitable discretion, and, with the defendant’s participation, draft
a personalized specific injunction that fits the law to the events, the discrete 
defamation. Neither proof beyond a reasonable doubt nor a jury trial should
be required before the judge enjoins the defendant’s specific defamation. 
This Article favors an injunction drafted to forbid the defendant’s
speech that the judge has adjudicated to be defamation. The process and 
the personally addressed injunction will bring the potential consequences 
of violation home to the defendant. The dispute will be resolved in court
rather than in the blogosphere.  A defendant charged with criminal contempt 
will be entitled to criminal procedural protections before being convicted.
Courts ought to repeal the Maxim that Equity will not enjoin defamation.687 
In a public-figure’s damages lawsuit, defamation is speech that is entitled 
to the deference of the Sullivan privileges.688 A defendant’s proved defamation
tort is not entitled to First Amendment protection that extends to prevent
the judge from granting the plaintiff an injunction that forbids that defamation. 
The prior restraint doctrine tells a court to prefer retrospective civil tort
damages to a preventive injunction. A judge should compare forbidding
the defendant’s tort in advance with awarding the plaintiff damages after 
the tort. The judge should be wary of standing aside while the defendant’s 
defamation tort occurs, only to substitute money later for the plaintiff’s
business losses, impaired reputation, and emotional distress. 
The Supreme Court in Near added an injunction to executive licensing 
as a prior restraint and a disfavored remedy for a defendant’s expression.689 
The Court treated an injunction as even more disfavored than a criminal
prosecution or a civil damages action.690 Times have changed. An injunction
that stems from ex parte or inadequate procedure is an improper procedural 
686. John 8:11 (King James).
687. Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 95 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Kramer v. Thompson,
947 F.2d 666, 677 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
688. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). 
689. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 721 (1931). 
690. Id. at 711. 
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prior restraint. Opinions are not defamatory. An injunction against 
a defendant’s professional opinion would be an improper prior restraint.691 
An injunction that forbids non-defamatory expression is improper because
it is too broad. The judge has equitable discretion in deciding between
damages and an injunction and, additionally, in drafting the injunction. An 
injunction can be an improper prior restraint if it stemmed from inadequate 
procedure or if it is badly drafted, too broad or too vague. The law of 
injunctions and the law of defamation have matured and developed enough
that courts should liberate an adjudicated injunction that forbids defendant’s 
specific defamation from the anomaly of being treated as a prior restraint 
like executive censorship.
Granting, drafting, and administering an injunction that forbids the defendant
from repeating specific defamation or that requires the defendant to remove 
identified defamation does not present insurmountable First Amendment 
problems. Under the circumstances examined and explained above, a judge
should consider that an injunction is not a prior restraint but an appropriate 
remedy for a defendant’s proved defamation. Sometimes the answer is
not more speech. 
Baldder v. Lokki involves intentional, perhaps malicious, libel.  If plaintiff 
proves defendant’s intentional, malicious libel in an evidentiary hearing, 
the judge should grant an injunction that requires the defendant to remove 
the defamation and to not repeat it. One possible impediment stems from 
Baldder’s risk that Lokki’s private incorrect libel could be re-characterized as
Baldder’s limited public-figure plaintiff’s claim under the heading of the 
public issue of consumer protection to qualify the defendant for Sullivan
privileges; Lokki’s intentional misstatement, may, however, surmount the
Sullivan Court’s “actual malice” test.692 
691. See Saad v. Am. Diabetes Ass’n, No. 15-10267-TSH, 2015 WL 751295, at *1–2 
(D. Mass 2015 Feb. 23, 2015). 
692. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280. 
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